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ABSTRACT
After many years of failure to control the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, numerous agreements 
have been concluded to inhibit their manufacture, 
transfer and combat use. The agreements are effective to 
the extent that they exercise a substantial influence on 
international conduct in this field. However, they are 
ineffective in the sense that there is an increasing 
discrepancy between the vertical and horizontal 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the restraint 
imposed by the agreements. Thus, with the continuation 
of present trends, the quantitative and qualitative 
growth of nuclear weapons and weapons systems is likely 
to become unmanageable, probably leading to world nuclear 
war .
Nuclear weapons have many novel attributes that put 
unprecendented strains on the international legal system 
with respect to the negotiation, verification, 
adjudication and enforcement of agreements to control 
them. Neither the theoretical basis of international law 
nor its application are appropriate for contemporary 
requirements. The international legal system is 
similarly deficient in facilitating the resolution of 
underlying conflicts that threaten international peace 
and security, which are the raison d'etre of the nuclear 
arms race.
Regarding the prevention of horizontal 
proliferation, the major legal impediment is the result
2of failure to distinguish clearly between explicit and 
implicit undertakings by States, and reluctance to make 
sufficient use of United Nations machinery for the 
formulation and application of unambiguous legal 
norms. Bilateral efforts by the Superpowers to 
utilise quasi-legal methods for halting vertical 
proliferation are chiefly hampered by an unwillingness 
to isolate subjects relating to the strategic balance 
from other contentious issues.
The modalities of agreement are not primarily 
responsible for the continuing nuclear arms race, 
especially between the Superpowers. That is the outcome 
of the overall inability of States, at many levels of 
interaction, to come to terms with the loss of jus ad 
bellum, despite the knowledge that all out nuclear war 
would put an end to human civilisation. Insufficient 
effort to reorient the theory and practice of 
international law so as to establish a system of accepted 
international justice is a symptom, but not the cause, of 
the general impasse. Nevertheless, the adoption of more 
appropriate theories and more precise rules of law, 
whether by United Nations forums, in the International 
Court of Justice, or during the course of international 
negotiation or mediation, would undoubtedly assist the 
process of accommodation that could make nuclear arms 
control ultimately and entirely effective.
3INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of the study is to contribute 
to the contemporary decision-making process. It is 
essentially a feasibility study on nuclear arms control 
from a predominantly legal point of view. Central to the 
theme is the examination of international systems for the 
creation and observance of nuclear arms control 
agreements. Consideration is given to possible advances 
in the relevant methodologies, based on a review of 
current initiatives regarding the negotiation, 
implementation, verification and enforcement of 
international agreements.
Subject matter selected for examination is focused 
on short term variables in preference to an enumeration 
of all pertinent factors, including those that are not 
foreseeably amenable to change. Control of nuclear 
weapons is interpreted as denoting both their regulation 
and elimination, with the emphasis on stability as the 
criterion of success.
Assessment as to what constitutes stability is an 
underlying theme throughout. The basic assumptions are 
that stability increases with the discouragement of 
attempts to gain political or economic advantage by the 
acquisition, deployment, threat or use of nuclear weapons 
as a deliberate policy; by maximisation of the time 
available for making anti-nuclear-weapon choices; 
adoption of procedures to mitigate the consequences of 
nuclear accident; avoidance of action-reaction
4
compulsion; simplification of deterrence, whenever 
possible, as well as strengthening the survivability of 
some deterrent systems; provision of opportunities for 
compromise; and ongoing machinery facilitating 
universally acceptable resolution of every kind of 
international dispute. All of these measures are seen to 
have legal or quasi-legal connotations.
In the interests of cohesion and brevity, several 
subject areas have been examined only in a limited 
context. For example, the historical background is 
restricted to the observation of trends with direct 
relevance to current issues and institutions. Several 
nuclear strategies are noted only cursorily, in order to 
demonstrate the nature of the complexities entailed and 
the unpredictability of outcomes. Likewise, the 
imprecision of the distinctive terminology applied to the 
various strategies is mentioned merely to illustrate the 
nature of the problems faced by policy-makers and 
negotiators. The examination of general conflict 
resolution principles and techniques is also confined 
to those aspects that have a bearing on the negotiation 
and compliance enforcement phases of nuclear arms control 
agreements.
Not all relevant variables are examined but only 
those that can be embodied in international agreements 
for the control of nuclear arms and matters directly 
related to such existing or putative agreements. This 
demarcation requires the omission from detailed 
consideration of many issues that have a vital bearing on
5the efficacy of nuclear arms control agreements, 
including the management of national bureaucracies and 
the internal politics of States; the local, regional and 
global interplay of ideological divisions and sectional 
interests; and the whole range of economic and 
territorial rivalries in all their myriad commutations.
The issues enumerated in the above paragraph are 
adverted to only in general terms as part of the genus of 
"primary" conflicts. The lack of distinctive treatment 
is felt to be permissible on the ground that the menace 
of nuclear devastation is indiscriminate, and because 
precepts for the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes have a similarly universal application. 
Therefore, it is felt that the line of demarcation should 
not be excessively distorting. Controversies about 
nuclear arms parity, and the equities of the competing 
security interests of States and groups of States, are 
regarded as "consequential" international disputes.
The control of weapons of mass destruction other than 
nuclear weapons is excluded from consideration, except 
to illustrate homogeneous features where other examples 
are lacking.
Despite the simplifications invoked, the topic is 
an unwieldy one due to the many facets of nuclear arms 
control. In particlar, it is overshadowed by Socialist- 
Free Enterprise enmity which, like other primary 
conflicts, is treated as a given fact. No attempt is 
made to adjudicate on its merits or even to probe the 
rationality of its motivation and pursuit. The
6
geopolitical background and the correlations between 
various aspects of the topic have been more fully 
examined in three published papers written during the 
course of the study, entitled Proliferation and 
Confrontation,1 Co-existence, Reciprocity and the
oPrinciple of Marginal Restraint, and Arms Control in
oOuter Space.J
The feasibility of avoiding, by means of nuclear 
arms control agreements, the untoward consequences of the 
nuclear arms race, including the disaster of nuclear 
devastation, would not warrant study if it took the form 
of a probability calculation. Clearly, if it were found 
that there is only a modest chance of escaping the direct 
or indirect deleterious consequences of the nuclear arms 
race with nuclear arms control agreements, the 
recommendation would have to be that the chance be 
taken. The sole contra-indication would be if a higher 
probability were found to favour the avoidance of nuclear 
war with the attainment of a disarming first strike 
capability by stealth. A conclusive evaluation of that 
possibility is beyond the scope of this study, which 
rests on the assumption that the probability of avoiding 
nuclear war by that means is negligible.
1 Australian Outlook, April 1979, Vo1.33 No.l p.27.
2 Australian Outlook, April 1981, Vol.35 No.l p.78.
3 The World Today, April 1982, Vo 1.38 No.4 p.154.
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Thus, the question is not whether agreements should 
be sought in the pursuit of nuclear arms control, but 
what measures are likely to produce the best results 
in the light of experience and informed conjecture.
That, in turn, entails the selection of priority issues 
and the designation of collateral measures to be taken.
In addition, it becomes necessary to assess existing 
principles, forms and institutions facilitating 
international concurrence, with a view to identifying 
such changes as may be prerequisite to the attainment of 
the objective.
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CHAPTER I
THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 
TO CONTROL NUCLEAR ARMS
First Initiatives
Among the many onerous and pressing concerns of the 
international community since World War II, none has been 
more demanding than the problem of nuclear arms control 
(NAC) . The devastation caused by the two nuclear bombs 
detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on the Gth and 9th 
of August 1945, left no doubt that nuclear weapons 
heralded unprecedented dangers for mankind.
When the Treaty setting up the United Nations came 
into force on 24 October 1945, only the United States had 
a nuclear capability, nuclear weapons were small by 
current standards, no missile systems existed for their 
delivery, and relatively little was known about the 
dangers of radioactive fallout. Nevertheless, from then 
onward the eradication, or at least the control of 
nuclear weapons became a major, if not the prime 
international preoccupation. Accordingly, the first 
Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly was 
directed toward the solution of that issue. Resolution 
1(1) was adopted unanimously on 24 January 1946, 
establishing an Atomic Energy Commission.^ The Commission 
was to report to the Security Council and to make specific 
proposals -
(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of 
basic scientific information for peaceful ends
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(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent 
necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful 
purposes
(c) for the elimination from national armaments of 
atomic weapons and of all other major weapons 
adaptable to mass destruction
(a) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and 
other means to protect complying States against 
the hazards of violations and evasions.
The fate of the Atomic Energy Commission was typical 
of many later attempts to control nuclear arms, even to 
the present day. Despite its high status and unanimous 
mandate, the Commission eventually lapsed into a two year 
stalemate and had to be dissolved on 11 January 1952, 
without achieving any of its objectives.
Like many of its successor negotiating bodies for 
NAC, the Commission was hamstrung by the overriding 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union 
and paralysed by obstinate efforts to devise 
international institutions modelled on national law 
enforcement prototypes. The attempt by some members of 
the Commission to set up an International Atomic 
Development Authority,^ to be in charge of all nuclear 
activities in the world, was the first of many over- 
ambitious attempts, in the interests of disarmament, to 
wrest a greater abrogation of sovereignty from States than 
they have been prepared to concede.
The first manifestation of Superpower rivalry and 
distrust in the field of NAC was the move by the United 
States to forestall the development of nuclear weapons by 
the Soviet Union. It began with the proposed imposition 
of strict inspection and control procedures concerning
10
the utilisation of nuclear materials for weapons, for 
peaceful uses and for research.4
Understandably, the United States was not ready to 
give up its nuclear advantage until a system of 
verification and sanctions was in place. The proposal 
was advanced by the United States delegate to the Atomic 
Energy Commission, Mr. Bernard Baruch, and it became 
known as the Baruch Plan. For its part, the Soviet Union 
was evidently concerned about its position and sought to 
eliminate the American nuclear advantage. It demanded 
that the destruction of all atomic weapons should occur 
prior to the imposition of a system of international 
controls for prohibiting their ongoing manufacture.
The impasse continued until 23 September 1949, when 
the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. A few 
months later the Soviet Union withdrew from the 
Commission in protest against the failure to seat the 
representative of the newly formed de facto Government of 
the People's Republic of China.^
The next attempt to attain international agreement 
regarding NAC, and to create effective institutions and 
procedures tor doing so, was prejudiced at its inception 
by growing antagonism between Socialist and Western 
States and by the outbreak of the Korean War. In 1950 
the General Assembly established a Committee of Twelve,^ 
composed of the same nations as the membership of the 
Security Council at that time, together with 
representation from Canada, to report on the feasibility
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of merging the Atomic Energy Commission and another 
existing Commission dealing with the control of 
conventional armaments. On the basis of the Committee's 
report, a Disarmament Commission was set up, consoli- 
dating the two previous Commissions. The Soviet Union 
voted against the General Assembly Resolution which 
established the Disarmament Commission, on 11 January 
1952.^ Within the year of the new Commission's 
inauspicious beginnings, the United Kingdom exploded its 
first atomic bomb, on the 3rd of October, and the United 
States exploded its first hydrogen bomb, on the 1st of 
November.
The mandate of the Disarmament Commission required 
it to prepare proposals, inter alia, "for the effective 
international control of atomic energy to ensure the 
prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic
oenergy for peaceful purposes only". As with previous and 
subsequent initiatives, the recommendations put forward by 
Western States emphasised the need for disclosure, 
verification, inspection and international control of both 
nuclear and conventional arms. The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, stressed the preliminary requirement to 
eliminate and prohibit all atomic weapons, justifying its 
stance by drawing attention to the alleged great 
preponderance of combined Western military might in relation 
to that of the Soviet Union and its allies.
The year 1953 marked the beginning of a more 
conciliatory and businesslike attitude to NAC. The 
change can be attributed to accumulated negotiating
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experience concerning the subject and to several
significant international events affecting the two
emerging Superpowers, including the election of General
Eisenhower to the Presidency of the United States, and
the death of the Soviet leader, Marshal Stalin. The year
also witnessed the end of the Korean War and the first
explosion of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviet Union, on the
12th of August. For the first time there arose the
worldwide recognition that war would not only continue to
be "the scourge" of mankind, as stated in the United
Nations Charter, but that it could destroy civilisation
altogether. The preamble of a unanimous General Assembly
Resolution of 28 November 1953, expressed the prevailing
attitude in the following terms -
Believing that the continued development of weapons 
of mass destruction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs 
has given additional urgency to efforts to bring 
about effectively controlled disarmament throughout 
the world as the existence of civilisation itself may 
be at stake...
It was in this atmosphere, eleven days later, that 
President Eisenhower made his famous "atoms for peace" 
proposal in the General Assembly, recommending the 
establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA).l® Another four years passed before the Agency 
came into being, as the first breakthrough in the 
international regulation of the utilisation and disposal of 
radioactive materials.
During the intervening period, the Disarmament 
Commission formed a Sub-Committee,^  composed of Canada, 
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the
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United States, which held 157 meetings. In 1954 a French
and British plan was discussed for verified nuclear
disarmament in stages. The Soviet Union countered with
amendments to the disarmament schedule and with a
proposal for an international Control Commission under
the auspices of the Security Council, to ensure that the
veto would be available to the Council's permanent 
l ?members.x A
In 1955, in the course of negotiations on compromise
solutions, both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union
put forward additional, far-reaching amendments to the
plan. The issues were again raised at a Summit
Conference convened in Geneva, in July 1955, between
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Again the main issue was that of
precedence between nuclear disarmament and international
inspection. Stressing the latter, the United States
suggested an agreement among the nuclear Powers to permit
reciprocal aerial photography as a means of verifying NAC 
1 iagreements. J The Soviet Union preferred ground control 
posts. At this time the Soviet Union also advanced a 
proposal for undertakings by the nuclear Powers not to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons.^
Gradually international opinion was swinging to the 
view that halting the nuclear arms race among the 
existing nuclear-weapon States, and preventing the use of 
nuclear technology for military purposes by additional 
States, would have to be sought through step by step 
agreements with limited goals. At no time was the
14
concept abandoned of "general and complete disarmament 
under effective international control" ,-*- ® as the ultimate 
objective. The above, and similar wording, has been used on 
innumerable occasions in the preamble of NAC treaties and in 
UN resolutions. Nevertheless, ten years of total failure in 
NAC, served as an irrefutable argument for the adoption of 
new tactics to reach that objective. In 1956, despite a 
rise in international tension due to unrest in Eastern 
Europe and the Suez crisis, negotiations were successfully 
concluded for the establishment of the IAEA. The Statute of 
the Agency came into force on 29 July 1957, just a couple of 
months after the United Kingdom exploded its first hydrogen 
bomb on the 15th of May.
The establishment of the Agency in Vienna, with a large 
expert bureaucracy, has remained the most tangible NAC 
achievement. Over the years, the Agency's influence 
continued to increase. It has acted as the executive agency 
for subsequent NAC agreements, most notably, the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty^® and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. ^
In addition the IAEA became a catalyst for the emergence of 
more NAC agreements, including the Partial Test-Ban 
Treaty-*-® and the moratoriums that preceded it.
For example, the Agency, which was also given the 
responsibility for establishing health and safety 
standards relating to the use of nuclear energy, helped 
to focus attention on the dangers of radioactive 
contamination of the environment. When moves to ban all 
nuclear testing had failed, concerted efforts were made
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to prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons at least in 
environments where fallout was thought to be most 
dangerou s.
Simultaneously, the obligation, through the IAEA, to 
promote nuclear technology for industrial uses, raised 
the spectre of more rapid horizontal proliferation than 
had been anticipated previously. The expected inhibiting 
effect of a nuclear test-ban on the spread of nuclear 
weapons capability, added a further strong impetus to test- 
ban efforts. From 1958 onward, a series of conferences and 
unilateral moratoriums on testing were undertaken by the 
three nuclear-weapon States. The first explosion of an 
atomic bomb by France, on 13 February I960, threatened to 
undermine that initiative but the pressure of world public 
opinion intervened, culminating in the signing of the 
Partial Test-Ban Treaty, on 5 August 1963, by the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.^®
At the time of the establishment of the IAEA i-n 1957 , 
the Soviet Union proposed the transformation of the 
Disarmament Commission into a permanent body of the United 
Nations with the participation of all Member States. After
O 1the defeat of that proposal on 6 November 1957, the 
Soviet Union withdrew from the Commission, despite the 
addition of 14 States to that body by the General 
Assembly. 2^ with the refusal of the Soviet Union and 
its allies to particpate in the work of the Disarmament 
Commission, it became unsuited to remain a negotiating 
forum for disarmament, and it consequently failed to
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reconvene in 1958.
The issue of representation at multilateral 
disarmament negotations was soon to be resolved by other 
developments. Acceleration of the decolonisation process 
led to the emergence, in the early sixties, of a Third 
World political force. In acknowledgement of the new 
distribution of power, the General Assembly, on 13 
December 1961, created the Eighteen Nation Disarmament 
Committee (ENDC) comprising eight Non-aligned States, 
five Western States and five Socialist States. It was 
the direct predecessor of the present Committee on 
Disarmament (CD).
The ENDC changed its name in 1969, when its 
membership was enlarged to 26. It became known as the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), and its 
representation was further increased to 31 in 1974, so as 
to keep pace with the growing membership of the United 
Nations. After the first Special Session of the General 
Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSD I) in 1978, it was 
renamed the Committee on Disarmament and its membership 
increased to 40 including, for the first time, all five 
permanent members of the Security Council. 3^ By that 
time both France and China had become thermonuclear Powers, 
China exploding its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964, 
and its first hydrogen bomb on 17 June 1967. France 
exploded its first hydrogen bomb on 24 August 1968. It 
is significant that since China became a nuclear power, 
no additional State has admitted testing a nuclear 
weapon. In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device stated
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to be for peaceful purposes,24 and in 1979 there was some 
evidence that a nuclear explosion had occurred in the 
atmosphere off the coast of South Africa.2^
Two prominent theoretical issues hindered NAC
f
negotiations during the early postwar years.2  ^ One 
involved questions of national security, such as whether 
total disarmament was possible or desirable in the short 
term. The other contentious issue had a more legal and 
administrative orientation and concerned the 
institutional management of disarmament, notably NAC.
The most vexed question that arose in that context was 
whether any type of veto power should be retained, 
especially by nations also members of the Security 
Council. The Western States, which had a majority in the 
United Nations at the time, were adamant that no exercise 
of the veto should be permitted with respect to the 
functions of any of the proposed supra-national 
disarmament or arms control bodies.
In addition to those contentious issues, from the 
earliest agreements to the present, including debates 
about the unratified SALT II Treaty, NAC has been the 
subject of criticism especially from within the United 
States. Some critics have contended that the agreements 
merely handicap a too honest and trusting United States 
in an inevitable nuclear arms contest which it could 
otherwise win. This contention relies on the argument 
that inadequate verification and compliance enforcement 
provisions enable other States, notably the Soviet Union, 
to breach NAC agreements to America's detriment.2^
18
A more belligerent version of the theory advocates 
deliberate confrontation, described in the following 
terms by the first head of the policy planning staff of 
the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Barry M . Blechman -
To many Americans these postures are wrong, both 
morally and in terms of U.S„ security interest. They 
believe that the United States must seek to change 
Soviet society and, that to do so, it must remain in 
a state of tension with the Soviet government. They argue that if it is isolated, the Soviet state 
eventually will crack of its own internal 
contradictions-nationalities problems, economic 
failures, corruption, the natural yearnings of 
individuals for freedom, and so forth. This means 
that the United States should seek to construct a 
wall of implacable hostility around the U.S.S.R., a 
political-cum-military alliance among the nations of 
Western Europe, Japan, China and others in the Third 
World. Only America can galvanize such an alliance, 
it is argued, and to do so the United States must 
avoid bilateral agreements or even bilateral 
negotiations, as these imply permanent acceptance of 
the Soviet regime and accord legitimacy to it. The 
ABM treaty, the SALT II treaty, and the SALT process itself - to say nothing of other arms negotiations - 
are thus seen to undermine the long-run objective of 
causing fundamental change in Soviet society. 8
Other critics have maintained that NAC agreements 
only restrain armaments production in growth areas 
thought to be useless or of marginal military value.
This objection to NAC agreements encompasses the notion 
that they merely "institutionalise" .the nuclear arms 
race. For example, in the case of the IAEA and the NPT, 
acquiescence in the existence of nuclear Powers and the 
sharp dichotomy between the rights and duties of nuclear- 
weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, has been 
characterised as an entrenchment of the spurious 
principle that might is right. With respect to the 
Partial Test-Ban Treaty, it has been claimed that the
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agreement gives tacit approval to the underground 
detonation of nuclear weapons. As recently as the 
signing of the SALT II Treaty in 1979, a similar genre of 
criticism has been levelled, contending that the Treaty 
gives a certain legitimacy to the nuclear arms race by 
sanctioning the retention and further production of most 
nuclear weapons.
Another objection to NAC agreements has been less a 
criticism of the nature of the agreements than of the 
whole process of attempting to reach agreement in view of 
sharply conflicting national i n t e r e s t s . These critics 
believe that, whether desirable or not, and even if 
adequately verified, NAC is not going to be effective 
because technological advances will soon outstrip all 
conceivable formulas for control. The emphasis here is 
on the expectation of the circumvention and eventual 
repudiation of the agreements rather than of their 
breach.
By contrast, the list of NAC agreements bears 
witness to the views of those, both within and beyond the 
United States, whohave favoured NAC agreements. Their 
position has been that half a loaf is better than none. 
Chastened by the long initial period of arduous but 
fruitless negotiations, they seek to utilise to the best 
advantage the maximum degree of co-operation that States 
may be prepared to contribute to NAC at any given time. 
Apart from coming to terms with the limits of co­
operation, supporters of less than ideal NAC agreements 
have tended to adopt a more optimistic view of the
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willingness of States to abide by their undertakings.
They also tend to place greater reliance on the 
feasibility of holding States to their NAC agreements, 
even in the absence of ironclad verification, 
adjudication and enforcement provisions.
Supporters of NAC cover a wide ideological spectrum. 
For instance, some advocates dismiss the likelihood of 
circumvention with the argument that additional 
agreements can be devised to accommodate technological 
advances as they arise. European disarmament specialists 
frequently stress the importance of confidence building 
measures and often adopt the position that consensus 
acted upon begets further consensus. There are those who 
go so far as to expect that in time, with increasing 
manifestations of global interdependence, military 
rivalry itself will decline. Others, at the lower levels 
of confidence in NAC, regard it as a holding operation 
aimed only at decreasing the pace of nuclear armament and 
the chances of inadvertent conflagration.
Renewed concern about the issues involved in NAC has 
been expressed, by both Governments and professionally 
involved individuals, apropos to SSD I held at United 
Nations Headquarters in New York, during May-June 1978. 
Preparations for the second Special Session of the 
General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSD II), to be 
held in June-July 1982, at the same venue, have also 
generated worldwide interest in NAC agreements already 
concluded, as well as in nuclear-weapon issues proposed 
to form the subject of future agreements.
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Existing Multilateral NAC Agreements
The NAC treaties referred to in Table I, were no 
doubt negotiated with a variety of expectations as to 
their future effectiveness. While those original 
assessments cannot be established with any certainty, it 
is evident from the terms of the treaties that they were 
formulated so as to achieve a universal consensus, even 
at the expense of restricted goals and range of 
application. Of the NAC related agreements concluded 
during approximately the past two decades, eight were 
substantive multilateral treaties that are still in force 
today. Without exception, they were the subject of 
intensive and prolonged negotiation before agreement was 
reached.
The main thrust of the treaties is to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons and to preserve the status quo, 
but no attempt is made to dismantle existing nuclear arms 
and facilities. The objectives of the treaties are 
modest in other respects also, when compared with the 
ambitious goals espoused during the first fifteen years 
of unsuccessful NAC negotiations. For example, repud­
iation of the treaties is usually available on three 
months' notice. Those provisions can be attributed to a 
realistic appraisal of the difficulties involved in 
attempting to coerce a State to adhere to a treaty after 
a decision has been made by it to withdraw. It is also a 
device for maintaining the status of treaties, by 
permitting States to assert their sovereignty without 
having to transgress obligations solemnly entered into
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under international law.
In a similarly pragmatic vein, the treaties have 
avoided setting up any institutions, except in the case 
of the IAEA and OPANAL.^2 Apart from the operation of 
those Agencies, administrative functions are restricted 
to measures required for accession, review, consultation, 
amendment and repudiation, to be performed by the 
depositary States. In practice, whenever necessary, 
especially in the organisation of review conferences, the 
administrative facilities of the United Nations have been 
successfully invoked. 3^
While it is clearly intended that the treaties should 
be endowed with the full force of international law, 
punitive provisions for breach are either minimal or 
omitted altogether.^  Such as there are, largely consist 
of notifying the other Parties and the United Nations of 
the facts constituting the breach. The provisions also 
require the non-complying Party, and any aggrieved or 
particularly interested Parties, to engage in 
consultations or to refer the matter to arbitration by 
consent. Failing those methods the treaties, either 
explicitly or implicitly, refer the Parties to the 
International Court of Justice, again by consent only.
None of the treaties requires acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the 
observance of its terms. Specific references to the 
Court do not appear to alter whatever general rights the
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Parties may have to invoke the Court's jurisdiction, but 
treaty provisions regarding the obligation to engage in 
consultations and other conciliatory measures would no 
doubt have to be discharged as conditions precedent.
This would be necessary so as to fulfil the agreed 
undertakings and in order to demonstrate that all 
alternative avenues of redress have been exhausted.
Having largely refrained from imposing sanctions with 
teeth, the treaties appear to rely on fear of discovery 
as the main inducement for compliance by reluctant 
States. To this end, emphasis is given to verification 
methods, and also adjudication procedures to the extent 
necessary to establish the acts and circumstances of non- 
compliance. Verification relies to some extent on 
notification by each Party of its own records and planned 
activities relevant to the terms of the treaty. Thus, 
the IAEA, and the treaties that rely on its safeguards 
methods for verification, utilise the records of national 
systems of accounting. The Antarctic Treaty and the 
Outer Space Treaty require notification of intention to 
proceed with certain designated activities.
No treaty could exclude verification by national 
technical means (NTM) which are, by definition, within 
the ambit of a State's sovereign rights.^ In addition 
to remote observance, most multilateral NAC treaties 
specifically authorise on site inspection by the Parties, 
by their designated observers, by experts or, as in the 
case of the IAEA, by inspectors who are not under the 
guidance of any individual Party in the performance of
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their tasks.
Provision for consultations is also an integral part 
of the verification and assessment process, devised for 
the supervision of compliance. Consultations avoid 
misunderstandings and can, on occasion, facilitate face­
saving explanations and adjustments. They also provide 
opportunities for last minute avoidance or rectification 
of outright breaches, when discovery becomes imminent. 
Such eleventh hour reprieves are permitted because the 
emphasis is not on the exposure of non-complying acts but 
on their avoidance.
Despite the dearth of coercive provisions and 
institutional support, the record of implementation of 
the multilateral NAC treaties has been remarkably good. 
For the time being, at least, the objectives set out by 
the treaties have been largely attained. The record can 
be summarised as follows:
Since the Statute of the IAEA came into force, no 
State receiving assistance in the use of nuclear power 
for peaceful purposes has utilised that assistance so as 
to become a nuclear-weapon State.
Since the Antarctic Treaty came into force, no 
establishment of nuclear bases, detonation of nuclear 
explosions, or disposal of nuclear wastes has taken place 
on that Continent.
Since the Partial Test-Ban Treaty came into force, 
the three major nuclear Powers have confined their
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testing of nuclear weapons to underground detonations, as 
prescribed. They have refrained from conducting any 
nuclear explosions, even of a purportedly peaceful nature 
not subject to the treaty, in any of the environments 
forbidden for military testing. The other two nuclear- 
weapon States, France and China, are not parties to the 
Partial Test-Ban Treaty. France, which for a period 
persisted with atmospheric testing, has ceased to do so 
since 1975, and now only China continues to conduct
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, at the rate of about one 
37a year.J
Since the Outer Space Treaty came into force, no 
evidence has become publicly available to suggest that 
any weapons have been installed on celestial bodies or 
that any nuclear weapons have been placed in orbit around 
the earth.
While the extent to which the Treaty of Tlatelolco is 
presently in force could become a matter of contention,®® 
Latin America is apparently totally free of nuclear 
weapons and all peaceful nuclear facilities there are 
subject to IAEA safeguards inspections.
Since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, 
there has been no addition to the number of declared 
and/or demonstrated nuclear-weapon States beyond the then 
existing five, being all of the permanent Members of the 
Security Council.
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Since the Sea-Bed Treaty came into force, no nuclear 
weapons or related facilities have been deployed at the 
bottom of the seas and oceans.
Since the ENMOD Convention came into force, no 
hostile modification of the environment has occurred with 
the aid of nuclear forces or otherwise.
The level of participation in the treaties has also 
been encouraging. In assessing the significance of the 
number of ratifications, it should be borne in mind that 
the subject matter of the treaties has scant relevance to 
States that are not technologically advanced. In many 
cases these States apparently regard accession to the 
treaties to be superfluous. Two of the treaties, the 
Antarctic Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, contain 
geographical limitations on participation.
Significantly, the United States, the Soviet Union 
and the United Kingdom have ratified all of the multi­
lateral treaties containing NAC provisions, with the 
exception that the United States has only signed, but has 
not ratified, Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
France is in the same position with respect to that 
Treaty. In addition, France has ratified the Antarctic 
Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, as well as undertaking 
to abide by the prohibitions of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and, in fact, observing the substantive terms of 
the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. China has only ratified 
Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Although the hope of attaining universal accession to
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the treaties by all eligible States has not been 
realised, it is noteworthy that State Parties are not 
withdrawing from the treaties. In round figures, the 
treaties are in force for the following number of States: 
IAEA - c 100; Antarctic Treaty - c 20; Partial Test-Ban 
Treaty - c 110; Outer Space Treaty - c 80; Treaty of 
Tlatelolco - c 25; Non-Proliferation Treaty - c 110; 
Sea-Bed Treaty - c 70; ENMOD - c 30.
Existing Bilateral NAC Agreements
The bilateral NAC agreements in Table II are, in some 
aspects, complementary to the multilateral agreements in 
Table I. The multilateral agreements, for the most part, 
aim to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non- 
nuclear-weapon States, zones and environments. This 
process is referred to as the prevention of "horizontal 
proliferation". On the other hand, the bilateral 
agreements chiefly seek to curtail qualitative 
improvements of nuclear weapons systems between existing 
nuclear powers, notably the two Superpowers. This 
process is referred to as the prevention of "vertical 
proliferation". ^
The Non-Proliferation Treaty goes so far as to 
require "negotiations in good faith" on measures to halt 
the nuclear arms race, which has been interpreted as a 
direct plea to the Superpowers to cease vertical 
proliferation as a quid pro quo to non-nuclear-weapon 
States for their renunciation of nuclear weapons. This
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interpretation is incorporated into the preamble of the 
SALT II Treaty. It is perhaps the most obvious 
juxtaposition of the two kinds of nuclear proliferation, 
one pursued via multilateral agreements and the other by 
way of bilateral agreements.
The nuclear Powers, especially the Superpowers, are 
clearly the most influential Parties in all of the 
multilateral NAC agreements, so much so, that without the 
concurrence of the "Big Three", most of them could not 
have been seriously contemplated. At present, at least 
two of the multilateral NAC treaties, the Outer Space 
Treaty and the ENMOD Treaty only have relevance for the 
Superpowers. Non-nuclear-weapon States, and nuclear- 
weapon States not Parties, have no formal role whatever 
in the bilateral NAC treaties.
Unlike the multilateral NAC agreements, not all of 
the bilateral NAC agreements are registered with the 
United Nations as formal, current treaties. For 
instance, the most concrete NAC measures between the 
Superpowers, contained in the two Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaties, SALT I and II,40 do not exist in 
the most binding form available in international law.
SALT I which had been duly ratified by both Parties 
expired, according to its terms, on 3 October 1977, 
although the Parties had indicated some weeks before that 
date that they did not intend to contravene its terms for 
a further unspecified period of time. The SALT II Treaty 
was duly signed on 18 June 1979, after a seven year 
negotiation, but has still not been ratified by an
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exchange of documents of ratification.
Likewise, the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed by the 
Superpowers on 3 July 1974 and 28 May 1976 respectively, 
have not been ratified, yet both Parties have abided by 
their substantive terms. The Agreement on Basic 
Principles of Relations between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, signed on 29 May 1972, and the Vladivostok 
Accord, signed on 24 November 1974, have also remained 
unratified. However, the two last named agreements are 
of lesser significance, as they are predominantly general 
statements of intention and guidelines for futher 
negotiations that have already taken place in other 
contexts. Similarly, the simultaneous Statement by the 
Soviet Union and the United States on the Reduction of 
Fissionable Materials Production, made on 20 April 1964, 
which has not been given the form of a treaty, has now 
been superseded and would have to be entirely 
renegotiated to become currently relevant.
All of the bilateral, formally correct NAC treaties 
in force between the Superpowers, relate to the 
immediate, day to day prevention of nuclear war. These 
are the "Hot Line" communications agreements; the 
Nuclear Accidents Agreement; the Agreement on the 
Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas; the 
SALT ABM Treaty; the Standing Consultative Commission 
Agreement; and the Agreement on the Prevention of
Nuclear War.
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Verification of the agreements is almost entirely by 
NTM. None of the agreements contains any provisions for 
verification, adjudication or administration of sanctions 
by any third party neither State, individual nor 
international entity. Only bilateral consultations are 
held out as the means of resolving disputes.
Consequently, the operation of the treaties is largely 
unknown by non-Parties. Not only are they excluded from 
any formal participation, but the Superpowers have 
kept the details of disputes confidential. Published 
records of queries regarding performance indicate 
mutually thorough verification of the agreements and an 
excellent record of compliance by both Parties.^
At present., assessment of compliance by non-Parties 
by means of NTM are mostly out of the question because 
they lack the necessary sophisticated satellite 
observation systems. However, this situation could 
change in time with, the establishment of an International 
Satellite Monitoring Agency^ or with improved NTM by 
additional States.
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CHAPTER II
THE CHANGING SCOPE OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
The Subject Matter of the Agreements
Negotiation and supervision of the implementation of 
NAC agreements have become substantially more difficult 
in the 1980s than in the '60s and '70s, when most of the 
agreements in Tables I and II were concluded. The change 
is the outcome of vast technological advances in the 
field of nuclear weapons. As the result of better 
techniques and simplified methods, non-nuclear-weapon 
States have become more susceptible to horizontal 
proliferation. At the same time, NAC among nuclear- 
weapon States has vastly increased in complexity, as 
designs and performance of weapons have undergone 
successive refinements. The trend continues while a 
substantial portion of the world's most able physical 
scientists is constantly engaged in further extending and 
perfecting the weapons.
Nuclear weapons today can release 4,000 times the 
energy released by the atomic bomb that was detonated 
over Hiroshima. Today there is no limit to the 
attainable levels of energy released by a single weapon. 
The explosive yield of present nuclear arsenals is about 
13,000 million tons of TNT, which has been estimated to 
be the equivalent of about 1 million Hiroshima bombs.3
Since SSD I in 1978, it has been universally 
acknowledged that a full scale exchange of nuclear
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weapons between the Superpowers could put an end to all 
human life, and would, at the least, threaten the 
survival of civilisation.^ However, it is not the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons that makes them a 
technologically difficult subject for international 
agreement, but rather the diversity of the systems 
involved and the rate of change to which they are 
subject.
Delivery systems are acquiring greater range, speed,
accuracy, and mobility. Intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) now have a range of about 13,000 km and
can reach their target within 3C minutes. Intermediate
range missiles can deliver their nuclear payload within 
£5-7 minutes. Over the 13,000 km range, targeting 
accuracy has increased about a hundred-fold during the 
past 25 years, bringing ICBM to an approximate accuracy 
of 50 metres using terminal guidance systems. No sooner 
were the necessarily large missiles fitted with intricate 
guidance mechanisms than it became possible to use 
satellite navigation systems to guide smaller missiles 
with the aid of computer links, which are now being
oinstalled. Technology is believed to exist for 
manoeuvring re-entry vehicles (MARV), designed to evade 
missile defences such as anti-ballistic missiles (ABM).  ^
Both Superpowers have already deployed multiple 
independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which 
can be released and targeted one by one, over an area of 
approximately 150 km by 500 km.^
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There are submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM) and air to surface ballistic missiles (ASBM). The 
aircraft can be based on land as well as on aircraft 
carriers. Technology is also available for the immediate 
deployment of cruise missiles, which, after launching 
from land, ship or aeroplane, are internally guided 
winged or wingless craft, using stellar automatic data 
link, or terrestial mapping systems. They can take the 
form of high speed missiles or of low flying miniature 
aircraft.1
In some cases the destructiveness, range and blast,
of nuclear weapons has been deliberately curtailed.
Arsenals of nuclear weapons exist that have been
miniaturised to the point where their destructiveness is
similar to that of powerful conventional weapons.
Another favoured modification is a low blast weapon with
enhanced radiation (ER), in which residual radiation is
increased by the use of special casings around the 
l ?wa rhead.
Some of the most far reaching innovations are being 
made with respect to the command, control and 
communications (C ) networks of the Superpowers. These 
networks, inter alia, form the nerve centre of nuclear 
weapons systems, by positioning potential targets, 
transmitting military commands, and performing weapons 
guidance functions. As these systems are greatly 
dependent on satellite transmissions, the vulnerability 
of military satellites and their status in international 
law are directly involved. 13
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The variety of functions to be performed by the 
present generation of nuclear weapons, makes calculation 
of equivalence possible only as a rough approximation, or 
not at all. Demarcation between the various systems of 
weapons is also difficult due to interlocking, 
overlapping and backup systems. As demonstrated at the 
United States Senate hearings concerning the operation of 
the SALT II Treaty, substantial differences of opinion 
about equivalence can arise, not merely between adversary 
States, but also among leading experts within a State.^ 
While policy differences have always existed, 
uncertainties on technical grounds are a growing problem.'*'^
New time scales are also presenting difficulties.
As noted above, the delivery speed of ICBM is down to 
about 30 minutes, with medium and short range strikes 
commensurately faster, while launch times are down to a 
few seconds. Such speeds have made reaction times to 
false alarms, miscalculations and technical faults so 
brief that, increasingly, only automatic and pre­
programmed responses could be utilised. For instance, it 
has been said that -
Soviet defence specialists viewed the ground-hugging 
Cruise missiles and the Pershing II, with its short 
delivery time, as so threatening that their 
deployment would cause the Soviets to set their SS-20 
medium-range missile force for a hair-trigger 
response to an attack... b
Under these circumstances, the usefulness of the 
various Hot Line Agreements is greatly reduced or, in the 
worst case, entirely eliminated.
By contrast, the lead time for research and
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development, manufacture and deployment of improved 
nuclear arms systems has increased to several years, and is 
estimated as more than a decade regarding some 
anticipated developments. This means that NAC agreements 
have to be made in anticipation of those possible 
additions to arsenals, so as to forestall them or, at 
least, to take them into account when striking a 
bargain.
Changing Nuclear Strategies
A growing body of world opinion holds that nuclear 
weapons have no utility whatever. The view was cogently 
stated by the delegate of Sri Lanka to the Committee on 
Disarmament, Ambassador H.M.G.S. Palihakkara, when he 
said -
We are up against an absolute weapon, the unleashing of which, however limited that may appear to those 
who advocate it, will leave neither the victor nor 
the vanquished and therefore does not serve any 
realistic political or military purpose. '
If this were a universally held opinion, then all 
nuclear weapons would be dismantled. Although there is 
an overwhelming convergence of expert opinion about the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons, it does not follow 
that all share the view that nuclear preparedness "does 
not serve any realistic political or military purpose".
It is necessary, therefore, to take note of the military 
strategies in accordance with which it has been envisaged 
that nuclear weapons may be employed, as well as the 
political objectives that might be served by the use, or 
merely the threatening presence, of nuclear weapons.
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The only time when the strategy for the use of
nuclear weapons was clear-cut, was when the United States
had a monopoly of the weapon. With the growing threat of
retaliation to any use of nuclear weapons, the
possibility of translating their destructive potential
into political advantage has become increasingly obscure.
As Ambassador B.A. Nzengeya of Zaire has said -
Twenty years ago, the desire of the nuclear Powers 
following the cold war, to acquire a deterrent or 
striking force, was understandable to the peoples 
of the world as being aimed at the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Now, however, the 
capacity of the new nuclear weapons to destroy all 
life on earth several times over no longer makes them 
a deterrent force and consequently no longer 
corresponds to the original aims of these States.-*-®
It compounds the difficulty of assessing acceptable
terms in NAC agreements when the usefulness of the
various weapons systems, in policy terms, is not at all
clear.
The confusion is exacerbated by the adoption of 
imprecise, interchangeable, and often deliberately 
euphemistic terminology. For example, a strategic attack 
has been defined as one aiming to eliminate the adversary 
as a war fighting unit.20 At the same time, long range, 
high yield nuclear weapons are usually referred to as 
strategic weapons. There is no clear distinction between 
these and intermediate-range weapons, also known as 
medium-range or theatre weapons, for use over a more 
limited range, as well as long-range theatre nuclear 
forces.
Another meaning of the terms is to refer to strategic 
weapons' in relation to a possible exchange between the
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Superpowers, and theatre weapons in the context of a 
regional, such as a European, conflict. Miniaturised, 
namely tactical nuclear weapons are also regarded as 
relevant to a European war, or they are envisaged in a 
Third World setting. Nuclear weapons suited for both 
strategic and theatre purposes are referred to as grey 
area weapons. 1 And yet, all of these weapons could 
be used in any nuclear war situation.
However, nuclear strategies can be categorized not 
only with respect to the location of military conflict 
but also regarding the targets to be sought out and the 
sequence of strikes to be made. Whether over 
intercontinental distances or within a region, nuclear 
weapons could be used for counter-value strikes against 
troops, industrial centres and/or population centres.
This could be a first strike or in retaliation. 
Counterforce targeting, meaning a strike against the 
nuclear missile launching and communications systems of 
an adversary nuclear power, is another comtemplated 
utilisation of nuclear weapons. Despite the misleading 
terminology, counterforce, like counter-value, could be 
used in a first strike, as well as in retaliation. If 
counterforce were used to cripple an adversary only 
partially then, like any of the other aforementioned uses 
of the weapons, it would invite further incalculable 
retaliation.
The efficacy of a counterforce strike as a manoeuvre 
to disarm the enemy depends on the timing of the 
retaliatory strike. If the other side were to launch on
42
warning, namely before the counterforce missiles reached
their targets, then only a third strike could be
prevented, while the second strike aimed at the
instigator State could be a counter-value strike. In the
view of Henry Trofimenko, Head of the Institute of United
States and Canada Studies, Moscow, it would be immaterial
whether the first strike were targeted as a counterforce
or a counter-value strike because, in either event, it
would elicit a retaliatory counter-value launch. He
describes the situation in the form of a question -
The Pentagon has estimated that such a disarming 
strike would require the launch of more than 2,000 
warheads against.the enemy targets. Tell me, who, 
with the exception of God himself, in the few minutes 
available could determine that this vast number of 
warheads already in mid-flight is a "limited" 
counterforce rather than an all-out countervalue 
attack and, accordingly, give the command for an 
appropriate limited retaliation?
The variety of ways in which nuclear weapons may be 
employed is said to facilitate a flexible response to 
threats. Public approval of the policy was sought 
pursuant to United States Directive 59 of 1980, issued by 
President Carter. In accordance with this policy, the 
development of many new types of nuclear weapons is 
justified on the ground that, otherwise, the only option 
would be an all out strike, which would not be a credible 
deterrent because of the corresponding full scale 
retaliation it would predictably elicit. This strategy 
contains two ambiguities. Firstly, it is not predictable 
that a relatively low level nuclear exchange could be 
prevented from escalating to total nuclear war.
Secondly, it has not been adequately explained why many 
varieties of nuclear weapons are essential to nuclear
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flexibility. It would seem that flexibility could be 
achieved, if this were desired, by curtailing the number 
of weapons launched and restricting the targets chosen.
Estimation of the outcome of the abovementioned
nuclear strategies is largely guesswork. The only use of
nuclear weapons with reasonable predictability of
outcome, other than total disaster, would be their use in
a counterforce operation, provided the enemy could be
reliably disarmed at one strike and prevented from
effecting a launch on warning. This is referred to as a
first strike capability, when a State has acquired the
capacity to deliver a nuclear strike against the other
without risking an intolerable reprisal. Although no
nuclear Power has attained this capability at present,
improved positioning techniques of enemy mobile craft,
combined with the present speed of launching and accuracy
3of targeting, the growing ability to disrupt C 
systems, together with the theoretical feasibility of 
effective ballistic missile defence, could perhaps make a 
disarming first strike capability a technical possibility 
for the Superpowers in the foreseeable future. J
Again, the terminology is misleading, because a 
nuclear disarming capability could be exercised either at 
a first strike or in retaliation to a lesser nuclear 
attack. Further confusion results from the concept of a 
pre-emptive strike, which would consist of launching 
nuclear weapons in anticipation of nuclear attack, before 
the enemy weapons have been launched. To speak of such a 
pre-emptive first strike does not necessarily denote the
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capability of a disarming strike. It could refer to a 
desperate measure, despite the anticipation of crippling 
retaliation.
A further obstruction in NAC dialogue has been the 
confusion between the concept of nuclear parity and that 
of the strategic balance. As the result of geographical 
differences, the diverse performance of nuclear weapons, 
and other variables, the concept of asymmetrical parity 
or essential equivalence in strategic arsenals has been 
accepted. However, this is not the same as the balance 
of terror, which continues to exist between nuclear 
Powers, especially the Superpowers, irrespective of 
parity, so long as neither side acquires a first strike 
capabi1ity.
Imprecise Motives
The difficulty of achieving agreement on limiting the 
proliferation and perfection of nuclear weapons does not 
only lie in the novelty of those weapons, nor the 
complexity of the strategies relating to their use. The 
primary problem is the perceived advantage to be derived 
from the possession of nuclear weapons or, stated another 
way, the disadvantage that could flow from abjuring, 
abandoning or curtailing nuclear weapons preparedness. 
Neither the uncertain nature of the advantage, nor its 
altered applicability in a new technological environment 
has, so far, led to a unilateral renunciation by any of 
the five nuclear Powers. Even if the precise utility of 
the weapons cannot be demonstrated, the image of military 
might they are thought to project has been sufficient to
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justify their retention and rapid build-up.
The offensive use of nuclear weapons would be 
contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter,2  ^
as is the offensive use of any weapon. While this 
provision of the Charter is often flouted by thinly 
disguised aggression with conventional weapons, the 
provision has been observed in the case of nuclear 
weapons. In some Third World conflict situations it has 
not been clear that the only inhibition to the use of 
nuclear force was fear of retaliation in kind. It would 
seem that the use of nuclear weapons for attack has been 
deemed to be inadvisable, at least in part, because of 
the probable reaction of world public opinion, which 
could lead to a broad international alliance against the 
aggressor. For the last-mentioned reason, nuclear 
weapons are not only impractical as offensive weapons, 
but also as threatening offensive weapons, which makes 
them unsatisfactory instruments for aggressive political
p c:leverage.
There could be some exceptions to the above 
considerations. One would be the offensive use of 
nuclear weapons against a State held in universal 
disfavour by the world community, such as South Africa 
might become if deprived of all Western support.
Aggressive use of nuclear weapons could also occur in a 
disarming first strike by one Superpower against the 
other, after which world public opinion would have 
diminished relevance. In that case, the problems 
arising within the aggressor State itself could be the
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more s ignificant.26
The attainment of a disarming first strike capability
would require overcoming political obstacles as well as
technological ones. The mere striving for a first stike
capability would undoubtedly be perceived as an
aggressive act, which is the reason why both Superpowers
periodically reiterate that their objective is the
retention of strategic parity.2  ^ If, nevertheless, one
Superpower were to approach outright prominence, this
could result either in the universal acceptance of the
dominant Superpower as omnipotent, or it could invite a
2 9pre-emptive strike from the other Superpower. The type 
of response by the other Superpower, as well as the 
political realignments that would occur in the world as a 
consequence of the changed threats and expectations, are 
quite unpredictable.
It is widely acknowledged that the extreme stress on
decision-makers in charge of conducting a nuclear war
would be likely to result in inefficient and erratic
behaviour. The contention was advanced in its most
unequivocal form by Ambassador A. Salah-Rey of Algeria,
during nuclear arms control negotiations in the Committee
on Disarmament. He said -
The idea entertained in certain quarters that a new 
nuclear war, whether limited or not, can be waged and 
won is not only extraordinarily dangerous because of 
the risks it imposes on mankind but also logically 
unacceptable because it is based on the assumption 
that the adversary's response will remain within 
rational limits. There is no need to be a great 
theoretician to foresee that, when that stage has 
been reached, the behaviour of the opposing camps 
will defy all the laws of rationality that we are 
today in a position to identify.30
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By contrast, the literature still does not 
acknowledge the probability of similarly erratic 
behaviour under conditions when the exercise of a first 
strike capability may become imminent. More specific 
internationa1 attitudes can be expected to emerge in 
opposition to strivings for nuclear-weapons pre-eminence, 
as soon as technical obstacles cease to be effective 
barriers to the option.
The threat of use of nuclear weapons for genuinely 
defensive purposes may be another matter. Such threats 
could be effective even if the State making the threat 
were not an overtly nuclear Power but only suspected of 
possessing a few nuclear weapons. It could be cogently 
argued, for example, that India has discouraged Chinese 
incursions across its borders and that Israel has kept 
its Arab antagonists at bay by having acquired the 
reputation of possessing nuclear weapons.
Threat of defence with nuclear weapons against attack 
by conventional weapons is less acceptable when it is an 
overt threat by nuclear-weapon States. Increasingly 
during the past few years, non-nuclear-weapon States have 
been insisting on assurances by nuclear-weapon States 
that the weapons would not be used against them, even in 
defence. The unstated theoretical basis of the demand 
is, that the only legitimate use of nuclear weapons would 
be in retaliation against another State that has used 
them or, perhaps, in retaliation against a nuclear-weapon 
State that had launched an attack with conventional 
weapons with the threat of escalating to nuclear weapons.
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When giving the requested assurances of non-use of 
nuclear weapons,  ^the nuclear-weapon States, with the 
exception of France, described in some detail the 
circumstances under which they would be prepared to use 
the weapons. While China has always ruled out the first 
use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, the 
United States and the United Kingdom did not reject their 
possible first use in support of an ally on foreign soil, 
even against a non-nuclear-weapon State, if it were 
acting in collusion with a nuclear-weapon State. In 
accordance with this doctrine, the use of nuclear weapons 
against North Korea and North Vietnam during the recent 
wars there could have been justified. The policy 
statement of the United States is consistent with the 
view that the non-use of the weapons on those occasions 
was in deference to world opinion, and not because such 
an act would have been categorically ruled out against 
non-nuclear-weapon States.
The heavily qualified negative security assurances
given by nuclear-weapon States, which could be read as
threats to use nuclear weapons in given circumstances,
have been justified by the respective Governments with
the argument that they are designed to forestall
aggression, not only by nuclear forces, but also by
3 3superior conventional forces.
In a statement to the United States Foreign Relations 
Committee, in November 1981, the Secretary of State, 
Alexander Haig, listed the enduring functions of nuclear 
weapons as assisting "deterrence, crisis management, and
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day to day diplomacy". Although he claimed it to be
common ground between the Superpowers that strategic
nuclear forces are "central instruments of foreign
policy", he failed to show how these functions are
performed by the weapons. Illustrations to support his
argument referred to supposed perceptions of the weapons'
efficacy. For example -
The nuclear balance inevitably affects the 
political and psychological environment within which 
deep international crises must be managed.
Similarly -
...the strategic nuclear balance casts a shadow 
which affects every geopolitical decision of 
significance. The image of U.S. strenath and the 
perception of U.S. commitment permeates into every 
region of the world. 4
It is not intended here to explore in depth what 
advantages may be derived from the possession of nuclear 
weapons and their delivery systems, at the various levels 
of sophistication of those systems, and in the diverse 
situations applying to the particular States. The 
intention is merely to demonstrate that in the eyes of 
influential world leaders there are persuasive incentives
"5 Cfor both horizontal and vertical proliferation. It is 
also sought to show that the indeterminate character of 
those advantages prevents the formulation of clear-cut 
priorities. This makes it unavoidable to introduce 
subjective criteria into the evaluation of the relative 
benefits and disadvantages of provisions in relevant NAC 
agreements.
The aims ascribed to NAC are the prevention of 
nuclear war; the halting of the vertical and horizontal
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nuclear arms race; the reversal of the nuclear arms race; 
and eventually, the total elimination of nuclear weapons 
and their delivery systems. The first priority is 
well nigh universally shared, although the subsequent 
priorities appear to enjoy less wholehearted adherence. 
The strongest support for NAC relates to the prevention 
of the imminent outbreak of nuclear war by regulating 
events that could lead to miscalculation, error, or any 
confrontation liable to rapid escalation.
By contrast, the assessment as to what levels of 
armaments are likely to lead to nuclear war in the longer 
term is highly subjective, so that while some see a 
vigorous programme of NAC as the best protection, others 
hold the view that additional armaments are necessary. 
Both Superpowers claim that they seek no more than parity 
with each other, yet both maintain that they are obliged 
to continue the extension of their nuclear armaments in 
order to maintain that parity.
A committed lobby of support for NAC comes from 
States which believe that they would benefit economically 
from any curtailment of the nuclear arms race. Those are 
mainly the developing countries, most belonging to the
3 Oso-called Group of 77, and advocating the establishment 
of a New International Economic Order. The annual 
financial cost of the nuclear arms race being 
approximately one thousand million US dollars, it is es­
timated by the States concerned that a rich source of 
economic aid would become available if the material and 
human resources used in the nuclear arms race were to be
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"3 Qdiverted to assist in economic development. *
The possibilities for NAC are predicated on the 
attainment of a number of objectives external to the 
content of NAC agreements. Some of these have been 
repeatedly identified at international forums. They 
include the availability of means for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes and the adoption of 
a number of confidence building measures designed to 
reassure States regarding their security which, in 
combination, would result in the relaxation of 
international tension.
Prevention of horizontal proliferation is believed to 
require an adequate assurance by nuclear-weapon States, 
to non-nuclear-weapon States, that nuclear weapons, or 
the threat of their use, will not be turned against them. 
Likewise, adequate safeguards on all nuclear activities 
of non-nuclear-weapon States have been widely accepted as 
essential for the prevention of horizontal proliferation. 
Developing nations tend to stress the importance of the 
non-discriminate application of safeguards, while the 
developed nations place emphasis on the need for full 
scope safeguards to be universally adopted by all non­
nuclear-weapon States.^0
Various principles of international conduct have also 
been noted as prerequisites for arms control, in 
particular NAC. These include the principle of the 
inviolability of international frontiers; the recognition 
of the sovereign equality of States, the prevention of
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the use of force or the threat of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State; the right to exercise self- 
determination and independence from foreign domination; 
and non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
States.41
Guidelines for the conduct of NAC negotiations 
pinpoint the need for mutual responsibilities between 
nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States; the 
requirement of undiminished security for all States at 
each stage of the disarmament process, to be achieved at 
the lowest possible level of military forces; and the 
requirement for verification measures satisfactory to all 
parties to the proposed agreement. The desirability of 
universal participation in appropriate NAC agreements has 
also been stressed at international forums from time to 
t ime.
It may be more appropriate to regard NAC not as a
series of separate objectives, in turn dependent on the
attainment of certain prerequisit ies, but as part of an 
integrated process. The aim of that process is to 
prevent a chain of events that could one day lead to
wholesale nuclear devastation, either in the course of
limited wars or in a universal holocaust.
Examined in this light, the objective of NAC has not 
changed over the years. As stated by Ambassador Yoshio 
Okawa, the Japanese delegate to the Committee on 
Disarmament, during a press conference in November 1981,
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the danger of nuclear war has not abated. Japan, at 
present "the only country" to have experienced 
bombardment with nuclear weapons could become, he said, 
"the first of many".^2
Variable Standards of Success
If the objective of NAC is seen as the prevention, 
rather than the postponement of nuclear war, then it is 
not sufficient merely to persevere with the process 
leading towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Eventual nuclear war could only be prevented with the 
maintenance of the required momentum of the NAC process, 
whereby the forces promoting nuclear weapons build-up 
would be outweighed by the forces inhibiting such steps.
It is inevitable that at any given time, some facets 
of the NAC process are more successful than other facets. 
A purported comprehensive balance sheet of progress and 
regression towards effective NAC would be inconclusive, 
because weighting the various indicators of success and 
failure would have to rely on a large measure of 
subjective assessment. For example, the same 
technological developments that give rise to new systems 
of nuclear weapons, can also produce techniques to 
improve the verification of performance of NAC 
agreements. Similarly, sectional alliances motivated by 
the desire of protection by the "umbrella" of a nuclear- 
weapon State, thus dividing the world, may simplify 
methods of international accommodation, by reducing the 
diversity of policy alternatives under consideration 
during negotiations. Attempts to evaluate the positive
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and negative features of these developments would be 
futile.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some clear- 
cut indicators of current tendencies. One way to measure 
the progress being achieved, is to examine the NAC 
process with respect to the initiatives believed to be 
most urgent, as well as those issues that appear to be 
the most amenable to short term resolution. The proposed 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTB), satisfies both the 
criteria of urgency and relative ease of implementation.
All relevant United Nations bodies have currently 
designated a CTB Treaty to be the first priority in NAC 
efforts.^ The matter has been given precedence for 
several reasons. One reason is that it would be a 
relatively simple, straightforward step. The view that 
explosions above a yield of 5 kilotons can be reliably 
detected is virtually unanimous, while much eminent 
expert opinion suggests that today there are no genuine 
problems of verification at all with respect to a CTB.^
The Treaty would not affect the balance of power 
between the Superpowers and it would be a move towards 
equalizing the sacrifices demanded of the nuclear-weapon 
and non-nuclear-weapon States. It is not disputed from 
any quarter that a CTB would have a strong inhibiting 
influence on both vertical and horizontal proliferation.
A less readily acknowledged, but nevertheless foreseeable 
consequence of a CTB is the pressure it would exert on 
China and France to acquiesce in an NAC regime and to
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relinquish their efforts to maintain a relativity with 
the major nuclear Powers. Another cogent reason for 
supporting a CTB at the present time is that it could 
help to build confidence in NAC, and therefore, that it 
could act as a prelude to other urgent agreements, such 
as a SALT III Treaty and an Outer Space II Treaty.
Attempts to reach a CTB are not new, nor have the 
long negotiations been without success. The whole 
process has been an excellent example of the persistence 
and determination required to achieve agreement on NAC 
issues. It also illustrates that, although the 
anticipated result may not be achieved exactly as 
planned, negotiating efforts are usually rewarded with 
some measure of progess.
The desirability of concluding a CTB was first raised
in the General Assembly in 1957. After six years of
effort the attempt to conclude a comprehensive treaty was
abandoned in favour of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 
4 51963. Nevertheless, negotiations continued for the 
conclusion of a Treaty to ban underground nuclear tests 
in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, (ENDC) and 
later in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 
(CCD) until the Special Session in 1978. Sweden took an 
important initiative in 1965, when it proposed 
verification of a CTB by an international exchange of 
seismic data, to be supplemented by on-site inspections 
in order to resolve the occasional uncertainties that may 
arise.
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Despite the Swedish and other initiatives, the
Superpowers still failed to agree on a CTB verification
formula when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was concluded
in 1 9 6 8 . The preamble to that Treaty expressed
disappointment that a CTB had not been concluded,
inferring that such a Treaty was expected to be concluded
in the near future, in fulfilment of the obligation of
the nuclear Powers vis-a-vis the renunciation of nuclear
weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The ENDC, and
its successor the CCD, continued to make no appreciable
headway, but in 1974 the two Superpowers agreed on a
Threshold Test-Ban Treaty. The Treaty prohibited
underground nuclear tests with a yield of more than 150
kilotons and prescribed specific testing sites for the
permitted explosions. In 1976 the Superpowers reached
4 8agreement on the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 
to supplement the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty.
In that year, also, the CCD established an ad hoc 
Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co­
operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. 
After SSD I, the Group of Scientific Experts continued to 
meet under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament. By 
1980, the Group had collated a programme for a 
seismological verification system, to consist of about 50 
teleseismic stations situated around the globe and 
exchanging data by way of the telecommunication system of 
the World Meteorological Organisation. Methods for the
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collection, analysis and distribution of the data were 
largely agreed upon by the scientists during 1980, and 
they proposed a practical test of the seismic network. 
This would have required the co-operation of the relevant 
States, and at that point the programme lost momentum. In 
the meantime, during 1977, bilateral negotiations on a 
CTB were commenced by the Superpowers, with the United 
Kingdom joining later in the year. The trilateral 
negotiations are still in progress at the time of 
writing, and the matter has also been discussed by the 
Committee on Disarmament.4^
With the entry into force of the Partial Test-Ban
5 0Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, as well as the Superpower 
agreements on the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, many objectives of a 
CTB, as originally envisaged, have already been realised. 
The Partial Test-Ban Treaty forbids all nuclear tests 
with the exception of those conducted underground; the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
inter alia, debar all non-nuclear-weapon States from the 
right to conduct nuclear tests, the Threshold Test-Ban 
Treaty prohibits the two Superpowers from testing nuclear 
weapons with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, while the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, in effect, extends 
the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty to include purportedly 
"peaceful" nuclear explosions. While the aforementioned 
Treaties have not attracted accession by all eligible 
States, and the two last-mentioned Treaties remain
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unratified, in essence the terms of all the Treaties are 
being universally observed.
Thus, although there has been a failure to secure the 
outlawing of all nuclear explosions with military 
potential, a large measure of success has been attained 
towards that end.^ -*- Had the technological environment 
remained static, the rate of progress towards a CTB would 
also be very satisfactory, when compared with previous 
international efforts to put legal curbs on military 
competition.
Yet, in present circumstances, a different yardstick 
of success may be appropriate. Since a CTB was first 
mooted, NAC-related problems have snowballed. The 
avoidance of accidental nuclear war, in a world saturated 
with complex, high speed nuclear weapons, is more 
perilous; maintenance of an increasingly intricate 
nuclear balance between the Superpowers is more tenuous; 
prevention of the spread of nuclear confrontation into 
space and the emergence of new weapons of mass 
destruction are more pressing; and it is increasingly 
difficult to restrain horizontal proliferation at a 
time when the manufacture of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems is within the technological and financial reach 
of a growing number of States. In this overall 
situation, with an ever increasing number of more and 
more complicated treaties to be concluded, the failure to 
negotiate a simple CTB could be regarded as a sign that 
the NAC process is faltering because the requisite 
momentum of progress is not being maintained.
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31 Infra Chapter VIII.
32 Infra Chapter III.
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col.2.
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dangers. One is the danger to our land-based 
missiles. I do not believe that the Soviets will 
exercise that capability against our land-based 
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sought by them, some developing out of revolutionary 
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So, even if a strategic equivalence were 
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Kissinger, then Secretary of State, The SALT II 
Treaty, Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
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Office, Washington, 1979) p.196.
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40 Infra. Chapter VIII.
41 Infra Chapter VII esp. G.A. Resolutions 2131 (XX) of 
1965; 2625 (XXV) of 1970; 2734 (XXV) of 1970; 2936 
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47 TABLE II.
48 Ibid.
49 Infra. Chapter III.
50 TABLE I.
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CHAPTER III
NORM CREATION BY NEGOTIATION FOR THE 
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARMS
Methods of Multilateral Norm Creation for NAC
The creation of authoritative standards for NAC is in 
the forefront of international endeavour. Its aim is to 
devise, and to oversee the implementation of specific 
arms control measures, which is a deliberate and 
painstaking process. The method used, based on initially 
achieving widespread consensus regarding the principles 
involved, has a bearing on the effectiveness of the 
agreements ultimately reached. Similar negotiating 
methods have been used at other times and in relation to 
other issues, but with less collective persistence.'*'
Generally the process involves three successive 
phases, although the second phase is often regarded as an 
end in itself. In the first phase, initiatives for major 
new NAC measures are usually proposed by Governments to 
their allies in NATO, The Warsaw Pact, or the Non-aligned 
Movement, before presentation to the appropriate United 
Nations body. Proposals for the elaboration of 
international norms relating to NAC are also made by a 
variety of non-governmental organisations and peace 
research institutes. Often these are Government 
supported at the national level and at the international 
level they have consultative status with the United
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Nations. In addition, emerging NAC proposals are 
sometimes considered at ad hoc international conferences 
on topics having a bearing on the subject; NAC treaty 
review conferences; expert study groups commissioned by 
the United Nations; and through an exchange of 
initiatives devised at the academic, scientific or other 
professional level.
During the second phase, debates are conducted at the 
United Nations with a view to reaching consensus on the 
basic elements of the subject matter. The chief 
organisational vehicles for the establishment of NAC 
norms in the United Nations are: the Committee on 
Disarmament, with its formal and informal Working Groups; 
the Disarmament Commission; the First Committee; and the 
General Assembly. Within the United Nations Secretariat 
there is the Centre for Disarmament, the United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research and its offshoot, the 
newly constituted United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research. Legal problems may be referred to 
the International Law Commission or to the Sixth 
Committee.
Upon reaching general consensus, the third phase 
consists of a plenipotentiary conference where the final 
text of the treaty is drafted by intending State Parties, 
for adoption by signature and subsequent ratification in 
conformity with traditional diplomatic practice. In the 
past, bilateral NAC treaties were almost exclusively 
negotiated between the Parties themselves at all stages. 
However, the current trend is to involve the whole
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international community, on the ground that all States 
are affected by the outcome.
Since the commencement of the first NAC negotiations, 
some negotiators have spent most of their working lives 
engaged in this task. Irrespective of the particular 
forum, they continue to confront each other in a global 
village atmosphere. The personal element ensures a 
thorough understanding of negotiating positions adopted 
by the various States, as well as the negotiating style 
of colleagues. It also enhances considerations of 
national honour, credibility and a degree of personal 
trust. Hence, the diversity of subjects considered and 
the varied locations of meetings give a misleading 
impression of fragmentation. Existing NAC agreements, 
ongoing negotiations and emerging initiatives are 
unified, not only by the interrelationship of the subject 
matter, but also by the continuing participation of a 
number of outstanding national representatives.
The State most involved in the process of NAC, the 
United States, is the one that has tended to be denied 
the benefits of continuity. Due to wholesale changes of 
both delegates and senior policy makers with each new 
Administration, there has been a repeated loss of 
expertise and adjustment. This is not only a periodic 
disadvantage for the United States. It is a continuous 
and cumulative global impediment to the evolution of an 
international arms control ethos. The problem was 
squarely faced by the United States delegate to the 
Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador C.C. Flowerree.
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Himself a mid-term appointee under the Carter Administration,
he admitted during his address in August 1981 -
It will not have escaped the notice of members of 
the Committee that the United States delegation has 
been relatively silent during our 1981 session.
Apart from my April 7 intervention and a recent brief 
discussion of chemical weapons last month, my 
delegation has spoken only when spoken to - that is, 
when it has been necessary to put our position on an 
issue on the record. We have thought this to be an 
appropriate posture, given the fact that the review 
of United States arms control policy is still 
continuing.^
Existing processes of norm creation for NAC employed
by United Nations organs are indicative of prevailing
opportunities and limitations. An examination of the
issues that are under consideration, and the working
procedures of the various bodies, reveals the discrepancy
between the concerns of legal theorists and those of
international lawyers directly engaged in NAC
negotiations. The Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs of the United Nations, Professor Erik Suy, has
urged that, "Contemporary international law must deal
with these new 'prescriptive norms'." He advanced the
view that it has become necessary to decide "to what
extent" the decisions of intergovernmental organisations
are creating new norms. In the course of his remarks he
posed the following questions -
Are they legal norms? Are they generally binding 
legal norms, or are some of them binding and some 
not? How are the binding norms determined?"5
A reluctance by States to enter into NAC treaties has 
already been noted in the previous chapters. Reasons for 
this are not uniform. In some cases States apparently 
prefer to continue with a phase of the arms race in the
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belief that they can outdistance other States in nuclear 
arms. On other occasions, there are grounds why one 
State may deliberately attempt to obstruct other States 
from reaching accommodation. Alternatively, the 
conclusion of NAC agreements is inhibited by genuine 
concerns about, inter alia, the precision, universality, 
verifiability or enforceability of a contemplated treaty. 
There is a positive aspect to the caution displayed in 
assuming NAC undertakings. It demonstrates that the 
utmost weight is attached to treaty obligations in this 
field. Apparently there is a belief that any public 
relations advantage that may accrue from acceding to an 
NAC treaty precipitously, would be outweighed by the 
possibility that responsibilities undertaken might have 
to be dishonoured or repudiated.
By contrast, non-binding expressions of opinion by 
States on NAC issues are given somewhat more readily, 
although generally care is exercised to convey a 
responsible attitude. While the voting patterns of 
States on these issues tend to be fairly consistent, no 
great loss of face is entailed in a vote change at the 
United Nations, provided that cogent reasons can be 
adduced to justify the altered position. The relevant 
negotiations and deliberations being undertaken in the 
forums of the United Nations are to be examined below.
It will be seen that despite many positive developments 
the rate at which NAC agreements are reached, whether by 
treaty, by resolution or otherwise, falls far short of 
what the agendas of those bodies have designated to be
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desirable targets.
No doubt with such concerns in mind, Professor Suy 
has put forward six proposals for assisting the 
conclusion of international agreements to satisfy the 
requirements of contemporary international life. While 
the proposals refer to all types of agreements, they also 
have great relevance to NAC agreements. The following is 
a summary of the proposals: Firstly, that there should
be more rapid and extensive codification of international 
law at international conventions; Secondly, that steps 
ought to be taken to further encourage universal 
participation during the elaboration of international 
instruments; Thirdly, that the timing and venue of 
international law-making gatherings should be arranged so 
as to enable States with limited manpower resources to 
participate effectively; Fourthly, that non-participating 
delegations at diplomatic conferences be entitled to 
submit texts for the consideration of delegates; Fifthly, 
that the importance of the speed with which treaties are 
concluded and ratified should be recognised; and Sixthly, 
that more attention be given to the implementation 
provisions contained in international agreements.
A consideration of the subject matter of proposed NAC 
agreements is undertaken partly in order to throw light 
on the reasons why the rate of progress does not meet 
stated expectations. This involves many subsidiary 
questions as to the significance of the issues that have 
been agreed upon so far, the reasons for differing 
progress in the establishment of NAC norms relating to
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the various subject areas, and why advice of the kind 
offered by Professor Suy is not sufficiently put into 
practice. A central question to emerge is, whether the 
content of the sought after agreements is insuperably 
difficult to negotiate and to deliberate upon, or whether 
the methodology of international negotiation and 
deliberation is merely inappropriate and out of date for 
the task at hand.
Multilateral NAC Negotiations in the Committee on 
Disarmament
The Committee was reconstituted following SSD I, to 
be the only "multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" 
on arms control of the United Nations. It is the 
successor to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 
established in 1961, and the subsequent Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament. During SSD I, it acquired its 
present format of delegations from 35 United Nations 
Member States, on the basis of equitable geographical 
distribution, together with the five permanent Members of 
the Security Council. In accordance with its mandate, 
the Committee is required to formulate all 
recommendations by consensus. At its first session, in 
1979, the requirement was incorporated into the 
Committee's Rules of Procedure.
Issues are referred to the Committee for 
consideration on the basis of international agreement in 
principle about the desirability of elaborating each 
topic into more specific commitments, if not binding 
treaties. Regarding nearly all of the themes that appear
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on the annual agendas it could be fairly said that, at 
the least, they constitute agreements to formulate 
agreements. They are an endorsement of the desirability 
that international norms should prescribe the rights and 
duties of States in the matters concerned.
During 1980 and 1981, the Committee had four formal 
ad hoc Working Groups on the following topics - 
. Effective international assurances to non-nuclear-weapon 
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
. A comprehensive programme of disarmament 
. Radiological weapons 
. Chemical weapons.
This format of negotiation has continued to be
acceptable. In a Statement evaluating the work of the
Committee in 1981, the Group of 21 comprising the Non-
aligned States, expressed the view that -
...ad hoc working groups have proved to be the best 
available machinery for the effective conduct of all 
substantive disarmament negotiations in the 
Committee on Disarmament.
In 1979 much of the Committee's time was set aside 
for drawing up its Rules, but in 1980 and 1981, it had 
full agendas of substantive items largely oriented 
towards reaching agreements on NAC issues. The following 
have been the major NAC topics discussed, as initiated in 
19809 and 198110 -
A. A Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
B. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction Including 
Radiological Weapons
C. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear
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D. Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
E. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
While no NAC treaty has emerged, so far, as the
outcome of any part of the Committee's work, significant
progress has been made on a number of items and many
issues have been clarified. In its reports, the
Committee has enumerated all of the pertinent
recommendations and other sources on which negotiations
were based. As well as summarising the conclusions
reached where agreement was possible, it has also
collated the various arguments put forward regarding
those issues that did not produce a consensus.
Assessments of the Committee's achievements, by the
Chinese delegation, for example, attribute considerable
value to those functions, even if they fall short of
constituting concrete agreements. As observed by the
Chinese delegation in August 1981 -
...the statements made by the various delegations 
during the general debate in the Committee and in the 
discussion on specific items in the working groups 
have made clearer the points in common as well as the 
points of divergence on various issues of 
disagreements and increased delegations' 
understanding of each other's positions, which will 
undoubtedly help the future consultations and 
considerations... 1
In order to study the effectiveness of this method of 
norm creation, and to examine the validity of the above 
assessment, each major NAC issue negotiated by the 
Committee on Disarmament since its inception will be 
considered separately.
A. A Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty:
Apart from various proposals by States and groups of 
States, in 1980 the Committee had before it a report on 
the subject by a Group of Experts, submitted by the 
Secretary-General, presenting the background to the 
negotiations as well as making numerous recommendations. 
Other notable documents were the progress report by the 
9 t h a n d  10th1  ^ Sessions of an ad hoc Group of 
Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative 
Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.
During the debates, there was a confirmation of the
view, long held in the United Nations, that the
conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests in all
environments was the first priority of all contemplated
disarmament measures. Previous negotiations on this
subject, discussed in Chapter II, had spanned a quarter
of a century. By 1980, the opinion was overwhelmingly
endorsed that all scientific and technical problems
relating to the verification of the proposed Treaty had
1 sbeen substantially solved and that only political 
commitment was outstanding. However, a few notable 
delegations, including those of the United Kingdom and 
the United States, maintained that some of the vital 
verification issues were still unresolved.
From the beginning of the discussions, many delegates 
claimed that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States were not making sufficient effort to
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promote the conclusion of a Treaty. These three nuclear 
Powers had been engaged in trilateral negotiation of the 
subject for over three years without reaching agreement. 
Committee Members requested that, at the least, the 
Committee should be given a full report concerning the 
state of the negotiations. Towards the end of the 
Committee's 1980 Session this was done^ and Committee 
Members had the opportunity to discuss the report. Among 
several criticisms and proposals, the suggestion was made 
that the three negotiating nuclear Powers should 
immediately stop all testing of nuclear weapons, either 
by way of individual moratoria undertaken by each of them 
or by a trilaterally negotiated moratorium, pending the 
conclusion of a multilateral Treaty on the subject.
In the course of 1981, it became further apparent 
that some States had made only half-hearted efforts 
towards establishing a global network that could verify a 
CTB with indisputable accuracy. The Progress Report of 
the Scientific Experts to Consider International Co­
operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, 
made to the Committee and hence to the Working Group,
17 i oregarding their 11th and 12th Sessions held in 
February and August 1981, left no doubt that the 
scientists engaged in the task failed to receive high 
priority assistance. At the latter meeting, the 
scientists noted the following areas in which additional 
scientific and technical progress was needed -
(a) studies on the use of seismographs and
hydro-acoustic instruments on the ocean 
bottom to improve the detection and 
identification capability for seismic events
in the southern hemisphere; \
(b) widespread digital recording of data from 
se isemog raphs;
(c) automation of the extraction of parameters 
from seismoghraph data;
(d) automation of the data processing at 
international data centres. Organisation 
and co-ordination of the work at these 
centres;
(e) methods to accommodate reporting of large 
earth-quake sequences and swarms. y
Apart from security considerations, there is a major 
legal disincentive for the conclusion of a Comprehensive 
Test-Ban Treaty, being the known intention of two nuclear 
Powers, France and China, to remain aloof from such a 
Treaty and their consistent non-participation in substantive 
negotiations on the subject. As noted previously, there is 
at present not even theoretical justification, let alone 
formal enforcement machinery that could be brought to bear 
on these two States to ensure their compliance, even if an 
overwhelming international consensus were achieved. The 
attitude of the great majority of States, in favour of the 
Treaty, has been expressed in resolutions of the General 
Assembly, notably in the Final Document of SSD I, albeit 
qualified by some disclaimers in the form of "explanation of 
vote" .
The Chinese and French position is not in breach of 
any recognised principle of international law, nor would 
it be if those States failed to accede to an existing 
Treaty on the issue. For example, it has not been 
alleged that those two States are acting contrary to 
international law for non-accession to the almost
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universally adopted Treaty for the prevention of 
horizontal proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Yet, it is very significant that the two States have 
complied with the applicable provisions of that Treaty, 
and that China has gone so far as to accede to Protocol 
II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
The international expectation appears to be that, with
the success of the Trilateral Negotiations and endorsement
by the Committee on Disarmament of the elements of a
Treaty, the resulting Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty would
be adopted by most States. China and France might then
decide to conform to the extent of abiding by its
provisions. ü However, the military plans of those
States would be directly affected by a ban on nuclear
testing. Therefore, in this instance, France and China
might decide to defy international consensus in the form
of an almost universally adopted Treaty, not only by
failing to become Parties but also by refusing to comply
with its provisions. The concern of the Soviet Union and
its allies on this issue was expressed in a Statement to
the Committee on Disarmament in the following terms -
The socialist States... expect that those two nuclear- 
weapon States which do not take part in the above 
negotiations determine more clearly their attitudes 
to the creation of an ad hoc working group on a 
nuclear test ban and express their readiness to take 
part in the preparation of a treaty on the complete 
and general prohibition of nuclearweapon tests and to 
take over corresponding obligations under that 
treaty.21
To what extent a decision along those lines would 
depend on the prevailing legal position is difficult to 
estimate with any degree of confidence. This aspect of
78
the question will be explored in the following Chapters. 
There it will be suggested that, if a clearly defined 
legal obligation existed imposing at least a theoretical 
duty to comply with internationally adopted standards of 
State conduct, it could substantially influence decision­
making by States contemplating defiance of international 
opinion in such circumstances.
Apart from problems of verification and universal 
accession by nuclear-weapon States, the two Superpowers 
and the United Kingdom may be reluctant to conclude a CTB 
because they wish to continue perfecting nuclear weapons, 
requiring test explosions to do so. Another weighty 
consideration is that a treaty would prohibit even the 
occasional testing of existing nuclear arsenals, so as to 
establish their persisting efficacy, against the 
possibility of deterioration or sabotage.
In the opinion of Non-aligned States, even this genre
of fundamental objections could be overcome if the
Committee on Disarmament were able to assume a greater
role in the negotiations. As they see it, the procedure
would entail the setting up of a Working Group to deal
specifically with the subject, and the exercise of
concerted pressures on the trilateral negotiators to
report fully and frankly all outstanding differences
between them. Contrary to some measure of reporting in
1980, at the conclusion of the 1981 session of the
Committee, many delegates felt it was -
...regrettable that the parties which had been 
engaged in trilateral negotiations on this subject 
did not respond, either jointly or individually, to
79
the question posed to them...on issues which are of 
vital concern to both nuclear-weapon States and 
non-nuclear-weapon States alike.
During a debate on the issue, the delegate of Nigeria, 
Ambassador 0. Adeniji, went so far as to question the good 
faith of the three nuclear-weapon States concerned, by 
saying that -
When a commitment to negotiate is coupled with refusal to 
accept the basic machinery for effectively undertaking the 
we are bound to doubt if good faith is
Their inability to obtain the necessary universal
consent for additional ad hoc Working Groups in 1981,
including one on a CTB, led to bitter recriminations during
plenary sessions by the States belonging to the Group of 21.
They pointed out that the rule of consensus had its
limitations«. For example, Rule 25 of the Committee's Rules
of Procedure, qualifies the consensus method as follows -
The approval by consensus of reports shall not be 
interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential 
requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully 
the positions of all the members of the respective 
o rgans.
In a Working Paper on the establishment of subsidiary
organs of the Committee, the Group of 21 recommended,
unsuccessfully, the following additions to Rule 25 -
The rule of consensus shall not be used either in 
such a way as to prevent the establishment of 
subsidiary organs for the effective performance of 
the functions of the Committee, in conformity with 
the provisions of rule 23. 4
This instance of the inability of the great majority of
States to exert their influence, even to the extent of
determining negotiating procedure, is a telling
illustration of the negative aspects of negotiation by
universal consensus.
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B. New Types of Weapons of Nass Destruction
Including Radiological Weapons:
An ad hoc Working Group was established by the 
Committee to deal with that portion of the topic relating 
to the negotiation of a Convention Prohibiting the 
Development Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Radiological Weapons. As radiological weapons are only a 
the research and development stage, they are still the 
subject of argument regarding definition. The weapons 
being developed could cause destruction, damage or injury 
by means of radiation produced by the decay of 
radioactive material that would be disseminated by means 
other than a nuclear explosive device. The definition, 
as presently envisaged, would not include particle-beam 
weapons, which produce radiation in ways other than 
through radioactive decay. Although by definition, the 
contemplated weapons are not "nuclear" weapons, they are 
in practice akin to those weapons, being non-explosive 
radioactive weapons.
From the point of view of norm creation by the 
Committee on Disarmament, it is an interesting case 
because, by mid-1979, the Soviet Union and the United 
States had already submitted an agreed Joint Proposal on 
a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stock­
piling and use of radiological weapons.^ The agreement 
was in a form that could have been readily endorsed and
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recommended for plenipotentiary negotiations to conclude
a final draft for multilateral signature. The 
Committee's attention was repeatedly drawn to this fact 
and a reference to it was eventually included in the end- 
of-session Statement by the Socialist States, in August 
1981, as follows -
The delegations of the socialist countries believe 
that in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament could have 
completed the drafting of a treaty on the prohibition 
of radiological weapons.
This Working Group's approach to its task 
conclusively demonstrated that it is not only Superpower 
rivalry or problems of verification, adjudication or 
enforcement of NAC agreements that inhibit their timely 
conclusion. The reluctance to commitment in this 
instance suggests that procrastination may have become 
endemic in NAC negotiations. Unlike the negotiation of 
other issues, where the Committee has been faced with 
irreconcilable positions adopted by the two major Power 
Blocks, or where overwhelming and imminent security issues 
were at stake, in this case failure to reach agreement was 
the result of many diverse and contradictory amendments of 
marginal significance regarding the definition of terms and 
the scope of the proposed Treaty.
Uncharacteristically, the most persistent obstruction 
came from Sweden, which, for no apparent international 
reason, attempted to link the proposed Treaty with the 
inviolability of commercial nuclear reactors. The 
unexceptionable response from Ambassador P. Lukes, of 
Czechoslovakia, was as follows -
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We share the concern of the Swedish delegation as 
regards the importance of the protection of civilian 
nuclear facilities. This problem is not new, and the 
concern of many countries has already been reflected 
in the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, as well as in several 
other documents of international law... With all 
this in mind we tend, like several other delegations, 
to be in favour of finding a way of dealing with this 
very complicated and very specific problem of the 
enforcement of the existing rules for the protection 
of nuclear facilities separately from the 
radiological weapons treaty. °
Ambassador de Souza E Silva, of Brazil, objected to
the proposed complaints procedure, despite its conformity
with complaints provisions in a number of NAC treaties,
on the ground that it was discriminatory. It would
"confer a privileged status on some of the parties", he
said, "if the complaints procedure made use of the
Security Council of the United Nations", and added -
We fail to see the merit of establishing a procedure 
that can easily be blocked by a handful of nations, 
among which, incidentally, are included those that 
possess the technological means to contemplate the 
production of radiological weapons. y
For its part, Romania gave great weight to two issues 
that had been raised in discussion,of very doubtful 
relevance to a Treaty on radiological weapons, being 
"the peaceful application of nuclear energy" and "the 
relationship between the convention and the nuclear 
disarmament process". Ambassador M. Malita referred to 
those issues as "fundamental problems on which the 
success of the convention depends"
Criticism of the Treaty by the Yugoslav delegate, 
Ambassador M. Vrhunec, concentrated on the definition of 
radiological weapons. Because the description adopted by
, . . • <
the Superpowers excluded nuclear weapons from the
definition of radiological weapons, Yugoslavia feared 
that this would "imply the direct or indirect 
legitimation of nuclear weapons". It was an approach 
to treaty interpretation, periodically echoed by other 
States at the United Nations, that would make nonsense of 
all arms control treaties, because each limitation placed 
on a weapon could be taken as a licence for the unlimited 
deployment and use of all other weapons. However, the 
opposite opinion was also presented to the Working Group, 
as noted in its 1981 Report.^
On any consistent interpretation of the definition, 
as originally proposed, of radiological weapons, it must 
be self-evident that the differentiation between the two 
weapons merely states that weapons having the additional 
properties possessed by explosive "nuclear weapons" are 
to be excluded from the operation of the particular 
Treaty, not that their use is thereby sanctioned.
Further, if there were any doubt about that, it could be 
stated in a simple explanatory clause.
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Notwithstanding the patently pinpricking nature of 
the objections, Yugoslavia, like the other Non-aligned 
States, persisted in stalling the conclusion of a Treaty 
on radiological weapons. Ambassador Vrhunec continued 
with the assertion that, "A very important circumstance 
is that radiological weapons in a concrete, operative and 
physical form are unknown." He then proceeded, in the 
next sentence, to assert that, "This was the reason why
- ■ • \  \
we focused our definition on specific characteristics of
radiological weapons"/ followed by the further
contention, regarding the non-existent weapons, that,
"Numerous scientifically-founded facts indisputably
confirm that the basic characteristic of a radiological
weapon is that it inflicts injury on living beings by its
3 3ionizing radiation."
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However, the coup de grace was administered by
Brazil, with the complaint that -
It should not be difficult to imagine the dismay of 
the membership of the United Nations if the Committee 
on Disarmament cannot go beyond presenting the 
international community, at the forthcoming General 
Assembly, with a draft text on weapons that do not 
exist, and which according to some expert opinion do 
not stand even the chance of ever existing, and 
reporting at the same time that no progress has been 
accomplished on measures deemed vitally urgent by the 
higher forum on repeated occasions.
It will be noted below, in connection with anti­
satellite weapons and exoatmospheric anti-ballistic 
missile systems, that radiological weapons do exist, 
albeit in a form that is still not sufficiently
destructive to warrant their deployment in preference to
3 5alternative weapons.
During the negotiations in the Working Group, the 
assessment by Sweden of the impracticality of 
radiological weapons appears to have carried much weight. 
The view denigrating the topicality of the subject was 
restated by Swedish Ambassador C. Lidgard, who declared 
that -
Studies which have been undertaken by the competent 
scientific and technical institutions in Sweden since 
the early 1950s, and which have now again been
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carefully examined, show that the development of 
specific radiological weapons, as defined by the 
drafters, is a very remote possibility. They could 
hardly become practical weapons of mass destruction 
or have any effective use in the battlefield. A 
radiological weapon of sufficient strength for 
denying an enemy access to significant areas of 
terrain would be almost impossible to fabricate, 
handle or deliver.^
The stance adopted by Sweden and the other Non- 
aligned States overlooked the consideration that, should 
the weapons remain impractical for a lengthy period, no 
harm could result from banning them, whereas the converse 
error of assessment about the "remote possibility" of 
their utility, could clearly have the gravest 
consequences.
In any event, the point which the Non-aligned States 
had made in the Committee on innumerable occasions was, 
that the Superpowers should be encouraged to reach 
whatever specific items of arms control they could agree 
to, bearing in mind the adverse political relations 
between them. Yet, in the case of the agreement on 
banning radiological weapons the process of accommodation 
was hindered, above all, by several of the States usually 
pressing for more NAC measures to be adopted.
The Committee on Disarmament in plenary session 
considered other types of new weapons of mass destruction 
(NWMD). It attempted, unsuccessfully, to define "weapons 
of mass destruction" and to decide whether an expert 
study should be commissioned on the subject. It was 
proposed that a Group of Experts be requested to prepare 
a draft comprehensive agreement on individual types of 
weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such
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weapons, and it was further proposed that the Experts be 
requested to keep the Committee constantly informed of 
developments in this field.
In contrast to the negotiations on radiological 
weapons, where Committee Members failed to adopt a 
practically ready made agreement, supported by both the 
United States and the Soviet Union, in the matter of new 
weapons of mass destruction, there was no draft, no 
outline of the topic or programme of work before the 
Committee, and even the ambit of the subject matter was 
in doubt.
In a Working Paper on the subject, Hungary suggested 
that, pending the establishment of a formal Group of 
Experts, there should be informal meetings between 
experts to explore suitable methods of approach. The 
following headings were proposed as the basis of 
preliminary expert discussions -
. Review of questions related to the definition of 
new types of weapons of mass destruction as well as the 
criteria on the basis of which particular weapons fall 
under certain categories of NWMD on the basis of the 
formula of 1948 taking also into account the advance 
reached in the field of science and technology.
. Review of the trends of the development of 
technology especially in the military field, identifying 
particular areas where the progress may contemplate 
emergence of NWMD.
. Recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament 
as to the methods of further work and negotiations,
87
including the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts.
. Other relevant aspects, experts may deem
necessary to bring to the consideration of the 
8 7Committee.J
The scope of the subject matter of new types of 
weapons of mass destruction is, by definition, limitless, 
both in terms of possible weapons to be controlled and 
the duration of the danger posed by the introduction of 
the weapons. The issues to be addressed under this 
heading go to the core of the problem of the 
circumvention of existing NAC agreements, adverted to in 
Chapter I. In view of these considerations, the proposal 
to set up a Group of Experts to monitor the emergence of, 
inter alia, new types of nuclear weapons and systems of 
weapons, was significant. Had an agreement been reached 
and implemented on this point in the Committee on 
Disarmament, it could have had a more far reaching effect 
on NAC than a formal NAC treaty, duly signed and 
ratified, on a less significant matter. Concerning the 
issue of new weapons of mass destruction, agreement on a 
method of approach could be expected to establish 
fundamental new principles regarding circumvention.
In the absence of agreement on the establishment of a 
Group of Experts, the functions envisaged have been 
fulfilled, to some extent, by several highly respected 
peace research organisations. Independent assessments 
regarding the development of nuclear weapons systems, 
especially those made by theStockholminternational Peace 
Research Institute, are frequently quoted by States at
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the United Nations during NAG debates. In September 1980 
another expert body was established outside the United 
Nations, which could fulfil some of the functions 
contemplated to be addressed by an Expert Group to the 
Committee on Disarmament on the subject.
Although that body, the Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues, has no formal connection
with the United Nations, many of its members and advisers
have represented their respective countries at the United
Nations in recent times. Commission members from all
five regional groupings, recognised by the United Nations
for the application of the principle of equitable
geographical distribution, take part in the
deliberations. The Commission makes periodic
recommendations on NAC issues like the SALT process, the
verification of proposed new NAC treaties, and the
operation of the ABM Treaty. Regarding the
identification of new weapons of mass destruction and
appropriate agreements for their control, the Commission
has met a need brought to light during the deliberations
3 8of the Committee on Disarmament.
When weighting the relative effectiveness of various 
approaches to the creation of NAC agreements, it is 
appropriate to take into account all of the threads that 
constitute the fabric of accommodation. Interaction 
between the Committee and the Commission, especially in 
relation to forestalling a new spiral in the nuclear arms 
race, is a particularly revealing example of the 
intertwining sub-structure of emerging international
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opinion.
C. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear 
Disarmament:
This topic has been a catch-all, especially useful
for the introduction of NAC issues not being considered
by ad hoc Working Groups. Apart from proposed treaties
for a CTB and the prohibition of radiological weapons, as
well as recommendations for the ratification of the SALT
II Treaty, the NAC issues discussed by the Committee on
Disarmament have presented no immediate prospect of
agreement on specific measures. That is not to deny that
NAC issues exist that would be amenable to rapid
negotiation. For instance, the Indian delegate to the
Committee, Ambassador A.P. Venkateswaran, regarded the
following items as falling within that category -
(i) a complete and immediate freeze on the deployment 
of new types of nuclear weapons and their means of 
delivery, (ii) a complete and immediate halt to the 
replacement of existing missiles, aircraft and other 
nuclear delivery vehicles by new and modernized 
versions, (iii) a ban on the increase of the 
megatonnage of existing nuclear warheads, 
irrespective of the delivery vehicle on which they 
are mounted.
Negotiating stages usually proceed from the general 
to the particular, and each stage is of importance 
towards the achievement of the ultimate goal. However, 
the greatest political resistance tends to occur towards 
the final steps, including agreement on all of the 
elements of a treaty and their incorporation into a 
binding instrument. There can be input from sources 
outside the United Nations regarding acceptable
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formulations at all stages of the NAC negotiating 
process, from the identification of the general concepts 
to concurrence about blanket obligations and, finally, 
the elaboration of specific measures.
The sequence of such negotiations consits of :
(a) Agreement on the scope of the subject matter and 
the need to take international action with respect to it; 
among the crucial NAC topics still at the stage of 
general principle was the suggestion for an agreement to 
prohibit the further flight-testing of strategic delivery 
vehicles. While agreement was not even reached on the 
desirability of imposing a prohibition of this activity, 
it was pinpointed as an issue worthy of intensive 
negotiation.
(b) The identification of conflicting interests and 
outlooks; for example the negotiation on affective 
international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon 
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons revealed eight distinctive stand points.
(c) The elaboration, in increasingly more detail, of 
the scope and consequences of the proposed NAC agreement; 
for example the negotiation on the prohibition of 
radiological weapons examined the detailed implications 
of the proposed Treaty.
(d) Resolution of the areas of disagreement by 
compromise, the introduction of new machinery provisions, 
and narrowing of the topic to exclude irreconcilable
clauses; for example, negotiations to overcome the
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outstanding impediments to the conclusion of on a CTB.
Negotiations in the Committee confirmed that the NATO 
and Warsaw Pact countries persist in their different 
approaches to the measures to be adopted for the halting 
of the nuclear arms competition, although the positions 
are not diametrically opposed. For instance, the Western 
States favour an agreement for the cessation of production 
of fissionable material for weapons p u r p o s e s . T h e  
Soviet Union and other Socialist States would prefer wide- 
ranging negotiations on ending the production of all types 
of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles 
until they have been completely destroyed.^ The Non- 
aligned States pressed the Committee to establish a further 
ad hoc Working Group to undertake intensive negotiations on 
those specific topics, as well as on additional subjects, 
such as concrete measures for the prevention of nuclear war 
and an examination of the doctrines of nuclear deterrence.
A major problem confronting the international 
community on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear 
arms race, including the prevention of nuclear war 
breaking out in the short term, and doctrines of nuclear 
deterrence delineating long term R and D policies, is 
that these matters are effectively in the hands of the 
Superpowers. Irrespective of the theoretical equality of 
States, it is universally acknowledged that, in practice, 
the choices lie with the United States and the Soviet
Union.
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The immutability of this situation in the foreseeable
future has given rise to two theoretical corollaries;
firstly, it is asserted that the greater potential to
cause nuclear war by the Superpowers has to be
accompanied by their commensurately greater
responsibility towards mankind; and secondly, that
bilateral processes to this end are the legitimate
concern of all other States, because third parties are
affected by those processes. During the debate it was
emphasized by delegates that, while bilateral and NAC
issues were primarily the responsibility of the States
concerned, the nuclear arms race has universal
implications and is therefore an appropriate subject for
multilateral negotation in all its aspects. Ambassador
Venkateswaran of India put it this way -
Today the worsening state of confrontation among the 
major Powers makes it even more necessary for the 
non-aligned and neutral countries to play an active 
role in the prevention of a nuclear war and the negotiation of urgent measures of nuclear 
disarmament. This would be in the obvious interest of 
the major Powers and their allies themselves just as 
it would be in the interest of the non-aligned and 
neutral countries. ■
Contribution by other States to the process for NAC 
between the Superpowers in the SALT related negotiations 
has not been excluded from the area of competence claimed 
by the Non-aligned States for themselves. It is 
noteworthy that the subject matter of the SALT-related 
treaties in Table II, concerns only weapons possessed by 
the Soviet Union and the United States, and does not name 
or directly involve any third State. Therefore, with 
reference to the principles of international law, the 
proposition that third parties have an interest in the
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negotiations, merely because they could be incidentally 
affected, is a novel one. It is an area where theory may 
have to yield to the exigencies of technological change. 
As the Group of 21 commented in a Statement to the 
Committee -
...all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have a 
vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament, 
because the existence of nuclear weapons in the 
arsenals of a handful of Powers directly and 
fundamentally jeopardizes the security of the whole 
world.43
The Statement further asserted that, "a nuclear war would 
affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike".44 
Finally, the Non-aligned States making up the Group 
rejected as "politically and morally unjustifiable that 
the security of the whole world should be made to depend 
on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon 
States". It was therefore recommended that the Committee 
set up an ad hoc Working Group to commence "multilateral 
negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear 
and non-nuclear-weapon States alike", as follows -
(i) the elaboration and clarification of the stages 
of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph i 50 
of the Final Document including identification of 
the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States 
and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in 
the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;
(ii) clarification of the issues involved in
prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the 
prevention of nuclear war;
(iii) clarification of the issues involved in
eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear 
deterrence;
(iv) measures to ensure an effective discharge by the 
CD of its role as the single multilateral 
negotiating body in the field of disarmament and 
in this context its relationship with 
negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament 
conducted in bilateral, regional and other
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restricted fora. °
Nevertheless, the substantive issues of the SALT 
negotiations were not canvassed, nor was there a move to 
apportion culpability between the Superpowers for the 
arrest of the SALT process. The declaration of the 
principle of a universal right to involvement in the 
limitation of strategic arms seemed to be intended more 
as an intimation of positions to be adopted in the 
future, should the negotiating hiatus continue, than as a 
signal of imminent international intervention in the 
bilateral process.
D. Assurances to Non-nuclear-weapon States:
The ad hoc Working Group on effective international 
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, has made 
only modest headway towards its goal of attaining 
agreement on a common formula that could be included in 
an "international instrument of a legally binding 
character".^
In Chapter II it was suggested that, in the absence 
of a first strike capability, the practical assurances 
against first use of nuclear weapons are a fear of 
retaliation by a nuclear power and/or a universal 
coalition against the culprit Government, possibly 
including some of its own citizens. It was also 
suggested that condemnation could only be avoided if the 
weapons were used defensively, to escape from an
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overwhelmingly adverse situation not brought about by the 
user's own actions.
Although it is not stated in these frankly pragmatic 
terms, the objective of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon 
States is to circumscribe, with the greatest possible 
accuracy, those extraordinary situations when the use of 
nuclear weapons may be excused and, by a process of 
elimination, to declare all other possible uses of the 
weapons to be heinous crimes against humanity. Hence, 
even the defensive use of nuclear weapons is to be 
outlawed in most situations.
Both positive and negative security assurances are
contemplated. Globally, the most significant positive
security assurance was given by the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and the United States, in Resolution
255(1968), jointly sponsored by them in the Security
Council, whereby they undertook to extend immediate aid
to any non-nuclear-weapon State attacked or threatened
4 8with nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances 
to the non-nuclear-weapon States have been given by all 
of the nuclear-weapon States during SSD I and again 
presented to the Committee on Disarmament in 1980 as 
follows -
China: Complete prohibition and total destruction
of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination 
of nuclear war and nuclear threats. We are aware 
that its realization is no easy matter. This being 
the case, we hold that the nuclear-weapon States 
should at least undertake not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon 
States and nuclear-free-zones. On its own initiative 
and unilaterally, China long ago declared that at no 
time and in no circumstances would it be the first to 
use nuclear weapons.49
France:
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To negotiate with nuclear-free zones 
participants in order to contract effective and 
binding commitments, as appropriate, precluding any 
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the 
States of these zones. ®
Soviet Union: To offer a binding commitment in a new
international convention not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States 
parties to such a convention which renounce the 
production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and 
which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or 
under their jurisdiction or control, and to consult 
whenever any party to the convention has reason to 
believe that the actions of any other party are in 
violation of this commitment.
The Soviet Union, for its part, wishes to 
state as emphatically as it can that we are against 
the use of nuclear weapons, that only extraordinary 
circumstances, only aggression against our country or 
its allies by another nuclear Power, could compel us 
to have recourse to that extreme means of self- 
defence. The Soviet Union is doing and will do all 
in its power to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war 
and to protect the peoples from becoming the victims 
of nuclear strikes, whether initial or retaliatory. 
This is our steadfast policy, and we shall act in 
accordance with it.
I wish also solemnly to declare that the 
Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against 
those States which renounce the production and 
acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on 
their territory. 1
United Kingdom: Not to use nuclear weapons against States 
which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or 
other internationally binding commitments not to 
manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices 
except in the case of an attack on the United 
Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces 
or its allies by such State in association or 
alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. ^
United States: Not to use nuclear weapons against any 
non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty or any comparable 
internationally binding commitment not to acquire 
nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an 
attack on the United States, its territories or armed 
forces or its allies by such a State allied to a 
nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear- 
weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the 
attack.  ^^
The diversity and imprecision of the undertakings
should be noted. For example, not being "the first to
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use nuclear weapons", as undertaken by China, is 
ambiguous. It could relate to a conflict at a particular 
time and place with a specific enemy, or to a region, or 
the whole world. Would China's undertaking preclude the 
use of nuclear weapons by that country after such weapons 
had been used in a broad conflict beyond China's borders? 
Strictly speaking, having been used on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, "first use" of nuclear weapons is no longer 
possible.
The undertaking by the Soviet Union is also ambiguous 
in several ways, for example, by the failure to 
enumerate or to define that country's allies, and by 
referring to countries that do not have nuclear weapons 
"on their territory", without elaboration. It is not 
clear whether the latter exception refers only to 
countries with permanent nuclear bases or also to those 
with communications centres or providing refuelling or 
other temporary facilities to craft armed with nuclear 
weapons.
Notwithstanding some uncertainties, the Chinese and 
Soviet negative security assurances regarding the use of 
nuclear weapons are more extensive and definite than 
those given by the other nuclear-weapon States. The 
large land areas and commensurate conventionally armed 
military forces possessed by the Soviet Union and China, 
could be contributing factories making the more 
stringent undertakings feasible.
By comparison, the undertakings given by the United
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Kingdom and the United States are even less predictable 
because they countenance the use of nuclear weapons, not 
only in defence of undefined allies, but also of the 
armed forces of those nuclear-weapon States wherever they 
may be in whatever capacity. Furthermore, that right is 
reserved irrespective of the entirely non-nuclear status 
of the adversaries against whom the weapon is to be used, 
provided they are "associated" with a nuclear-weapon 
State. In accordance with the terms of these 
undertakings, the use of nuclear weapons would have been 
permissible during the Korean and Vietnam wars while 
United States troops were engaged in military action on 
the territories of those countries.
The statement made by France does not amount to any 
kind of undertaking to exercise restraint in the use of 
nuclear weapons. It is merely an indication of 
willingness to conduct negotiations .with members of 
nuclear-free-zones. At present these only exist in Latin 
America and Antarctica, the two continents in respect of 
which France has already entered into treaty obligations 
to refrain from the deployment or use of nuclear 
weapons.
Nuclear-weapon States have, in effect, undertaken to 
refrain from the use of nuclear weapons aggressively and, 
by implication, in some situations of self-defence. As 
the distinction between aggressive and defensive situations 
is not always obvious, an explicit undertaking not to 
use nuclear weapons defensively, except in clearly defined 
extreme circumstances, could have a genuinely restraining
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effect, especially on the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons.
Prohibition of aggression and permission for self- 
defence are already provided for in the Charter of the 
United Nations. Article 2, requires States to abjure 
"the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State", while 
Article 51, guarantees "the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations".
The Committee on Disarmament established an ad hoc 
Working Group in 1979, to consider security assurances to 
non-nuclear-weapon States. Since SSD I, three basic 
attitudes to the issue have emerged. The first was put 
forward by the Soviet Union in a draft Convention, with 
operative provisions in Articles I and II, as follows -
Article I
The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention 
pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties 
to this Convention which renounce the production and 
acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no 
nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under 
their jurisdiction or control, on land, on the sea, 
in the air or in outer space.
Article II
The obligations set forth in Article I of this 
Convention shall extend not only to the territory of 
non-nuclear States Parties, but also the armed 
forces and installations under the jurisdiction and 
control of such States wherever they may be, on 
land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space.
An alternative formulation of the draft Convention
was proposed by Pakistan in the following terms -
Article I
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The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention, 
as a first step towards the complete ban on the use 
or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pledge 
themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties 
to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear- 
weapon States.
This undertaking is without prejudice to the 
obligation of States Parties to this Convention 
arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon- 
free zones.
Article II
The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention 
also undertake to avoid the possibility of the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons in any contingency 
and to achieve nuclear disarmament, resulting in the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in the 
shortest possible time.
As in the individual security assurances given by the 
five nuclear-weapon States, restraint in defensive use is 
tacitly implied in both drafts, but neither draft 
acknowledges this explicitly. It is noteworthy that 
similarly non-specific formulations are used in other 
existing and proposed treaties to ban the use of certain 
weapons, including biological, chemical, radiological, 
and excessively harmful conventional weapons. The 
difference is that, in those instances, the destruction 
of all militarily significant stockpiles of weapons is 
contemplated, guaranteeing their non-use in any 
circumstances, whereas that is not the case with respect 
to nuclear weapons.
During negotiations, Western States did not favour a 
multilateral convention of any kind, on the ground that 
the diversity of the security requirements of the various 
nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States would make the
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operation of any convention inequitable. Concurrently 
with that position, the Western view has been that the 
solemn undertakings by States as unilateral declarations 
carry a genuine, if undefined, element of binding force. 
In the words of the United States, the individual pledges 
made at SSD I, "represent an immediately effective
5 5measure of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States".
A Working Paper presented by the United Kingdom in April
1981, claimed that its undertaking, as confirmed at the
second NPT Review Conference, was "fully in force". The
submission of the United Kingdom added that -
Much of the discussion about security assurances has 
been concerned with the possibility of making them 
"legally binding"... In these circumstances 
attention has focussed on the possibility of 
enhancing the political status of the various 
assurances given by Nuclear-Weapon States. The 
United Kingdom doubts the need for any such 
enhancement of its own assurance since it already regards it as a solemn underetaking. b
Ruling out the-possibi1ity of a generally acceptable 
world-wide treaty, the Western States proposed as a 
gesture of compromise, that the pledges made by the 
nuclear-weapon States in the course of SSD I should be 
incorporated into a General Assembly resolution, in order 
to formalise them in an internationally recognised 
manner. As this approach to internationally binding 
agreements was not acceptable to the Non-aligned and 
Socialist States, the issues remained unresolved.
A strictly legal evaluation of this dispute would be 
misleading. The point of contention was not the 
principles of law as to what constitutes a binding 
international agreement, or whether States genuinely
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regarded themselves, as they claimed, to be obligated to 
observe an undertaking given in one or other form. The 
essence of the difference of opinion concerned the 
establishment of a common formula that would greatly 
alter, in favour of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the 
substance of the undertakings already given. It may be 
unfortunate with respect to the development of 
international law, that the motivations for the dispute 
were not spelled out and separated from the legal 
principle that was casually invoked.
During negotiations it was agreed, in general terms, 
that non-nuclear-weapon States should be assured against 
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Significant 
headway was made with the identification of two main 
questions regarding the application of the proposed 
a r rangements:
(1) the criteria for extending the undertakings; and
(2) the exceptions in the undertakings associated with 
the right of self-defence.
The Group made significant progress, from general to 
particular concepts, when it differentiated between the 
basic elements of several negotiating positions. The 
analysis highlights the fundamental differences, as well 
as the many uncertainties, contained in the security 
assurances offered individually by the nuclear-weapon 
States. The alternative elements extracted from the 
undertakings in 1380 were -
pending nuclear disarmament, a complete prohibition
on the use of nuclear weapons;
the extension of arrangements, pending a complete
103prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, to all 
non-nuclear-weapon States without any condition or 
limitations;
the extension of arrangements to all non-nuclear- 
weapon States which were not parties to the nuclear 
security arrangements of some nuclear Powers;
the extension of arrangements to States which 
renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and which have no nuclear weapons on their 
territories or under their jurisdiction or control;
the extension of arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon 
States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any 
other comparable internationally binding commitment 
not to acquire nuclear explosive devices;
the extension of arrangements to non-nuclear-weapon 
States parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
During 1981 another two elements were differentiated
C Oand the formulations were expanded. In view of the 
demonstrably incompatible positions that emerged, it 
became necessary to consider the possibility of interim 
arrangements. An effort to narrow the gap between the 
varying positions led to a proposal for the Security 
Council, on the recommendation of the General Assembly, 
to adopt concrete measures for the assurance of non­
nuclear-weapon States. Neither this, nor any other 
compromise suggestion has been acceptable to all power 
blocks. The most favourable assessment of the 
negotiation was made by Ambassador Saw Hlaing of Burma, 
who stated that -
In an effort to find [such] a common formula or 
approach, the Ad Hoc Working Group, under the 
chairmanship of Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, has 
mobilized all its negotiating power to recgncile
different formulations into a cohesive one that would5 9be acceptable to all.
By the end of 1981, although important progress had 
been made in identifying the points of agreement and 
disagreement, the terms of a universally acceptable
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Convention could not be formulated, nor could the several 
unilateral undertakings be given a universally 
acknowledged legal character.
E. A Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament:
When first formulated, this topic was envisaged as a long 
term agenda for the negotiation of arms control issues.
It consisted of the restatement of NAC priorities that 
had already been identified in the Final Document and had 
been re-evaluated, without any substantial changes, by 
the Disarmament Commission during its 1979 Session. The 
substantive issues had also been elaborated, once more, 
in a Draft Declaration designating the 1980s as the 
Second United Nations Decade on Disarmament.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Disarmament set up an ad 
hoc Working Group to prepare a text.
Subsequently, it was decided by the Preparatory 
Committee for SSD II, that adoption of the Comprehensive 
Programme was to be the cornerstone of deliberations at 
the Special Session. As a consequence, during 1981, the 
subject was addressed with renewed vigour, as indicated 
by the 41 working papers submitted on the Comprehensive 
Programme of Disarmament to the Committee on Disarmament 
during 1981, in addition to the official documents 
presented to the Committee. 0^
While the submissions contain many variations of the 
general theme, there was no change in the consensus, 
repeatedly reiterated in 1980 and 1981, that the Final
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Document agreed to at SSD I should form the basis of the 
Comprehensive Programme, and that there should be no 
departure from its terms. For example, in the draft 
submitted by Australia, Belgium, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom, it was noted 
that -
The present draft is based on the Final Document of 
the First Special Session of the General Assembly 
devoted to Disarmament, in which the Comprehensive 
Programme was outlined as encompassing all measures 
thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the 
goal of general and complete disarmament under 
effective international control becomes a reality, 
and on the Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of 
Disarmament which have been adopted by the 
Disarmament Commission. The draft reflects in 
particular the discussions and negotiations held so 
far in the Committee on Disarmament and the report of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive 
Programme.
The submission of the Group of 21 on the principles to be 
embodied in the Comprehensive Programme, assumed as 
axiomatic that all the principles contained in the Final 
Document would be included, adding that, "even those that 
are not to be found in the Final Document but which may
fi 9be found appropriate", should be included.
The Socialist States have also maintained a similar 
position, as stated at the inception of negotiations on 
the Comprehensive Programme in the Committee by the 
delegate of the Soviet Union, Ambassador V.L. Issraelyan. 
He said -
The Soviet delegation considers, as previously, that 
in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of 
disarmament, States must above all adhere 
unswervingly to the provisions contained in the Final 
Document of the special session of the General 
Assembly devoted to Disarmament and in the 
Commission's report, and must strictly comply with 
the balanced formulations which, as we all recall, 
were arrived at with such great difficulty.63
As the Comprehensive Programme, by definition, 
encompasses all NAC programmes, the discrepancy in 
proposed formulations of the document under consideration 
was to be expected. However, the area of most acute 
contention has been the binding character of the 
undertaking to be attributed to every State prepared to 
adopt the text. Many of the States that consented to the 
Final Document at the conclusion of SSD I, advised the 
Wo'rking Group that they regarded more concrete 
undertakings, as to the treaties into which they would be 
prepared to enter in the future, to be impractical. In 
particular, they objected to the proposal put forward by 
developing States, that rigid time frames should be set 
for the completion of the various phases of arms 
control.
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The arguments presented had not persuaded the States
belonging to the Group of 21, by the time the Committee
rose prior to the commencement of the 36th regular
Session of the General Assembly, when the original
demands were restated in the following terms -
The Group of 21 attaches considerable importance to 
the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of 
Disarmament at the second special session of the 
United Nations General Assembly devoted to 
disarmament. To be meaningful, the Programme must 
contain concrete disarmament measures in defined 
stages leading to the ultimate [goal] of general and 
complete disarmament within an agreed time frame. In 
accordance with provisions of paragraph 38 of the 
Final Document which refers, inter alia, to the 
negotiation of a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament, a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament 
should create obligations on the part of all States 
to implement the measures included in the Programme.^
There is no possibility of the Western States
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entering into a treaty, or even consenting to a 
declaration, which requires them to undertake 
international obligations the terms of which have not 
been settled. In the domestic jurisdictions of those 
States, a contract to enter into further contracts that 
are only vaguely defined in character, would be adjudged 
void or voidable on account of uncertainty. Indeed the 
proposition to impose rigid time frames on negotiations 
runs counter to every known principle of law, domestic 
and international, because it seeks to make legal 
entities responsible for events that are, at least in 
part, beyond their control.
Evaluation of the Committee's Norm Creating Role
Despite frequent references in the Committee to the 
legal nature of its undertaking to create internationally 
binding agreements, the formulation of relevant legal 
principles has been invariably vague, and often 
subordinated to the exigencies of a particular advantage 
sought.
The problem has arisen with each major topic 
discussed. For instance, during negotiations on 
radiological weapons, the rules of treaty interpretation 
with respect to the definition of the weapons were 
disregarded. Concerning the cessation of the nuclear 
arms race and nuclear disarmament, the existence of 
any rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to become 
involved in treaties only applicable to nuclear-weapon 
States, remained unresolved. In the case of assurances to 
non-nuclear-weapon States, the "binding" nature of
108
unilateral undertakings - made at international 
conferences, in Security Council resolutions, or 
incorporated into General Assembly declarations - was not 
determined. In connection with a comprehensive programme 
of disarmament, the Committee failed to face up to the 
legal implications of attempting to impose time frames on 
negotiations.
With respect to a CTB, a legal approach to a non- 
legal matter could have been beneficial. As it was, no 
attempt was made to determine the degree of certainty 
required to amount to an "adequate" level of 
verification, although this was the issue said to prevent 
agreement. There can be little substance in an agreement 
if there is no possibility of discerning whether or not 
its terms are implemented. Yet, if the certainty of 
instant discovery of every possible breach is to be the 
criterion of adequate verification, then the possibility 
of further NAC agreements can be dismissed. It would be 
appropriate, therefore, to delineate the approximate 
requirements of adequate verification of an agreement.
It is worth noting that the above issues have not 
been widely discussed by international lawyers beyond the 
United Nations, which indicates a dichotomy between the 
theory and practice of international law regarding NAC. 
Lack of concern to pursue a consistent approach to 
international law by NAC negotiators, is matched by a 
corresponding absence of interest by international 
lawyers to enquire into the legal implications of ongoing 
NAC negotiations. There are no doubt substantial 
justifications for this tendency. One reason could be
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the fragile quality of international discourse on 
military matters, and the resulting need to put civility 
and tact ahead of precise formulations that could expose 
questionable motives too pointedly.
Being the only multilateral negotiating body on arms 
control, the Committee is a microcosm, burdened with all 
the problems associated with NAC in the context of a 
divided world. The prevailing ethos in the Committee is 
predicated on the interests of power blocks, primarily 
those of NATO, the Warsaw Pact States and Non-aligned. 
Negotiating patterns reveal the presumption by each power 
block that any negotiating position acceptable to the 
others is likely to be disadvantageous to itself.
Whatever sense there may be of common purpose, to escape 
the physical danger and economic and social burdens posed 
by the nuclear arms race, appears to be outweighed by the 
presumption of implacable hostility. This could be the 
paramount reason why the rate of negotiations is so 
slow.
The distrust between States is compounded by the 
technical complexity of the issues being negotiated. 
Neither concessions nor demands can be readily evaluated 
in their true colours. Even relatively simple issues, 
such as the proposal for the cessation of the manufacture 
of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, can be 
interpreted by the adversary block to be an excuse for 
gathering military intelligence under the guise of 
verification. Alternately, sweeping proposals for 
halting and reversing the nuclear arms race are looked
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upon as mere propaganda, designed to weaken the resolve 
of other peoples to defend themselves.
Concurrently with the above difficulties, co­
operation between the Superpowers, as in their joint 
attempts to inhibit horizontal proliferation, or to 
conclude a treaty on radiological weapons, is immediately 
under suspicion by the Non-aligned, who fear a conspiracy 
against themselves by the militarily and economically 
powerful North.
Many difficulties can also be traced to internal 
communications problems shared by legal and technical 
experts in their contacts with policy-makers within their 
own countries. Legal analysis of international problems 
tends not to probe beyond the persona of the State. It 
is assumed that States conduct themselves in their own 
best interests vis-a-vis other States, on the basis of 
adequate knowledge and foresight. While not necessarily 
acting for the benefit of all their citizens, it is also 
taken for granted that at least the welfare of 
Governments in power and their supporters are well 
served. These assumptions are not invariably correct 
with respect to nuclear arms policies. In reality, the 
inflexibility of the one party system, preoccupation with 
domestic politics in the Western democracies, and the 
absence of stable government prevalent among developing 
States, prevent administrations from fully utilising 
experct advice available on NAC issues that could best 
serve their long term interests.
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The most difficult stance for any State to adopt in 
the long term interests of its people, is to make a 
magnanimous gesture in its day to day relations with 
other States. On the other hand, if all of the 
abovementioned problems were to be overcome and one of 
the power blocks, or individual States, were to make an 
unequivocally generous NAC gesture, it could well be 
interpreted by all other States as a sign of fear and 
weakness, to be exploited with more stringent demands, or 
even covert threats.
Concerning a somewhat analogous case already adverted 
to, when concessions were repeatedly made by one side, 
each concession was greeted by a further objection. In 
that case, for a period of many years, a Comprehensive 
Test-Ban was ruled out by the United States on the 
grounds that the Soviet Union refused to permit on site 
inspections, to include peaceful nuclear explosions in 
the proposed treaty, to co-operate in a seismological 
network to monitor nuclear explosions,- and because the 
Soviet Union required that all nuclear-weapon States take 
part in the agreement from the outset. Having conceded 
all of those issues, albeit gradually, to the 
satisfaction of Western arms control experts, the United 
States and the United Kingdom are still unwilling to 
end nuclear weapons tests on the ground that verification 
procedures are not absolutely foolproof.
Conversely, States often adopt extreme negotiating 
positions with the intention of subsequently making 
apparent concessions regarding matters that should have
been conceded at the outset. Apropos to the 
abovementioned case, the United States and the United 
Kingdom could assert that objections to its various 
demands over the years were unjustified from the outset.
These difficult circumstances, reinforce the short 
term interests of States to equivocate and to delay 
decisions. Although the postponement of NAC decisions 
may be inimical to the long term interests of States, the 
short term interests usually prevail. It was probably in 
recognition of the lack of short term incentives for NAC 
that prompted Ireland, in a submission to SSD I, to
6 5propose that such incentives be deliberately devised.
Based on the analogy of the manner in which societies 
maintain cohesion within the State, Ireland's approach 
was very apt. The measure of success in any area of 
endeavour tends to correlate with the extent to which 
long term interests can be equated with short term 
satisfactions. For instance, within States, rewards are 
given to young people long before they are able to 
contribute productive work. Incentives are given to 
industry to establish export outlets, and honours are 
awarded to those who perform tasks that are especially 
valued by society. The perpetuation of national entities 
is not only the result of sanctions and commands
r £administered by the sovereign, as Austin postulated, 
nor imposed by the rest of society. On the contrary, 
most importantly, the State offers its citizens a series
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of immediate benefits.
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It could well be, that all of the formidable problems 
associated with speedy conclusion of NAC agreements would 
be overcome if adequate short term rewards for doing so 
could be devised. The proposal for direct diversion of a 
proportion of funds earmarked for armaments to the needy 
people of the world, especially in the developing 
countries, which was the cornerstone of the Irish 
proposal, has the disadvantage that the benefit would go 
to those who have the least influence in halting the 
nuclear arms race. Thus, the persuasive influence of the 
scheme, which has been reiterated many times by other 
States, has proved to be insufficient.
While there are immediate benefits to be derived from 
the promotion of,friendly relations between States within 
each of the power blocks, at the inter-block level the 
stigma of being lenient with a perceived enemy evidently 
outweighs other considerations from the individual 
statesman's point of view - at least in most countries. 
States that have been active in NAC endeavours, in 
keeping with long term rather than short term interests, 
like Austria, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden and 
Yugoslavia, have been given the honour of frequently 
having their nationals elected to sensitive posts in the 
NAC negotiating process, such as chairmen of working 
groups, conference preparatory committees, ad hoc 
committees etc. But these distinctions are clearly not 
sufficiently rewarding to induce the overwhelming 
majority of States to make greater efforts in the NAC
field.
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Although, judged by historical standards, the 
Committee on Disarmament has made a notable impact, it 
has failed to live up to the high expectations that 
accompanied its foundation, even if the intangible 
benefits to be derived from its mere existence are taken 
into account. For instance, the contribution of the 
Committee cannot be adequately assessed on the basis of 
its formal meetings alone, because that gives no credit 
to initiatives taken at informal, exploratory 
negotiations. During 1980, for example, the Committee 
held 45 informal meetings regarding which no formal 
records are publicly available.
Another intangible function performed by the
Committee is to consolidate world opinion for the
retention of NAC agreements already in existence. This
was pointed out by the delegate of Australia, Ambassador
R.A. Walker, who, while acknowledging the limitations
imposed on the Committee resulting from "the current
international situation", asserted that the work of the
Committee was "more important than ever". He regarded it
as a positive achievement of the arms control process
that, despite international stresses -
The edifice of international disarmament agreements 
built up over the previous decade survived and there 
was, moreover, a widespread reaffirmation of these 
existing agreements.
All of the above factors have to be taken into account 
when evaluating the Committee's performance. They can 
also throw light on why, for example, the size of 
delegations and supportive staff accorded to the
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Committee are disproportionately small compared with the 
gigantic task they are required to perform, and why 
blatant obstruction by some States has been tolerated.
During 1980 obstruction and delay in the work of the 
Committee mainly took the form of extended procedural 
interventions. The adverse consequences of this have 
been partly countered by delegating most of the 
substantive work of the Committee to ad hoc Working 
Groups. The additional delegation of most procedural 
matters to a further working group, or to a sub­
committee, could go a long way towards making the 
Committee more effective than it is. As the delegate of 
Mexico, Ambassador A. Garcia Robles, pointed out -
The lengthy discussions in the Committee this year, 
on the question of requests for participation 
received from States not members of the Committee 
have resulted in a deplorable loss of time which has 
had a very harmful effect on the substantive 
negotiations which should constitute the principal 
function of this multilateral negotiating body on 
disarmament.
Of course, improved staffing and better machinery 
provisions could not, in themselves, improve the 
Committee's performance in the face of widespread 
determination to stall its work. However, at a time of 
mere hesitation and vacillation, the prevailing 
conditions and procedures of work could have a strong 
influence on the rate and content of NAC negotiations.
In those circumstances, under sound procedural 
conditions, any deliberate obstruction would have to be 
in blatant opposition to the great majority, which is a 
stance that States generally try to avoid at the United
Nations.
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Probably as the result of loss of face by the States 
mainly responsible for the administrative delays in 1980, 
this problem was largely overcome in the course of the 
following year. However, it has been widely acknowledged 
that during 1981, the Committee's work was seriously 
impaired by what was referred to as "the adverse trends 
in the international situation",^  which prevented 
significant progress in negotiations on most items on the 
agenda, "especially the items to which the United Nations 
General Assembly has accorded the highest priority". ®
At the commencement of the Committee's 1981 session,
the approach by Western medium Powers was to advocate
modest but readily achievable goals. The Canadian
delegate, Ambassador D.S. McPhail, observed that -
...the Committee on Disarmament does not work in a 
vacuum, but is influenced by the international 
environment... We should therefore limit our 
objectives to realistic proposals lending themselves 
to items where prospects of agreement are high or where we have reasonable chances of achieving 
consensus. Only through registering progress can we 
be confident that the credibility of the CD will be 
strengthened.
The Socialist view coincided with those sentiments,
as advanced by the delegate of the German Democratic
Republic, Ambassador G. Herder, saying -
Mr Chairman, never before has the responsibility that 
rests with the Committee on Disarmament, as the 
single multilateral forum for disarmament 
negotiations, been so apparent as now in view of the 
complicated and aggravated international situation. 
The delegation of the German Democratic Republic 
believes that the Committee should make more vigorous 
efforts now to achieve tangible progress at least on 
the most important issues on its agenda.
Yet, by the end of 1981, failure to reach agreement on
the contents of any NAC treaty or protocol, demonstrated
the limitations of the Committee's influence.
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CHAPTER IV
NORM CREATION BY DELIBERATION FOR THE 
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARMS
Multilateral Norm Creation for NAC by Deliberation 
The distinction between seeking international 
agreement by negotiation, on the one hand, and 
deliberation, on the other, is rather fluid. The term 
"negotiation" carries a stronger inference of exploration 
to find common interests and of bargaining to reach a 
compromise, whereas the term "deliberation" connotes 
decision making with greater reliance on the force of 
numbers, or other authority, to overcome differences.
Yet each function contains elements of the other.
In the course of establishing norms for NAC at the 
United Nations, the two functions are divided between the 
Committee on Disarmament, being the negotiating forum, 
and a number of other bodies, all of which are said to 
have deliberative functions. A submission by the United 
Kingdom to a United Nations Study on institutional 
arrangements relating to the process of disarmament, 
referred to the relationship between the two functions. 
The submission stated -
Deliberation on the political and security aspects of 
disarmament should be carried out in the established 
United Nations institutions: the First Committee of 
the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission. 
In the view of the United Kingdom, discussions in the First Committee would be assisted by the introduction 
of a properly structured agenda; every effort could 
then be made to concentrate on achieving resolutions 
which would be directly helpful to the disarmament 
negotiations, and not merely declaratory statements.1
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There is also a demarcation of significance within 
the deliberative function. One type of NAC deliberation 
(a) is concerned with the establishment of international 
standards regarding the testing, deployment and use of 
given nuclear weapons. The other type of NAC 
deliberation (b) deals with the implementation of those 
standards in a way that can have exhortative, 
administrative or adjudicative overtones. Deliberative 
function (a) usually culminates in a resolution approving 
the elements of a proposed NAC agreement, say, a CTB 
Treaty. Deliberative function (b) could take several 
forms such as a resolution or declaration, calling on 
States to conclude a treaty in accordance with the agreed 
elements. Alternatively, it could involve setting up a 
subsidiary body to assist with NAC verification, for 
example an International Satellite Monitoring Agency. Or 
it could entail the adoption of an expert report 
apportioning the blame for a nuclear explosion contrary 
to the principles stated in the standard setting 
resolution (a).
Deliberative NAC functions for standard establishment 
and implementation overlap in the various United Nations 
bodies, and several, or all deliberative functions may be 
accomplished within the scope of one resolution.
However, with the streamlining of United Nations 
activity, it could become necessary to formalise the 
distinctions, at least between (a) the standard 
establishing tasks in arms control, and (b) the standard
adherence tasks. The United Nations bodies most involved
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in norm creation by deliberation for NAC are the 
Disarmament Commission, the First Committee and the 
General Assembly.
The Disarmament Commission
Like the Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament 
Commission was also reconstituted at SSD I, after its 
suspension as an active forum in 1965. In its earlier 
capacity it had the hybrid functions of negotiating and 
planning. On reconstitution, it has retained only its 
overall planning role, with representation from all State 
Members of the United Nations. While the Commission 
may utilise voting procedures for the resolution of 
differences among delegates, in conformity with the rules 
of procedure relating to the Committees of the General 
Assembly, in the words of the Final Document of SSD I, it 
was requested to make "every effort" to achieve consensus 
in its deliberations.
The Commission has the task, inter alia, of overall 
planning for NAC, yet it has marked time with repeated 
reiteration of disarmament priorities. During 1979 the 
Commission considered priorities under the heading of the
3"Elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament".
In 1980 it did so, pursuant to a General Assembly 
directive, in the context of the elements of the 
Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament 
Decade.
In 1981 the Commission at last abandoned its 
regurgitation of the disarmament priorities already
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successfully established during the course of SSD I, and 
concentrated on three other items largely unrelated to 
NAC. These were, the elaboration of a general approach 
to negotiations on conventional disarmament; the 
reduction of military budgets; and the general approach 
to the study on disarmament relating to conventional 
weapons. By the end of 1981, the Commission produced a 
Background Paper on principles and ideas with respect to 
the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. The 
Disarmament Commission Chairman also presented two 
Working Papers to the General Assembly, both in the form 
of guidelines relating to conventional disarmament.
In its position of a disarmament norm creating body,
4so thoroughly overhauled as to be virtually a new organ, 
the Disarmament Commission has yet to find a useful 
niche. Its formal mandate is that of a deliberative 
body, subsidiary to the General Assembly, required to 
"consider and make recommendations on various problems in 
the field of disarmament".
Since its reconstitution, the Commission has laboured 
under a fourfold inhibition. It has been obliged to 
avoid infringing the domain of three United Nations 
bodies with similar but more specific mandates than its 
own. These were the Committee on Disarmament, the First 
Committee and the Preparatory Committee for SSD II. The 
Committee on Disarmament is charged with the conduct of 
all specific arms control and disarmament negotiations on 
a continuing basis. The first Committee debates
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disarmament and arms control draft resolutions in 
preparation for their endorsement by the General 
Assembly. The Preparatory Committee for SSD II, a 
temporary body functioning during 1981-2, has had the 
task of collating the agenda for the Session, involving 
an overview of arms control and disarmament issues. 
Finally, the Commission had to avoid reopening 
controversies successfully settled at SSD I, which were 
negotiated at the time with extraordinary diplomatic 
skill, to the satisfaction of all concerned.
The reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission had 
been the result of pressure from the Third World for a
LTdisarmament forum where all States would be represented. 
States that did not expect to participate in the 
Committee on Disarmament were particularly adamant about 
the need for the Commission. At present, it is in 
reality an arms control forum in reserve. An NAC issue 
could arise at any time, ideally suited for preliminary 
investigation by the Commission before referral to the
7overburdened Committee on Disarmament.
The First Committee
This is one of the seven Main Committees serving the 
General Assembly. The First Committee is the most 
authoritative recommendatory body on NAC matters, 
preparing draft resolutions in the form of direct 
recommendations for consideration by the General 
Assembly. It does so on the basis of reports referred to 
it by the Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament 
Commission, as well as several expert and procedural
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reports of the Secretary-General, drawn up or processed 
by his Secretariat. The recommendations are almost 
invariably accepted by the General Assembly.
Many of the diplomats who participate in the work of 
the Committee on Disarmament, also attend the Sessions of 
the First Committee and the relevant General Assembly 
debates. Unlike the Committee on Disarmament, the First 
Committee is not restricted to agreement by consensus. 
However, the range of subjects discussed is very similar 
because, since 1978, the First Committee has been 
required to restrict the range of its deliberations to 
"questions of disarmament and related international
osecurity questions". Within the context of that 
mandate NAC is the Committee's chief preoccupation.
As part of its standard establishing functions, the 
First Committee prepared many recommendations during 1980 
for the General Assembly on topics relating to NAC, 
including the following significant items -
. Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories 
of States where there are no such weapons at present - 
requesting the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate an 
international agreement on the subject.
. Study on all aspects of regional disarmament - 
deciding to transmit a recent Expert Study on the subject 
to the Disarmament Commission and requesting the 
Secretary-General to refer the Study to the Committee on
Disarmament.
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. Study on nuclear weapons - inviting regional 
intergovernmental organisations, the Specialised Agencies 
of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, as well as national and international 
organisations, to make the report widely known.
* Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting 
the development, production, stockpiling and use of 
radiological weapons - calling on the Committee on 
Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to 
elaborating a treaty.
. Prohibition of the production of fissionable material 
for weapons purposes - requesting the Committee on 
Disarmament to pursue its consideration and prohibition 
of the production of fissionable material for nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
. Strategic arms limitation talks - urging the two 
signatory States to ratify the SALT II Treaty and, in the 
meantime, to refrain from any act which would defeat the 
object and purpose of the Treaty, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties; and expressing satisfaction that agreement had 
been reached on basic guidelines for subsequent 
negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms.
Further to the requirement, in Article 13 of the 
Charter, for the General Assembly to "initiate studies", 
the First Committee has increasingly devoted more 
attention to the commissioning of expert reports on NAC 
related issues.9 Generally that is done pursuant to the
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recommendations of the Advisory Board on Disarmament 
Studies. This has become an effective aspect of the 
process of norm creation, by helping to overcome 
difficulties resulting from the complex and technical 
nature of NAC. From the time that the studies are first 
contemplated, the choice of the particular issues to be 
investigated, the formulation and presentation of the 
terms of reference, and the selection of representative 
and universally respected experts, all entail a high 
level of consensus with respect to the goals of NAC.
The reports themselves enjoy an excellent reputation, 
making both the factual and evaluative findings 
acceptable as common ground. Exceptionally influential 
expert reports on NAC in recent years have been the Study 
on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban, and the 
Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, both submitted to 
the 35th Session of the General Assembly. For example, 
the latter report was endorsed by the General Assembly 
as - *
... a highly significant statement on present nuclear 
arsenals, the trends in their technological 
development and the effects of their use, as well as 
on the various doctrines of deterrence and the 
security implications of the continued quantitative 
and qualitative development of nuclear-weapon systems 
and also a reminder of the need for efforts to 
increase the political will necessary for effective 
disarmament measures. ü
Such highly prized evaluations have proved to be 
effective launching pads for further agreement on NAC 
principles. The tendency was very pronounced at SSD I, 
where background papers, prepared largely by disarmament 
experts and co-ordinated by the Centre for Disarmament,
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formed the basis for much of the ultimate consensus 
reached.1  ^ The groundwork provided by the experts 
helps to make resolutions on NAC factually non- 
controversial and sound. Hence, the resulting consensus 
tends to be based on realistic expectations and is 
therefore more likely to have long term effectiveness.
As well as preparing the final drafts of resolutions 
containing NAC initiatives for approval by the General 
Assembly, standard adherence tasks are sometimes referred 
to the First Committee regarding the application and 
enforcement of NAC measures. The Committee's functions 
have not been prominent, in this regard, with respect to 
either vertical or horizontal proliferation. In the 
former case, compliance issues have been negotiated by 
the Superpowers directly or via the Standing Consultative 
Commission established for that purpose, while in the 
latter case, the two Review Conferences of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty have been the major forums for 
compliance issues.
The potential of the First Committee for the 
initiation of measures to ensure compliance with NAC 
agreements was reinforced by a prolonged debate in the 
Committee, in December 1980. It concerned an arms 
control matter not associated with nuclear weapons, 
namely, compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous 
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare, which entered into force on 8 February 1928.
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The debate concerned the appropriate methods to be 
employed for the verification of compliance with arms 
control agreements, in a manner equally relevant to all 
forms of arms control measures. The debate helped to 
circumscribe the parameters of United Nations competence 
for verification and enforcement, as well as to examine 
the modalities of any actions to be taken.
Positions adopted by the various States are 
particularly relevant to compliance measures for NAC, as 
four of the eight multilateral treaties listed in Table I 
specifically refer to United Nations assistance with 
compliance problems, while the other four treaties do not 
exclude United Nations involvement. Futher, Non-aligned 
States assert, with increasing conviction, that even the 
bilateral treaties between the nuclear-weapon States are 
not immune from oversight by the United Nations, although 
neither the theoretical nor the practical implications of 
the principle have been examined beyond the proposition 
that anything that directly affects the peace and 
security of third countries is their rightful concern.
12The Protocol under discussion relates to the use 
of chemical and bacteriological weapons, to be 
distinguished from the Draft Convention on Chemical 
Weapons, which refers not only to the use of such weapons 
but also to the research, development, manufacture, 
stockpiling and transfer of the weapons. The operative 
paragraphs of the Protocol provide that -
131
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices has been justly condemned by the general 
opinion of the civilized world,
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared 
in Treaties to which the majority of Powers in the 
world are parties,
And to the end that this prohibition shall be 
universally accepted as a part of international law, 
binding alike the conscience and the practice of 
nations,
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of 
their Governments, declare that the high contracting 
parties, so far as they are not already parties to 
Treaties prohibiting such use, accept their 
prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the 
use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree 
to be bound as between themselves according to the 
terms of this declaration.
No provision is made in the Protocol for the
establishment of machinery to investigate reports about
the activities prohibited by it. In November 1980,
Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and Spain,
sponsored a draft resolution in the First Committee
requesting the Secretary-General to carry out an
investigation, concerning "the alleged use of chemical
weapons and to assess the extent of the damage caused by
1 3the use of chemical weapons".
The allegations were referred to as "recent reports" 
of use of the weapons "in recent years", "in various 
parts of the world". It was contended in a preambular 
paragraph of the resolution that, "the continued 
authority of the Protocol and relevant rules of customary 
international law" required that all reports regarding 
alleged breach should be properly investigated,
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notwithstanding the absence of verification clauses in 
the Protoco1.14
The investigation was to be carried out by the
Secretary-General, a procedure that in practice means the
United Nations Secretariat, to be aided by medical and
technical experts. By the terms of the draft resolution,
the Secretary-General was to collect and examine
evidence, including on-site evidence, but only with the
consent of the countries concerned. Information was to
be sought from Governments, international organisations,
and any other sources deemed "necessary" after consulting
"the States on whose territories the use of chemical
weapons has been reported", with reference to their
proposals on how the investigation should be carried out.
The precise aim of the investigation was to be the
ascertainment of the facts regarding the allegations and
the assessment of the extent of the damage caused. The
Secretary-General was called on to submit a report on the
1 5matter at the following Session of the General Assembly.
The draft resolution was adopted with some amendments 
after a week-long debate, by 62 votes to 17, with 32 
abstentions, the remaining States having refrained from 
participation in the vote. However, while the particular 
issue was thus settled, several important questions have 
remained undecided. The debate had been acrimonious and 
highly politicised, with much more attention devoted to 
scoring debating points than to constructing an enduring 
framework for promoting compliance with arms control 
agreements. In this connection the Mexican
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representative, Ambassador A. Garcia Robles, remarked
that "I do not believe we have had any topic which has
been as controversial in all our deliberations and has
1given rise to such strong statements as this one".
Nevertheless, some signficant principles were 
advanced regarding, for instance, the circumstances in 
which alleged breach of arms control agreements should be 
investigated by the United Nations, and the most 
desirable form that such investigations should take.
The United States put forward the view that all 
"reports that cast doubt on solemn international 
agreements" should be investigated "to make certain that 
no accusations are made without solid foundation in fact
1 7and to clarify ambiguous situations..." Other
Western States largely concurred with that point of view.
For example, the United Kingdom supported the
investigation of "numerous reports" of breach, in
circumstances "where the facts cannot be ascertained
1 8through generally available information".
France concurred that it was appropriate and necessary
to conduct an investigation, because information existed
"from various sources regarding the possible use of
1 Qchemical weapons". Sweden also supported the 
investigation on the ground that, "in principle, every 
request from a State Member of the United Nations for 
clarification of the reality behind allegations of such a 
serious character" deserved support.^® New Zealand, 
which introduced the ‘proposal for an enquiry, similarly
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took the position that it is necessary "to look into all 
reports of alleged use" of the prohibited weapons, and to 
conduct a "speedy" and "impartial" investigation by a
9 1"respected body".
States that opposed the resolution contended that it
would constitute a dangerous precedent to initiate an
enquiry based on "so-called information of a more than
dubious character", as stated by the German
Democratic Republic. Even more scathingly, Viet-Nam
referred to the evidence prompting the investigation to
be "fables invented by the radio broadcasting service of
the so-called Democratic Kampuchea... In a similar
vein, the representative of the Lao People's Democratic
Republic accused the resolution's sponsors of seeking to
set up the enquiry merely as an excuse for intervening in
the internal affairs of States by the use of "unreliable
information". He further contended that -
If they have been unable to name or identify the 
countries which are contravening the Geneva Protocol, 
with solid proof in support of the allegation, it 
would be entirely futile to spend any length of time 
on this draft resolution.
Legal arguments opposed to the draft resolution were 
presented mainly by Non-aligned and Socialist States, 
stated in their most succinct form by Madagascar. The 
delegate of Madagascar claimed that "any violation of 
the Protocol should be referred to a conference of the 
contracting parties".25 It was argued that State 
participation in any treaty, more particularly a 
disarmament treaty, is substantially influenced by 
procedures to ensure compliance, and that therefore it is
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unfair to change those procedures. Furthermore, even if 
the United Nations were to substitute new methods for the 
verification of complaints, Madagascar claimed that 
referral to a committee of enquiry would not be an 
appropriate method.
Elaborating this point further, the delegate referred 
to the verification and adjudication of complaints 
pursuant to the provisions of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, which was opened 
for signature in 1977. Madagascar found that to be a 
preferable method of investigation. In addition to the 
other disadvantages of the verification procedure 
proposed in the draft, Madagascar asserted that the 
"independence of the functions of the Secretary-General" 
would be placed in jeopardy if the Secretariat were 
required to conduct the enquiry, and that the procedure 
would establish an unfortunate precedent.
The representative of the Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic presented the main objection raised by
Madagascar in the form of a general principle, stating
that, "any question connected with the status of an
international legal instrument is exclusively a matter
7 7for the parties to that instrument". That outlook, 
which is consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, would exclude United Nations involvement 
altogether. .However, the provisions of NAC treaties, as 
well as the predominant view presented at the debate, 
favour a United Nations role at some stages in promoting
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arms control compliance, although there is no accepted 
procedure as to which organs should initiate or carry out 
the function.
In practical terms, an investigation by the 
Secretary-General with the aid of experts, at the request 
of the General Assembly, would not be very different from 
an investigation by the Security Council, having overcome 
the veto provisions of that body. The personnel engaged 
to conduct the investigation are likely to be the same 
and a report back to the General Assembly, instead of the 
Security Council, would not preclude the Security Council 
from taking any action flowing from the report.
Article 11(2) requires the General Assembly to refer 
any question on which action is needed to the Security
Council. The meaning of "action", in this context, has
*
been interpreted by the International Court of Justice to
2 8refer only to issues where enforcement is contemplated.
In accordance with that Opinion of the Court, the General 
Assembly may set up "commissions or other bodies" in 
connection with the implementation of its recommendations 
on peace and security issues. The Court qualified the 
Assembly's competence to do so only to the following 
extent -
The functions of the General Assembly for which it 
may establish such subsidiary organs include, for 
example, investigation, observation and supervision, 
but the way in which such subsidiary organs are 
utilized depends on the consent of the State or-------------------- k---------- 2-q -------------- :-------------------------------------States concerned.
While in accordance with Article 10, the General Assembly 
may discuss any issues, Article 11(3) especially
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empowers the Assembly to "call the attention of the 
Security Council to situations which are likely to 
endanger international peace and security". The parallel 
provision with respect to the Security Council, in 
Article 34, empowers that body to investigate any dispute 
and to evaluate whether it poses a threat to peace and 
security.
Several Non-aligned States, among them both those 
that voted for the resolution, like Sweden, and those
that abstained, like Mexico, voiced deep concern
regarding the dearth of agreed principles, as well as
machinery provisions, to cope with issues of the kind
confronted in the debate. The representative of Sweden
maintained, regarding the exchange that had just taken
place in the First Committee that it was -
...shown beyond any doubt how well founded is the 
demand of the neutral and non-aligned countries for a 
strengthened complaints procedure in matters of this kind, so that what we have experienced here this year 
can be avoided in the future. 0
It may indeed be preferable that the mode of 
establishing any investigatory group on compliance 
matters should be predetermined by national vote, rather 
than left to decisions within the Secretariat, although 
such decisions are also made on the basis of 
international consensus. The ultimate discretion for all 
decisions of the Secretariat, which in theory rests with 
the Secretary-General, is usually not exercised by him 
personally. Decision-making bodies of the Secretariat 
are selected on the basis of equitable geographical 
distribution, taking into account major political
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alignments. Due to their composition, those bodies tend 
to reflect national attitudes, notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 100 of the Charter, prohibiting 
Governments from seeking to influence persons employed in 
the Secretariat.
Thus, the most important factor is not which body 
sets up the enquiry, but the existence of machinery 
provisions, and the acceptance of operating principles, 
on a permanent basis. If those provisions were to apply 
to appropriate NAC issues, it would preclude the 
exacerbation of disputes with conflicts over 
implementation procedures, whether they be the task of 
the Secretariat or of other organs of the United 
Nations.
The General Assembly
At its normal Sessions, the General Assembly 
predominantly acts as a rubber stamp to approve the 
NAC and other disarmament related recommendations of the 
First Committee. Its vast agenda, encompassing all the 
areas of endeavour of the United Nations, leaves little 
opportunity for substantive input with respect to NAC. 
However, the Assembly has an important role as publicist 
for the dissemination of information and advocacy of NAC 
related problems.
Resolutions of the General Assembly, as the apex of 
the United Nations norm creating system, have often laid 
the groundwork for NAC agreements. For example, the 
Partial Test-Ban Treaty was preceded by many General
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Assembly resolutions on the subject, including 
resolutions 1648 (XVI) and 1762A (XVII). The Outer Space 
Treaty closely followed the principles laid down in the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, in 
resolution 1962 (XVIII), together with associated 
principles laid down in resolution 1884 (XVIII). The 
Treaty of Tlateloclo relied on United Nations consensus 
as Expressed in resolution 1911 (XVIII), while both that 
Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, were founded on 
United Nations deliberations as expressed in resolution 
808 (IX), advocating "the total prohibition of the use 
and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction of every type". International opinion 
demanding limitation of the vertical nuclear arms race, 
which eventually led to the SALT Treaties, was expressed 
long before in resolution 2028 (XX), establishing the 
principle of balanced responsibilities between nuclear 
and non-nuclear-weapon States for the implementation of 
NAC.
The General Assembly assumes a more significant 
initiating role in the creation of norms during its 
Special Sessions. So far, only one of those has 
concerned NAC, under the general aegis of disarmament. 
The world-wide consensus arrived at in the course of the 
five weeks of SSD I, held in May-June of 1978, has 
restructured both the theoretical approach and the 
organizational machinery of NAC negotiation.
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The Special Session was preceded by protracted
negotiations of the agenda and of draft documents. These
preliminary negotiations were conducted by a Preparatory
Committee, composed of a globally representative group of
States, which considered proposals and draft formulations
from all Member States of the United Nations wishing to
contribute. The intractable nature of the issues that
had to be resolved was demonstrated by extensive
disagreements, many of which remained contentious at the
beginning of the Special Session, evident from the large
number of bracketed alternative formulations in the draft 
t 1documents.
Ultimate resolution of all controversies by the
General Assembly on that occasion, in the form of a
3 2consensus Final Document, was an extraordinary 
achievement. At the time, the dilution of substance for 
the sake of consensus was regarded by many statesmen and 
commentators as a failing, but the passage of time has 
demonstrated the paramount importance of universal 
endorsement of fundamental arms control precepts.
The document consists of 126 paragraphs, being in the 
format of an Introduction, a Declaration, the Programme 
of Action, and a collation of Machinery Provisions.
While it is directed to arms control issues in all their 
aspects, attention is predominantly focused on the 
solution of NAC problems including general principles, 
accepted negotiating positions, priorities, and guiding 
precepts. Interrelationships are noted and steps to be 
taken for the attainment of solutions are indicated. The
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document concludes with 33 arms control proposals 
submitted by Member States, which could not be debated at 
the Session due to insufficient time, but which are 
gradually being more fully elaborated.
The most notable aspect of this concise document is 
the Programme of Action, which, in the terms of 
Article 44 -
... enumerates the specific measures of disarmament 
which should be implemented over the next few years, 
as well as other measures and studies to prepare the 
way for future negotiations and for progress towards 
general and complete disarmament. J
The Programme of Action designates the following
priorities for negotiation: nuclear weapons; other
weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed
to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate
effects; and reduction of armed forces.^
The achievement of having reached universal agreement 
in favour of the document can be measured less in terms 
of the arms control achievements that have flown from it, 
than in the fervent adherence to its provisions over the 
years. In the period between the two Special Sessions on 
disarmament there has been no substantial departure, in 
any negotiating or deliberating organ of the United 
Nations, from the objectives, priorities and methods 
designated in the Final Document.
The Final Document is the best demonstrat ion of both 
the strengths and the weaknesses of the General Assembly 
in its approach to NAC. To acknowledge that the document
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contains a fundamental and irreconcilable theoretical 
flaw, is not tantamount to a denial of its pioneering and 
overwhelming significance. In 1978 no higher consensus 
could have been reached regarding the theoretical-legal 
basis of disarmament. Yet, for the achievement of 
positive NAC measures greater commitment would be 
required, generally referred to as "political will". The 
General Assembly has, so far, failed to acknowledge that
the measure of political will is the extent of the
sacrifices that a State is prepared to incur in the short
term, in order to attain the long term benefits of arms
control and disarmament.
Consequently, an erroneous juxtaposition of 
objectives and possibilities permeates the Final 
Document, which was not queried by any State at the 
Special Session or since but which, nevertheless, 
excludes the possibility of substantial progress in NAC 
if the defective principle is to set the standard of 
international conduct. The defect lies in the 
concept of disarmament, in particular NAC, without 
sacrifice in the short term. The various manifestations 
of the erroneous principle in the Final Document will be 
examined in turn.
Firstly, arms control and disarmament conducted on 
"the principle of undiminished security of the parties", 
in paragraphs 22, 29, 49 and 83, is often not possible. 
At the least, there is usually an element of uncertainty 
about the operation of an NAC agreement. The equivalent
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operation of arms control measures can virtually never be 
ascertained with accurancy, while the difficulty of so 
doing is exacerbated by inevitable partisan assessments 
of security interests by potential enemies. As a 
theoretical concept, the aim of minimising security 
imbalance that may be temporarily, and unavoidably, 
caused by arms control measures, would be far more 
constructive. Simultaneously, and most importantly, 
there should be an expression of accolade for -States 
prepared to proceed with arms control measures despite 
their possible short term drawbacks. This is not 
possible while the fiction of "undiminished security" 
persists.
Secondly, the Final Document lays down the 
theoretical requirement, in paragraph 31, of "adequate 
measures of verification satisfactory to all parties 
concerned". Such measures of verification have not been 
found in practice, nor are they likely to become possible 
in the future. Again, the formulation should have been 
to strive for those objectives not to make their non­
attainment an excuse for delays in arms control measures, 
especially in the control of nuclear arms.
Thirdly, paragraphs 36, 68, 69 and 70, advocate the 
principle of the "inalienable right of all States" to the 
acquisition of all levels of nuclear technology and 
proclaim this to be consistent with non-proliferation 
goals. The "appropriate" safeguards, referred to in those 
paragraphs, do not exist and will become even less 
appropriate when the more sophisticated reactors come
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into operation, to be described in Chapter VIII.
Fourthly, paragraph 40 states the self-evident 
principle that universality of multilateral disarmament 
agreements would make those agreements more effective.
It would seem necessary to take that concept one step 
further by proclaiming that it is the duty of each State 
to make whatever concessions it can, without flagrantly 
jeopardising its own security, to comply with applicable 
multilateral arms control agreements.
Fifthly, as a corollary to the concept of undimished 
security and strictly equivalent obligations in arms 
control, the Final Document belittles the importance of 
unilateral measures, especially relevant in the field of 
NAC. Paragraphs 41 and 114 merely refer in passing to 
that method of arms control. However, as confidence 
builder, as a means of overcoming an impasse, and as a • 
method of shaming other States into emulating the 
initiative, unilateral steps in arms control warrant 
greater emphasis.
Sixthly, the document offers no satisfactory formula, 
even in theory, for measuring the equitable rate of NAC 
or any type of arms control, while acknowledging, in 
paragraph 49, the various stages of armament attained by 
different States. It is merely observed in paragraphs 48 
and 81, that the most heavily armed States have the 
greatest responsibility in that regard. The imprecision 
countenanced has resulted in a variety of arms control 
formulae, with all States contending that the others
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should be first to practice arms limitation. China and 
France, in particular, have explained their refusal to 
accede to multilateral NAC agreements on the grounds that 
they are entitled to maintain a relativity with the 
Superpowers.
Since the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability 
by the United States, to the present day, the Soviet 
Union has asserted that it feels threatened unless it can 
attain and maintain approximate parity with the forces of 
the United States and the nuclear prowess of other 
nuclear-weapon States. The United Kingdom has not 
claimed a right to parity, but the constant upgrading of 
that State's nuclear forces, including the replacement of 
the existing Polaris with Trident missiles, is in itself 
an assertion that the nexus between the strength of its 
nuclear forces and those of other States is to be 
retained.
The two subsequent nuclear Powers, France and China,
have persistently asserted that they have a right to
maintain a nuclear weapons capability proportionate to
that of the two Superpowers. In the case of France, it
is sought merely not to fall behind the rate of
development pursued by the other Powers,as stated during
SSD I by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs -
As for France, it would take appropriate action on 
the basis of such reductions only if there were a 
change in the extent of the disparity persisting 
between those two arsenals and its own arsenal, which 
France keeps at its disposal to ensure the security 
and creditbility of its deterrent.^
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China, on the other hand, does not only assert the 
right to ensure that the gap between its own nuclear 
prowess and those of other nuclear-weapon States is not 
increased but claims the right to close the gap.
The proposition that all States have an equal right 
to weapons, including nuclear weapons for defence, is 
theoretically unassailable. Fortunately, non-nuclear- 
weapon States have so far refrained from giving it 
practical application, no doubt in appreciation of the 
appalling practical consequences that it would have. The 
Chinese position in mid-1981 was explained in Beijing 
Review by Mu Youlin, the International Editor, as 
follows -
...we demand that the two super powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, should be the first to 
reduce their armaments. When the huge gap between 
them and the other nuclear states and militarily 
significant states is closed, the latter should then 
join them in reducing armaments proportionately.
This is fair and reasonable.
In this exposition only the militarily significant 
were designated as having the right to nuclear-weapons 
parity with the Superpowers, with no attempt to define 
which States may be included in that category.
Nothing would be gained from re-writing every clause 
of the Final Document which reflects the notion that 
disarmament and, in particular, the NAC component of 
disarmament, can be accomplished without risks and 
generous gestures. Nor does acknowledgement of the 
unavoidability of short term imbalances in the NAC 
process have to be presented in the form of amendments. 
The appropriate changes could be adopted in the course
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of applying the various arms control measures, by making 
the neccessary additions to and elaborations of the 
concepts contained in the Final Document.
The General Assembly can contribute to such 
developments at SSD II, and subsequent Special Sessions 
on disarmament, when time is provided and world leaders 
are available to discuss the issues in some depth. 
Otherwise, the General Assembly is in a position to 
collaborate with other United Nations bodies, like the 
Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the 
First•Committee, and other bodies referred to at the 
commencement of Chapter III, by putting the stamp of 
approval on proposals emanating from them.
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balance and a strict observance of mutual 
obligations;
Adequate measures for verification satisfactory 
to all parties should be provided for in order to 
attain the confidence of all parties in the 
implementation of agreements.
36 SSD I, Ninth Plenary Mtg. ref. The United Nations 
Disarmament Yearbook Vol.4 of 1979 (New York 1980) 
p. 117 .
37 Beijing Review, 20 July 1981, No.29, p.3.
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CHAPTER V
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
International Law in a Changing World
The practice of negotiating, entering into, and 
adhering to the NAC agreements in Tables I and II, has 
been undertaken by all parties at all times on the 
understanding that those actions were within the 
framework of a system of international law. It is the 
existence of international law which induces the 
expectation that an agreement between States will be 
adhered to, together with other shared expectations 
regarding the consequences that will flow from its 
adoption, such as the predictable interpretation of forms 
and expressions used.
Changes in the international legal system can 
therefore affect international agreements, as can the 
responsiveness or lack of responsiveness of international 
law to economic, political, social and technological 
changes throughout the world. The interrelationship 
between individual international agreements, and the 
milieu in which they operate, has been noted by the 
General Assembly. For example, the influence of changing 
social, economic and political conditions on the 
development of international law has been considered by 
the General Assembly in relation to drawing up the 
programme of the International Law Commission.^
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In practice, international law has responded more or 
less adequately to the needs of many of the growth areas 
of interaction at an international level, as, for 
example, in maritime law, civil aviation, diplomatic law, 
communications, and a variety of commercial transactions. 
As a result, the theoretical basis of international law 
is rarely examined with respect to agreements between 
States regarding these and many other areas of activity. 
By contrast, the nature and domain of international law 
become matters of concern and analysis in relation to 
those aspects of international life which have so far 
eluded regulation by adequate and predictable rules,^ 
including issues of international security, peace and 
war. As NAC is among the least satisfactory areas of 
contemporary international endeavour, it is appropriate 
that the difficulties encountered in the negotiation of 
NAC agreements should lead to reappraisals of the 
precepts of international law applying to them.
The advent of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction has introduced a fundamental new element 
into international law, namely, the exclusion of all-out 
war as the ultimate method for resolving intractable 
hostilities between States. The traditional maxim of jus 
ad bellum, the right to resort to war, was already 
seriously challenged during the period between the world 
wars, but it was only after World War II that it was 
abandoned altogether.4 Elaborating on provisions in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the General Treaty for 
the Renunciation of War, known as the Briand-Kellog Pact,
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was signed in 1928. Article I of the Treaty states -
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the 
names of their respective peoples that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of 
national policy in their relations with one 
anothe r.
The 63 States, currently Parties to the Treaty in
1939, included the belligerents in the war which broke
out at that time. Clear words of the Treaty had been
interpreted only five years previously, by the
International Law Association, to mean that -
A signatory State, which threatens to resort to armed 
force for the solution of an international dispute 
or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact.
The United Nations Charter of 1945, in Article 2, 
paragraphs (3) and (4), requires all Members, being 
Parties to the Treaty of the Charter of the United 
Nations, to "settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means" and to "refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force". Article 2, 
by itself, could be interpreted to outlaw armaments other 
than those required for the maintenance of internal 
order. However, Article 51, which gives Members the 
right of individual or collective self-defence until such 
time as the Security Council may be able to protect them 
from armed attack, has been relied upon as justification 
for the maintenance and unprecedented growth of armed 
forces, and the stockpiling of armaments, including 
nuclear arms.
One of the four stated aims of the United Nations
Charter is
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... to establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law can be 
maintained . . .
Since the Charter was signed in San Francisco, on 26 June 
1945, the avoidance of world war has been generally 
attributed to the fear of "unacceptable damage" from 
enemy nuclear weapons, rather than obedience to the 
undertakings pledged at the inception of the United 
Nations and subsequently. Foreseeably, States will 
continue, in the main, to be motivated by considerations 
of self-preservation and self-advancement until a 
condition of much greater international cohesion is 
attained than at present.
International law merely facilitates methods to be 
devised for the attainment of those national objectives 
that are shared by States at the international level. As 
the avoidance of nuclear war is the most ardently shared 
objective of the current era, the appropriate utilisation 
of the international legal system in that endeavour 
becomes uniquely relevant. Existing NAC treaties, and 
innumerable General Assembly resolutions, bear witness to 
the expectation that the elaboration and observance of 
international law will be able to prevent nuclear 
confrontation in the short term, and facilitate the 
conversion of a fragile balance of terror into a secure 
system of assurances in the long term.
Traditional Approaches to International Law
Due to the ossification of the basic tenets of jus 
gentium, the Greek, Roman and mediaeval approach to
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international law still carry definitive influence. The 
age and continuity of the system are regarded as virtues 
by many contemporary jurists, one of whom expressed this 
widely held sentiment with the observation that, "the 
structure of the international system ... appears to be 
still tremendously solid since its distant origins back 
in the Middle Ages".^
While there are countless divergencies regarding the 
finer points of international legal theory, it is 
generally assumed that international law is an entity 
with inevitable characteristics and that it only remains 
to establish what those characteristics are. For 
example, Professor Eric Suy, Legal Counsel of the United 
Nations, asks some of the most fundamental questions 
confronting international law today, but he asks them as 
if the answers merely had to be discovered and not 
invented. In 1981, speaking of the status of resolutions 
adopted by the United Nations and its specialised 
agencies, he said -
Contemporary international law must deal with these 
new "prescriptive norms". There are a number of 
questions that must be examined. For example, to 
what extent are the decisions of those various 
intergovernmental organizations creating new norms? 
Are they legal norms? Are they generally binding 
legal norms, or are some of them binding and some 
not? How are the binding norms determined?
The attributes of international law are enumerated and
analysed as if they were the properties of a specific
object known to exist, whose chemical and physical
composition have not yet been adequately identified and
measured. Consequently, questions about reconciling
contemporary needs with persisting traditions are
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invariably posed within a static framework.
It is asked, "How can resolutions of the General 
Assembly become rules of customary international law in 
order that they may be incorporated into the 
international legal system?" It is not asked, "How could 
international legal theory be recast so as to accommodate 
recommendations of the General Assembly in a way that 
would attribute to those resolutions a normative 
influence on international conduct commensurate with 
their de facto authority?" and "How could this be 
achieved without ascribing to the States that voted for 
those resolutions an intention to create positive law 
which they patently did not envisage?" In other words, 
the possibility of remoulding the basic principles of 
international law, in order to make it a convenient tool 
for the attainment of current objectives, has not been 
adequately confronted.
The conduct between States in their dealings with 
each other at the time of the Greek and Roman Empires, 
and later, in the Middle Ages, consisted of rules that 
were so obvious and elementary as to be identifiable with
othe rules of nature jus naturale. With the spread of 
religious concepts during the Middle Ages, the law of 
nature was equated with the Divine Law in the writings of 
theologians such as Saint Thomas of Aquinas. Christian 
and Moslem^ religious writers and naturalists as they 
came to be called, shared the view that law, including 
international law, was part of an immutable body of 
precepts waiting to be discovered. European scholars,
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who developed and refined this concept, included Thomas 
Rutherford, Jean Jacques Burlemaqui^^ and 
De Rayneva1.^^
As international contacts became more frequent and increas­
ingly complex, subjective evaluations of what the natural or 
Divine Law was, inevitably conflicted with different 
evaluations made by other individuals. Telling examples can 
be found among the views propounded by Samuel Pufendorf,1  ^
Professor of Law at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, 
in the mid-Seventeenth Century. The reputed foremost 
exponent of the naturalist school, Pufendorf claimed, for 
instance, that no mercy should be shown in war, as this 
would merely delay a return to a condition of peace, being 
the natural state of existence. Predictably, the proposition 
did not meet with universal concurrence.
In response to the untenable conflicts arising from 
the naturalist interpretation, there emerged an approach 
to international law which, after theoretical elabor­
ation, became known as the positivist school. Cornelius
Van Bynkershock,14 Johann Jacob Moser1  ^ and George
1 (:Friedrich von Martens are regarded as the founders of 
the positivist school, which maintained that the sources of 
international law are international obligations explicitly 
undertaken by sovereign States. This view proved to be 
much less te.nable in the Eighteenth Century than it would be 
today, due to the sparseness of treaties and other overt 
undertakings. Technical difficulties, including 
rudimentary communications and the absence of efficient 
bureaucratic structures, made the conclusion of
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treaties and the ascertainment of other agreements very 
difficult. Hence, it was not possible to adhere to the 
positivist principle because often no agreements existed 
to guide the resolution of new international conflicts as 
they arose.
The theory that best suited the requirements of 
Euro-centred international life from the Seventeenth 
Century to modern times, made a pragmatic compromise 
between naturalists and positivists, without 
acknowledging its pragmatic origins. The compromise 
approach relied on the obscure language of treaties; 
whatever scant evidence there was of international 
customs; together with naturally fertile imaginations, 
to adduce the rules and principles of international law. 
The followers of this compromise approach were the first 
to state their views in detail. They became known as the 
Grotians, after Hugo Grotius who is regarded as the 
"father" of international law. The theory on which the 
Grotian school was based differentiated between what was 
believed to be necessary law, and merely voluntary law. 
The former was believed to be the law of nature and God, 
while the latter consisted of treaties and customs made 
by men to suit the exigencies of given situations. These 
views were further elaborated by Christian Wolff and 
Emmerich de Vattel.
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century doctrines still 
form the basis of international law as it is known today. 
These vague and jumbled concepts, with generations of 
elaborations and qualifications haphazardly appended,
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provided the basis of the jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. In 1945 they were 
incorporated into the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice which, in Article 38 (1) designates the terms 
of reference of international law to be -
a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting States;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.
The drafters of the Court's Statute deliberately chose to
establish no hierarchy of precedence to be attributed to
paragraphs a, b and c of Article 38 (1), on the ground
that this would be self-evident to international lawyers.
The aforementioned exposition of sources, in the 
light of the meanings that those concepts have acquired 
over the centuries, is the only guide to the nature and 
content of international law to be applied under the 
Statute, which enjoys the concurrence of 157 Member 
States of the United Nations pledged by Treaty. In 
practice, relevant treaties are usually given precedence 
over other sources as the best evidence of State consent 
in any matter, while as between treaties, obligations 
under the Charter are claimed, by Article 103, to prevail 
in case of conflict with "any other international 
agreement". However, the Statute does not recognise the
159theoretical supremacy of treaties.
According to the West European tradition of inter­
national law, enshrined in the Statute, the most highly
1 9respected source of international law is custom.
Therefore, when Professor Bo Johnson, legal adviser of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, claimed in 1381 that 
"the first and most important source of this 'international 
law' is the custom of states",2ß he was describing the 
contemporary factual situation consistent with the 
provisions of the Charter.
International Custom and Nuclear Arms
We have seen that international agreements for NAC are 
an integral part of the international legal system, and that 
the international legal system is inextricably bound up with 
"international custom as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law". It is not immaterial, therefore, that 
both the applicability of custom and the theoretical basis 
of the whole international legal system of which custom is a 
part, are in disarray. As Professor Grahl-Madsen said when 
opening the Joint UNITAR-Uppsala University Seminar on
*
International Law
I cannot see that we have any alternative to 
attempting to develop new and more efficient 
machinery for the progressive development of 
international law. * 1
Later in the Seminar, Professor Grahl-Madsen observed that -
Like the old Law of Nature, a customary law and 
legal principles developed in Europe can no longer 
serve as a solid basis for international law.22
Much of the criticism of international custom as 
applied by the International Court of Justice, is not of 
the concept of custom, but its affinity to West European
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values and approach to legality. While this is no doubt 
the case, criticism of this kind, emanating from the 
Socialist and recently independent States, has somewhat 
obscured more fundamental problems. When some of this 
criticism surfaced in 1974, during a debate in the Sixth 
Committee on the efficacy of the International 
Court of Justice, the United States, Canada, and Italy 
complained that -
...the uncertainty of the content and scope of the 
rules which were applicable in the international 
sphere was a weakness; the Court's role and the law 
it applied should be clarified and strengthened.22
Uncertainty regarding the content of the rules of 
international custom, unless they are interpreted by a 
Court, can lead to difficulties. There is also 
uncertainty, inter alia, about how custom comes into 
being, its relevance to United Nations resolutions, how 
it can be renounced, and what States are bound by it.
It is well established that, in order to determine 
the existence of a rule of international custom, it is 
necessary to prove that States have acted in conformity 
with the rule, and that they have done this in the belief 
that they were legally obliged to do so.
There are several uncertainties, however, concerning
what constitutes the required acts of States. For
instance, it would be necessary to have a clear
understanding as to what is regarded a sufficient number of
States applying the rule. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction
case, the Court declared that -
States are on record as not supporting in fact and by their conduct the alleged maximum obligatory 12-
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mile rule. In these circumstances, the limited 
State practice confined to some 24 maritime 
countries cited by the Applicant in favour of such a 
rule cannot be considered to meet the requirement of 
demanded by Article 38 of the Court'sgene ra1itv 
Statute.2^
Yet, in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, the Court 
relied largely on the practice of one State, the United 
Kingdom, stating -
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration 
of the international community, Great Britain's 
position in the North Sea, her own interest in the 
question, and her prolonged abstention would in any 
case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system 
against the United Kingdom. b
Another uncertainity is whether pronouncements of 
States accompanying custom creating acts should be taken 
into account.
As the Court put it -
There is at the moment great uncertainty as to the 
existing customary law on account of the conflicting 
and discordant practice of States. Once the 
uncertainty of such a practice is admitted, the 
impact of the afore said official pronouncements, 
declarations and proposals must undoubtedly have an 
unsettling effect on the crystallization of a still 
evolving customary law on the subject. b
In the circumstances it was thought unreasonable to
discard official statements as to "what States are
2 7prepared to claim and to acquiesce in ..."
In the Asylum case, the Court entertained the
possibility of a rule of customary law developing in a
region. The Court did not disapprove that -
The Colombian Government has finally invoked 
"American International Law in General". In 
addition to the rules arising from agreements which 
have already been considered, it has relied on an 
alleged regional or local custom peculiar to Latin- 
American States.2®
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Provided that other necessary conditions were met, the 
Court took the view that recognition of a regional custom 
falls within the provisions of Article 38 of the Statute 
of the Court.
The required duration of the State practice 
establishing the rule is also subject to wide variations. 
Whereas the original fiction was that the rules had been 
observed from time immemorial, contemporary writers speak 
of the possibility of "instant custom" arising from 
United Nations resolutions, while in the dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Tanaka it was suggested in the South 
West Africa cases that -
... the establishment of such a custom would require 
no more than one generation or even far less than 
that.30
Requirements regarding proof of the belief that a 
legal obligation exists are even more subject to doubt. 
The tortuous reasoning of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Lotus case, is a pertinent 
illustration -
Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be 
found among the reported cases were sufficient to 
prove in point of fact the circumstance alleged by 
the Agent for the French Government, it would merely 
show that States had often, in practice, abstained 
from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that 
they recognized themselves as being obliged to do 
so; for only if such abstention were based on their 
being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it 
be possible to speak of an international custom. ^
A modern statement of the requirement appears in the 
judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases. There it was laid
down that
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled 
practice, but they must also be such, or be carried 
out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief 
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need 
for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a 
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion 
of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States 
concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.
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There are numerous further refinements and
distinctions in relation to international custom, with a
3 3variety of views as to their exact application. In 
one instance, it has been remarked with some exasperation 
tha t -
The complexity of the question of customary law is 
not diminished by the tension which exists between 
the application and interpretation of general 
principles and rules versus the creation and 
subsequent application of detailed rules.^
Indeed, the labyrinth of uncertainty that surrounds the
concept of "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law" is endless.
The above illustrations demonstrate that 
international law, as it relates to the notion of custom, 
is not suited for the establishment of the rights and 
duties of States in relation to NAC, or any other vital 
issue of international peace and security. Perhaps 
international custom is a useful concept with respect to 
subject areas where agreements are sparse and any 
definitive ruling is more important than the detailed 
content of a rule, as in demarcation and border disputes. 
In these and similar instances of moderate concern to 
States, where there is scant evidence of the law, 
customary rules may be helpful.
In regard to NAC, the most insidious aspect of
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international custom, as presently understood, is its 
possible admixture with treaty law. There have been 
suggestions that, providing a State does not expressly 
object to a "norm creating" treaty in force among other 
States, and does not act in contravention of that treaty, 
it may be bound by the rules established in the treaty in 
the form of a rule of international customary law. Such 
an interpretation could be given, for example, to the 
States that have abided by the terms of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty but which have not acceded to it.
Discussing the question as to what constitutes
"consent" and "opposition" to an international custom,
Professor Allan Rosas contended that -
It seems pertinent to speak of presumed consent, 
which means that a state can become bound by a rule 
the creation of which it has not participated in as 
long as it has not clearly voiced its opposition. 
Perhaps this is better terminology than the often 
used expression "tacit agreement", which despite the 
word "tacit" seems to connote the idea of specific 
"understandings" between the parties to a customary norm, something which might not correspond to 
reality."^
In modern national administrations, contemporary 
treaties that are relevant to a State, especially 
treaties relating to peace and security like NAC 
treaties, are continuously and carefully assessed.
If they are not acceded to, that is positive proof that 
the State concerned does not wish to be bound. However, 
that State may agree with some aspects of the treaty and 
therefore comply with some or all of the provisions of 
the treaty, or it may be persuaded by one means or 
another to comply, despite fundamental reservations.
Although perhaps indistinguishable in terms of acts
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performed, there is a profound difference in principle 
between a State acting as if it were bound by an NAC 
treaty, and giving its explicit consent to be bound. Any 
legal fiction that may blur that distinction must be 
counterproductive in the longer period. That is so 
because, unless the theory reflects reality, it cannot 
change that reality constructively when the time for 
change has arrived. Even in the short term, all that the 
fiction of notional consent to NAC agreements could 
achieve, would be to add to the scepticism about the 
relevance of international law.
To assert the above is not to deny the beneficial
influence that treaties can exert on third parties in
standardising State conduct. The problem would only
arise if it were sought to bind States to a course of
action with a ruling of the Court. For example,
Professor Franck pointed out -
Also, when treaty provisions or law-declaring 
resolutions are adopted by consensus, these may so 
affect national conduct as to create 'instant' 
customary law. An example is the concept of the 
200-mile economic zone, adopted by consensus at the 
Law of the Sea Conference, which immediately entered 
into the repertory of practice of enough states to 
raise the question whether, quite aside from the 
treaty, it does not thereby become universally 
sanctioned as customary law.
While ineffective in its positive tenets to come to 
terms with the realities of contemporary inter-State 
relations, the general theory of international law, as 
far as it can be ascertained, also suffers from several 
important omissions. For example, it contains no 
coherent principles to distinguish between emerging norms
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and existing norms. Further, not only is no legal status
accorded to non-procedural United Nations resolutions,
but the current and potential adjudicative functions of
the Security Council and General Assembly are ignored.
It is little wonder then that Professor de Nascimento e
Silva thought it appropriate, in 1981, to describe the
present time as being -
.. a period when international law is being 
subjected to challenge from so many quarters, when 
its very existence is being questioned not only by 
laymen but even by some lawyers, and when its 
relevance to international relations and to the 
regulation of concrete problems between States is 
constantly belittled. /
The anachronisms and uncertainties of international 
legal theory prejudice attempts to control nuclear arms. 
They detract from the authority of the International
O OCourt of Justice and respect for the whole system of 
international law. Not surprisingly, only a small 
percentage of States has accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, and that percentage is 
shrinking. Today there are only 47 States that have made 
declarations under Article 36, paragraph (2) the Court's 
Statute, or made declarations under Article 36, paragraph 
(2), of the Statute of the Permanent Court of Inter­
national Justice that are currently operative. It is 
about 30% of the present membership of the United 
Nations, whereas in 1950, 60% of United Nations Members 
had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
Moreover, States that have done so, have mostly attached 
such rigorous conditions to their acceptances that they 
have little practical import.
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A statement touching on these issues by Judge Robert
Ago of the International Court of Justice, made in the
course of an address to the International Law Commission
in mid-1981, has been reported as follows -
He said it would in particular, be very dangerous 
to lose sight of the fact that, following the 
profound changes that had occurred in the 
composition of the community of States, it had 
become both essential and urgent to define anew and 
with the participation of all concerned, the old 
customary law, to redefine it, to supplement it, and 
to invest it with the clarity characteristic of 
written, conventional law. y
The imprecision of the international legal system 
leaves the judges of the Court, as well as any 
arbitrators or negotiators who may wish to rely on the 
principles of international law, with vast areas of 
personal discretion. Few contemporary treaties, and none 
of the NAC treaties now in existence, require disputes to 
be adjudicated by the International Court of Justice. On 
the contrary, several of the multilateral NAC treaties 
specifically indicate that recourse to the Court is to be 
by mutual consent, while many NAC treaties designate 
alternative modes of settling disputes.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ADJUDICATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS
Settlement of NAC Disputes by the International Court
Two recent cases have been brought before the 
International Court of Justice, with attributes that 
indicate the extent of the Court's ability to settle 
international disputes involving NAC type issues.
Although Article 59 of the Court's Statute provides that, 
"The decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case", in practice the decisions and reasoning of the 
Court have been accorded high authority in subsequent 
cases. In Opinions handed down, judges have referred to 
passages from previous Opinions much more frequently than 
warranted by the tentative wording of Article 38(1)(d) of 
the Court's Statute.^
The cases to be examined are relevant to the 
adjudication of NAC disputes, not only on account of the 
persuasive influence likely to be exerted by the 
decisions reached and the principles enunciated, but also 
because the Court's evasion of substantive issues 
demonstrates the limits of its genuine competence.
The issue of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in 
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France)^  and Nuclear Tests
-j(New Zealand v._France) (the Nuclear Tests case),
concerned similar facts, relating to the detonation of 
nuclear devices in the South Pacific area by France. The 
other case was United States of America v. Iran (the
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Hostages case),4 which concerned the capture of United 
States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran. The last 
mentioned case was not related to nuclear arms in any way 
but it involved the interpretation of significant 
contemporary treaties under circumstances likely to 
prevail in relation to the breach of an NAC agreement.
The Nuclear Tests Case
In the Nuclear Tests case, Australia and New Zealand 
instituted proceedings against France, on 9 May 1973, 
alleging that the carrying out of atmospheric nuclear 
weapons tests in the South Pacific Ocean was not 
consistent with applicable rules of international law.
The two States sought orders prohibiting the French 
Republic from carrying out any further nuclear tests of 
that nature. The Court's jurisdiction was invoked by the 
Applicants on the basis of the General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and 
Articles 36 and 37 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.
France failed to file a Counter-Memorial and did not 
appear at the hearing, informing the Court by letter that 
it did not intend to submit to the Court's jurisdiction, 
France asked for the summary removal of the case on the 
basis that the Parties were not in conflict as to their 
legal rights and that nuclear tests did not violate any 
rules of international law.
Refusing to accede to the request by France, the 
Court made a Provisional Order, on 22 June 1973,
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requesting France to avoid nuclear tests that could 
deposit radioactive fallout on Australian and New Zealand 
territories. In defiance of the Provisional Order,
France continued to conduct nuclear tests in the 
atmosphere in the prohibited area. The gesture could 
only be interpreted as a severe blow to the Court's 
prestige and it underlined the precarious nature of the 
Court's authority. However a measure of lost ground was 
retrieved when,in mid-1974, a series of verbal and 
written statements were made by the President of the 
French Republic, French delegates at the United Nations 
and French Embassy officials to the effect that France 
was about to conclude its tests of nuclear weapons in the 
atmosphere. None of the statements by France indicated 
that the cessation of the tests was to be in response to 
the cases before the Court. On the contrary, it was 
pointed out that the change to underground nuclear tests 
was to be undertaken "in the normal course of events"
Nor did the statements give any undertaking that 
atmospheric tests would not be resumed at some future 
da te.
By a majority of nine votes to six, the Court decided 
to attribute to the equivocal statements of intention by 
France the status of existing commitments to be 
recognised by international law and asserted, on that 
basis, that the alleged dispute did not exist. In this 
way the Court avoided the necessity to adjudicate upon 
its own jurisdiction; the legal standing of the 
Applicants as members of a much wider class of States
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that may have incurred damage; and an assessment of the 
merits of the case.
In a closely argued and eminently logical joint 
dissenting Opinion, Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez de 
Arechaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock, argued that the Court 
had jurisdiction - both as to the legal nature of the 
dispute, and the legal standing of Australia and New 
Zealand to present their case in accordance with the 
practice of actio popularis. Further, the joint 
dissenting Opinion contended that the statements made by 
French officials, although accepted by the four judges as 
"the French Government's unilateral undertaking", were 
not capable of "affording the Applicant legal security of 
the same kind or degree as would result from a 
declaration by the Court specifying that such tests 
contravened general rules of international law
Oapplicable. . . " 0 Most importantly, the dissenting 
judges held that no undertaking could dispose of the 
dispute as to the general issue of the legality of 
nuclear testing in the Pacific region. The Applicants 
were therefore still entitled to a judgment. Hence, the 
judges who delivered the joint dissenting Opinion formed 
the view that the Court should have proceeded to hear and 
to adjudicate upon the merits of the case.
The majority of the Court put expediency before 
logic. Had the Court proceeded to adjudicate on the 
merits it would have been faced with an untenable 
situation. The Court would have been required to make 
pronouncements on various aspects of the applicability of
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customary international law to an NAC issue. This would 
have entailed the evaluation of several multilateral NAC 
treaties, a large number of General Assembly resolutions, 
the decisions of a World Conference of the United 
Nations,^ as well as the findings of national and 
international scientific b o d i e s . T h e r e  is no 
disrespect for judicial integrity in the proposition that 
the above, unstated but weighty considerations, may have 
prompted the decision reached by the majority of the 
Court.
The evidence presented in the written Pleadings 
referred to the large majority of eligible States Parties 
to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as to General 
Assembly resolutions 1148 (XII) 1957, 1252 (XIII) 1958, 
1379, 1402 (XVI) 1959, 1578 (XV) 1960, 1632 (XVI) 1961, 
1948 (XVI) 1961, 1762A (XVII) 1962, 1910 (XVIII) 1963, 
2032 (XX) 1965, 2163 (XXI) 1966, 2343 (XXII) 1967, 2455 
(XXIII) 1968, 2604B (XXIV) 1969, 2661A (XXV) 1970, 2663B 
(XXV) 1970, 2828 (XXVI) 1971, and 2934A to C (XXVII)
1972,11 all of which, in one way or another, condemned 
atmospheric nuclear tests. A resolution and a 
declaration were also cited from the United Nations 
sponsored Stockholm World Conference on the Human 
Environment, which deplored the tests on the grounds of 
environmental damage allegedly caused by them. In 
addition, references were made to the findings of the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection and 
the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
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Atomic Radiation However, with respect to none of the 
Treaties, resolutions or evaluations just referred to, 
had France committed herself to the views expressed by 
the overwhelming majority of mankind.
If the concept of customary international law is to
have any practical meaning as an expression of
international opinion and commitment, then the
conclusiveness of the evidence prepared by the
Applicants, that customary international law prohibited
the testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, was
unassailable. The evidence could have withstood any
reasonable test, irrespective of the precise view taken
regarding the mode of creation and the applicability of
international custom. Therefore, had the case been
decided on the merits, the Court would have been obliged
to make a clear-cut ruling on whether or not a State had
the right to withhold its consent to be bound by a
general rule of customary law. The only way to avoid the
issue with a substantive argument, would have been to
maintain the untenable assertion that the existence of
the rule had not been established. Faced with such a
dilemma, the majority of judges chose to evade the
12substantive issues.
The prudence of that decision can be demonstrated by 
exploring in greater detail the problems that would have 
confronted the Court had it proceeded to consider those 
substantive issues. For the Court to do so, would have
entailed a determination as to whether France was bound
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by treaty, by custom, or otherwise to observe the 
putative rule of general customary international law 
prohibiting the detonation of a nuclear device in the 
atmosphere. Had the Court decided that France was 
not bound, it would have done so in defiance of the 
overwhelming weight of world opinion. On the other hand, 
had the Court decided that France was bound, the 
decision, while favoured by world opinion on the 
particular issue, would have rested on contentious legal 
grounds. Further, at the time it seemed uncertain 
whether France could be persuaded to desist permanently 
from atmospheric testing of its nuclear weapons, in 
obedience to the Court or otherwise, while the 
possibility of persuading China to conform to such a 
ruling was remote. Finally, there was no realistic 
prospect of compensating States that may have suffered 
damage as a result of the tests, to be designated by the 
Court as having been in breach of the rule.^
The first issue for the Court to consider would have 
been whether France could be required to adhere to the 
terms of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, a Treaty to which 
it had not acceded. A decision that an almost universal 
treaty, like the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, is ipso facto 
binding on non-Parties would be counter to the rule of 
international law that treaties confer no rights or 
duties on States not parties to them. That rule has been 
recently confirmed with its incorporation into the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Articles 34-37. 
Nevertheless, the Convention leaves the supremacy of
179
custom untramelled by providing, in Article 38, that 
"Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth 
in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a 
customary rule of international law, recognised as 
such."
Continuing to assess the merits, the Court would have 
been required to make a decision on whether the testing 
of nuclear devices in the atmosphere had become 
unacceptable as the result of a rule of customary law.
The Court's Opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases1  ^would have been directly in point. In that 
Opinion, the elements of a putative customary rule were 
assessed in the light of various criteria and were 
found, in the main, to lack the attributes required. 
However, the putative rule in the Nuclear Tests case 
would satisfy all of the following five criteria advanced 
by the Court in its earlier Opinion. Although not stated 
in precisely these terms, the criteria invoked can be 
identified as follows -
(i) The rule must be sufficiently significant to be
T /Tof a fundamentally norm creating character. °
(ii) The rule must be of a potentially norm creating
character with respect to precision as to its meaning and 
17scope.x '
(iii) State practice constituting the subject matter 
of the rule should be extensive and virtually
uni form.
(iv) The passage of a considerable period of time is 
not necessary, provided there is widespread and
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representative participation in the observance of the 
rule, particularly among States having a direct interest 
in the issue.^^
(v) The States that adopt the practice constituting 
the rule must do so because they feel legally compelled 
to comply.
A rule prohibiting atmospheric nuclear explosions 
would patently satisfy criteria (i) and (i i) . Criteria 
(iii) and (iv) would also have been satisfied because, 
apart from France, with the only exception of the then 
minor nuclear-weapon State of China, all nuclear-weapon 
States had observed the rule, as had all non-nuclear- 
weapon States. In confirmation of their commitment, by 
1973 more than a hundred States were Parties to the 
Partial Test-Ban Treaty, including the three original 
nuclear-weapon States. Further, as the States observing 
the ban were predominantly bound to do so by treaty, 
there can be no doubt that they believed themselves to be 
under legal compulsion to comply, thus satisfying 
criterion (v),
Yet the putative rule in the Nuclear Tests case would 
have failed to satisfy the further two criteria posed by 
the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, nor 
could any foreseeable NAC rule satisfy those criteria. 
They can be stated as -
(vi) The States that observe the rule because they 
feel legally compelled to do so, must believe themselves 
to be bound by a custom as representing law, not merely 
by treaty obiigation.21
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(vii) The treaty embodying the rule in question must 
have been, at its inception, declaratory of a then
p pexisting rule of customary international law.
Regarding the application of opinio juris sive 
necessitatis in (vi), it is not only "extremely 
difficult" to obtain evidence of its existence, as stated 
in the dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, J but it is 
entirely impossible with respect to NAC issues. It would 
be reasonable to suppose, however, that States obeyed the 
test-ban so as to comply with the Treaty, to which they 
acceded probably because they approved of its terms as 
being in their own national interest.
Prior to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, all nuclear- 
weapon States conducted nuclear tests in the atmosphere, 
except for periodic suspensions in pursuance of agreed 
moratoria. Thus, there was conclusive evidence that 
criterion (vii) was not satisfied, as there had been no 
existing mandatory rule prior to the Treaty.
On reaching agreement for a test-ban, or any other 
NAC related issue, States do not enter into a treaty 
because it gives expression to an existing custom but 
because they believe it to be imperative to prescribe 
future conduct in the light of new technological advances 
in armaments. States parties to NAC treaties make every 
effort to persuade all eligible States to accede to the 
treaties or, at least, to abide by their terms. Had the 
Court been prepared to state explicitly that an NAC 
treaty, embodying a novel breakthrough in arms control
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was, by reason only of its acceptability in the form of a 
treaty, and its originality, precluded from engendering a 
customary rule, it would not have been possible to 
conceal the absurdity of the proposition.
However, the Court could have concluded that a rule 
of customary international law existed, by giving a 
different interpretation to the seven criteria advanced 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, and by invoking 
so much of the contradictory theories of international 
custom as might have been regarded sufficient to 
attribute a legally binding quality to the rule in question.
With respect to (vi) and (vii), regarding the 
requirement to comply with the putative norm for legal 
reasons other than treaty obligation, a contrary point of 
view has been expressed from time to time. For example 
in his dissenting Opinion Judge Lachs, in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, said that not only could 
provisional international instruments, like unratified 
treaties, give rise to general rules of international 
law, but that -
Treaties binding many States are, a fortiori capable 
of producing this effect, a phenomenon not unknown in 
international relations.24
Adjudication on the merits of the Nuclear Tests case 
would have required that the Court, as well as examining 
treaty provisions and customary rules, to take into 
account any applicable general principles of law. In 
that connection, the Court would have been obliged to 
assess the principle-creating function of the numerous
183
General Assembly resolutions and other expressions of 
international opinion exhorting States, with a cumulative 
authority, to refrain from nuclear testing in the 
atmosphere.
Conclusively to dismiss these pervasive expressions 
of international opinion as not indicative of principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations, would have been 
difficult to justify with the usual arguments. In 
academic analysis the most frequently advanced reason 
for not accepting General Assembly resolutions as capable 
of establishing binding principles and rules, beyond the 
very limited express rule making powers ascribed to them 
by the Charter, is that the States voting for the 
resolutions do not make institutional arrangements 
confirming their commitment. However, with respect 
to the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, the 
large number of accessions to the Partial Test-Ban 
Treaty, as well as the actual cessation of the testing of 
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere by the United Kingdom, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, demonstrated the 
determination to abide by the rule on the part of the 
vast majority of States.
However, in order to justify a finding that Assembly 
resolutions were relevant to the outcome, would have 
required at least some indication as to the legal status 
of those resolutions. Did they establish custom? Were 
they to be regarded as quasi-legislative? In what ways 
and by whose authority were they to be so regarded? To 
answer those questions would have disposed of many of the
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major controversies presently confronting the whole 
discipline of international law. Recent Opinions handed 
down by the judges suggest that the Court has not been 
sufficiently united in its views to make pronouncements 
on those fundamental questions in a credible manner.
Yet, if despite all obstacles, the putative rule had 
been accepted as law, the Court, on the discretion of a 
handful of individuals, would have challenged the 
perceived vital security interests of several States, 
notably those of both France and China. The judges who 
handed down the majority Opinion were no doubt aware that 
this would not have been an acceptable solution in the 
eyes of the international community.
Finally, the Court may have been required subsequently 
to adjudicate on the issue of actio popularis with far 
reaching consequences. If Australia, New Zealand and 
other South Pacific States had been found to have a legal 
interest based on damage suffered, this would have given 
them a right to compensation. Consequently all States in 
the world, especially those in the Northern hemisphere 
which have received far larger amounts of radioactive 
fallout from nuclear testing than Southern hemisphere 
States, would have been given the right, by inference, to 
receive compensation for damage sustained during the 
previous series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. 
Alternatively, the Court would have been required to 
pinpoint a time when the international custom forbidding 
tests in the atmosphere came into being.
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It is difficult to envisage any contravention of 
international law relating to NAC which would not affect 
all States in the world, or at least in a region. This 
would be equally true regarding the breach of bilateral 
agreements between the Superpowers. For that reason 
uncertainty about the applicability of actio popularis 
and rules for the apportionment of damages, if any, could 
be serious obstacles to the predictable outcome of any 
litigation.
The dilemma faced by the International Court of 
Justice in the Nuclear__Test.s case was not one that arose 
as the result of the particular facts involved, nor was 
it related to the individual judges who happened to 
constitute the Cowart. It was a dilemma that would 
foreseeably arise with every NAC related case to be 
brought before the Court, unless the applicable lav/ were 
entirely unambiguous Moreover, the situation is likely 
to apply equally to cases brought before any independent 
court or arbitrator, not only to the International Court 
of Justice.
The case discussed here, highlights the discrepancy 
between the significance of the disputes in terms of 
contemporary world politics and human survival, and the 
anachronistic and vague notions to be invoked in any 
judicial attempt to settle those disputes.
With respect to the case in question as in possible 
future NAC related cases, the weight of international 
opinion as expressed in United Nations forums, perhaps
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translated into overt or thinly disguised sanctions by 
member States, can put pressure on racalcitrant States to 
conform to the accepted norms of international conduct. 
Since the Nuclear Trests case, France has in fact ceased 
to conduct nuclear tests in the environments prohibited 
by the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and condemned by the 
various General Assembly resolutions. What appears to be 
unacceptable is to entrust issues of such magnitude to 
the unpredictable discretion of individuals, however 
highly regarded they may be as to their personal 
integrity. A recognition of such attitudes by States was 
implicit in the Court's unobtrusive; stance on this 
occasion.
It has been contended from time to time, that 
predictable outcome in international law is not necessary 
because, if it existed, there would be no point in 
referring cases for adjudication. The argument is 
erroneous, firstly, because the objective is not to 
increase the number of cases but to settle or prevent 
international disputes. Secondly, States may refer"' 
predictable cases to the Court so as to obtain judicial 
confirmation of their rights, just as they present such 
issues to a General Assembly vote, in order to attract 
more determined enforcement procedures. With each case 
brought before the Court, no matter how unambiguous, the 
Court would have an opportunity to further clarify and 
confirm the principles of international law.
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The Hostages Case
The Hostages case presented the Court of 
International Justice with somewhat different problems.
In this case the Court's jurisdiction, as well as the 
substantive issues to be decided, were essentially based 
on two Treaties clearly in force at the relevant time 
between the United States of America and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. These were the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations of 1963, together with the Optional 
Protocols of each Convention concerning the compulsory 
settlement of disputes. the Treaty of Amity, Economic 
Relations and Consular Rights of 1955, was also invoked 
in relation to a side issue regarding two hostages who 
were not members of the Consular staff of the United 
States of America.
In this case, the problems arose from an element of 
Superpower rivalry due to the strategic implications of 
Iran's political affiliations, leading to the intense 
involvement of the Security Council in mediating efforts 
to settle the dispute. These, as well as several other 
major issues in the case, are likely to be features of 
any NAC dispute that may be referred to the Court.
The Hostages case resulted from an incident on 4 
November 1979, when several hundred citizens of Iran 
invaded the United States Embassy compound in Tehran, 
taking diplomatic personnel and other persons present 
hostage by detaining them in the Embassy. The United 
States sought the release and repatriation of all United
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States hostages and reparations from Iran for the 
alleged violations of her international legal 
obligations. It was claimed that the breach of 
obligations by the Iranian State consisted of 
"tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and 
punish the conduct described", relating to the capture 
and detention of the hostages.
It was alleged that the breach of obligations had 
been compounded by specific undertakings by the 
Government of Iran that the United States Embassy staff 
would be defended by Iranian Security Forces against the 
frequent demonstrations that were taking place throughout 
the country. The undertaking was to apply despite any 
adverse political developments between the respective 
countries, notably the permission given by the United 
States for the entry into its territory of the deposed 
Shah of Iran for medical treatment.
The issue of State responsibility for the 
unauthorised acts of individuals could well arise in a 
dispute involving an NAC agreement. It could relate to 
illegal modes of production of nuclear energy. Or it 
could arise in connection with the manufacture of certain 
types of nuclear weapons by a company engaged in 
armaments manufacture where the particular weapons are 
in breach of international obligation.
The reasoning of the Court in the Hostages case gives 
cause for concern in this regard. While the judges were 
unanimous in the view that, in all the circumstances, the
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State of Iran was responsible for the actions of the 
captors, the many arguments adduced in the majority 
Opinion to support this proposition indicates that, in a 
less factually clear-cut case, problems could be 
encountered. However, in NAC, State responsibility for 
the acts of individuals or entities within the State has 
to be absolute in order to make agreements appropriately 
reliable.
Like the Hostages case, NAC cases are likely to 
create international crisis situations. The United 
States instituted proceedings in the Court on 29 November 
1979, a little over three weeks after the events 
complained of took place in Iran. However, many decisive 
international actions concerning the dispute had been 
taken in the interim. On 9 November 1979, the President 
of the Security Council was requested by a letter 
addressed to him from the Permanent Representative of the 
United States to the United Nations, to secure the 
release of the hostages. Before the end of that day, the 
President of the Security Council had already made a 
public statement asking Iran to release the hostages. 
Still on the same day, the President of the General 
Assembly was able to announce that he was sending a 
personal message to the Ayatollah Khomeini, making a like 
appeal. On 25 November, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations requested the President of the Security 
Council to call an urgent meeting of that body in order 
to seek a peaceful solution to the dispute.
After the institution of proceedings, but before the
190
case was heard, the Security Council on 4 December and 31 
December, respectively, adopted resolutions 457 and 461 
of 1979, calling on the Iranian Government to release 
the hostages. At the instigation of the Security 
Council, the Secretary-General visited Tehran on 1-3 
January 1980, and he established a fact-finding mission 
to Iran on 20 February 1980. In the meantime the United 
States imposed a number of economic sanctions against 
Iran on a unilateral basis.
On 13 January 1980, a draft resolution introduced 
into the Security Council by the United States, calling 
for economic sanctions against Iran by the International 
community, received ten votes in favour, two against, and 
two absentions, with one Member not participating in the 
voting. The negative vote of a permanent Member, the 
Soviet Union, having had the effect of a veto, the 
resolution was defeated. Despite the veto, the United 
States and some other States continued with the economic 
sanctions directed against Iran, and the United States 
Government broke off diplomatic relations with the 
Government of Iran on 7 April 1980.
Hence, by the time the Court delivered its judgment 
in May 1980, all the issues of the case had been explored 
in other forums, negotiating initiatives and sanctions 
had been implemented, and international opinion had 
crystallized regarding the merits of the case.
It is foreseeable that if a breach of a treaty 
occurred involving NAC, a similar sequence of events
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would follow. In 1978, in the Aegean Sea Continental 
Shelf case, the Court had already found that "the fact 
that negotiations are being actively pursued during the 
present proceedings is not, legally, any obstacle to the 
exercise by the Court of its judicial function".^  The 
unanimous confirmation by the Court that intensive 
involvement by the Security Council is no bar to legal 
proceedings, could be a valuable guide to the decision­
makers of Governments involved in an NAC dispute.
The Court demonstrated its ability to respond with 
some speed, by having made an Interim Order concerning 
the return of the hostages as early as 15 December 1979, 
barely two weeks after proceedings were instituted. This 
was undoubtedly largely the result of the existence of 
"multilateral conventions codifying the international law 
governing diplomatic and consular relations".^
Despite the indisputable breach of treaty 
obligations, and accession by both States to the Optional 
Protocols, Iran failed to submit to the jurisdiction of 
the Court on the grounds that: (a) the issue was an
internal matter for the State of Iran, and (b) the 
existence of alleged breaches of international 
obligations by the United States, being of overwhelming 
weight and consequence, were not before the Court in its 
deliberations on the matter.
The failure of Iran to acknowledge the jurisdiction 
of the Court was not given the opprobrium in the 
judgment that might have been expected to result from so
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clear a breach of treaty obligations. Iran's absence 
from the proceedings was noted chiefly in the context of 
rebutting the contention that the Court should have 
examined alleged political actions in Iran by the United 
States during the preceding quarter century. The Court 
claimed that it would not be in a position to investigate 
those issues unless Iran appeared to present its case. 
Taken as a whole, the judgment conveyed the impression 
that little significance attaches to the acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction and that the only sanction for 
failure to appear formally before the Court is the 
inability to fully present an alternative argument. This 
would suggest that the absence of clauses requiring 
submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in 
NAC treaties is of no practical importance. However, the 
case has no bearing on the situation regarding those NAC 
treaties which specify that recourse to the Court is to 
be by consent of the parties. The plain words in those 
treaties indicate that, unless all concerned parties 
agree, the Court has no jurisdiction in relation to 
claims arising from obligations under the treaty in 
question.
In the Hostages case it was fortuitous that Iran 
refused to take its counter-complaints to the Court, as 
the issues raised in its informal communications with the 
Court by letter, telegram and telex, would have presented 
insurmountable difficulties. Iran alleged "more than 
twenty-five years of continual interference by the United 
States in the internal affairs of Iran".33 The Court
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would not have been in a position to examine the merits 
of that claim due to the nature of the evidence required, 
the breadth of the value judgments involved, and the 
gravity of the allegations at issue. No matter how 
ideally impartial the judges might be, a pronouncement by 
the Court on such matters would be regarded by most, if 
not all States, as a political evaluation either in 
favour or opposed to their particular point of view.
Although the Opinion handed down made reference to 
the wide jurisdiction of the Court notwithstanding the 
political implications of cases brought before it, had 
the Court felt obliged to examine Iran's claims in 
greater detail, it may well have found that it did not 
have jurisdiction with respect to those matters. 
Similarly, in an NAC dispute, the Court would not be a 
suitable organ to adjudicate upon the relevance of any 
overriding political consideration that may have prompted 
a party to an NAC treaty to act in breach of its treaty 
obligations
In the Hostgages case, even presuming that Iran had 
presented its arguments before the Court in a defence 
Memorial or by way of a counter-claim, the Court would 
have avoided adjudicating upon the substance of those 
arguments. In passing, the Court adverted to the grounds 
that would have been adduced, namely, that the State of 
Iran could have invoked other means of countering 
unwarranted United States diplomatic influence with the 
use of appropriate sanctions against illicit activities 
by any member of a diplomatic mission. While adeptly
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avoiding to consider the substance of major political
issues, the Court still claimed competence to deal with
issues involving significant political overtones, stating -
Yet never has the view been put forward before that, 
because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is 
only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court 
should decline to resolve for the parties the legal 
questions at issue between them. Nor can any basis 
for such a view of the Court's functions or 
jurisdictions be found in the Charter or the Statute 
of the Court; if the Court were, contrary to its 
settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would 
impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction 
upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution 
of international disputes. 4
With this observation, the designation of "a legal
dispute" as distinct from "a political dispute" was
avoided.
Perhaps the most important principle enunciated in 
the judgment was the decisive weight given, by all 
judges, to the express words contained in the relevant 
Treaties, resulting in a unanimous decision for the 
immediate return of the hostages. Although the Court did 
not base its conclusions exclusively on the binding force 
of the Treaties involved, but on the more general 
"imperative character of the legal obiigation", J the 
ultimate importance of treaty commitments is conveyed by 
the overall import of the judgment.
The inference to be drawn is that unequivocal treaty 
commitment are justiciable even in politically complex 
and strategically sensitive situations. These are the 
conditions likely to prevail in disputes involving NAC.
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Eventually, the Applicants in the Nuclear-Tests 
case, as well as in the Hostages case, were all 
successful in that the matters they had complained of 
were resolved largely to their satisfaction. Further­
more, contrary to fears prevalent at the time that each 
case was heard, the conduct complained of has not been 
repeated. With respect to the testing of nuclear weapons 
in the atmosphere since the judgment, these have only 
been conducted by China, with a negligible average of one 
weapon per year on that State's own territory. Likewise, 
contrary to predictions, the capturing of diplomatic 
hostages by States has not become a favoured method of 
extracting concessions from other States. The nations of 
the world did succeed in imposing their common will on 
the deviating States. They defined their purpose 
primarily through resolutions and negotiations undertaken 
via the Security Council and the General Assembly, and, 
in the Hostages case, with the aid of the provisions of 
treaties in force, upheld by the International Court of 
Justice.
Nevertheless, there are some negative conclusions to 
be drawn from the conduct of the two cases. These 
relate to the cumbersome nature of the international 
machinery for determining and imposing justice at the 
international level, and the haphazard decisions that are 
entailed in activating the process.^ Central to the 
dilemma is that the theoretical ambit of the Court's 
competence to deal with matters of the kind that would be 
involved in NAC disputes, greatly exceeds the authority
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that the Court actually enjoys in practice. The 
discrepancy tends to lead to the mistaken perception that 
the Court, and the system of international law identified 
with it, are not very relevant. Therefore, in order to 
make the international legal system effective in ways 
that promote respect for NAC agreements, leading to their 
observance and the more expeditious negotiation of new 
agreements, it would be advantageous if the Court's 
ostensible functions could be brought into line with its 
actual authority to prescribe the conduct of States inter 
se.
A corollary of the Court's inflated jurisdiction, is 
a corresponding lack of legal recognition for the vast 
normative and mediating potential of the Security Council 
and the General Assembly. Yet it is only these bodies 
with their subordinate committees and backup facilities 
which have, by virtue of their constituent nationally 
accredited representatives, de facto authority and power 
to modify international conduct on the most vital issues 
such as NAC.
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CHAPTER VII
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL PRECEPT
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law
The endeavour to reach agreement so as to control 
the spread and perfection of nuclear arms is one of the 
most recent international endeavours, without traditions 
of its own and with no history of contribution to the 
basis, nature, and methodology of international law 
during its formative period. The rules that govern NAC 
were not founded on natural law, customary law or 
existing international norms.
International law applying to NAC is in the form of 
treaties or other specific written agreements, or is 
embodied in declarations and resolutions of the United 
Nations. Whenever discussing the negotiation of NAC 
agreements at the United Nations, States continually 
emphasize the distinction between non-binding and binding 
agreements, the latter being in the form of treaties duly 
signed and ratified. Since the beginning of the nuclear 
era, vigilant, streamlined bureaucracies have regularly 
and meticulously weighed the advantages and disadvantages 
of signing or ratifying NAC treaties, and they have 
prepared elaborate reservations to qualify the extent of 
their commitment. Deliberateness and precision are the 
hallmarks of undertakings relating to NAC.
By contrast, in traditional approaches to 
fundamental issues, like aggressive and defensive
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military postures, the principles of international law 
tend to be diffuse and contradictory, deliberations are 
usually ponderous in style, and ad hoc methods are often 
invoked. The inappropriateness of the principles and 
methods of international law to satisfy many of the 
contemporary requirements of interaction among States in 
several subject areas is universally recognised. It has 
led to many serious efforts to rectify the position, 
especially by international lawyers themselves.
The most extensive endeavour for improvement is 
conducted by the International Law Commission, which was 
established by the General Assembly in 1949, with the 
express objective of promoting the progressive
2development of international law and its codification.
A number of very significant treaties have been concluded 
on the basis of Draft Articles prepared by the 
Commission. However, its recommendations concerning 
fundamental rationalisations of the principles and basic 
tenets of international law have failed to gain acceptance.
The recommendations have consisted of a Draft 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, prepared 
in 1949; a formulation of the principles of 
international law contained in the Charter and in the 
Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, in 1950; and a Draft 
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, in 1954. All three drafts were prepared by the 
Commission at the request of the General Assembly but 
none has been adopted. At the time, the orientation of
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the Commission was still focused on the problems of the 
international situation prevailingprior to and during 
World War II, as revealed at the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
Nevertheless, some contemporary issues were addressed, 
notably, the Draft Code in Article 2 (7) lists the 
following offences against the peace and security of 
mankind -
Acts by the authorities of a State in violation of 
its obligations under a treaty which is designed to 
ensure international peace and security by means of 
restrictions or limitations on armaments, or on 
military training, or on fortifications, or of other 
restrictions of the same character.
Personal responsibility for the acts is proclaimed
by Article 4, which states -
The fact that a person charged with an offence 
defined in this code acted pursuant to an order of 
his Government or of a superior does not relieve him 
of responsibility in international law if, in the 
circumstances at the time, it was possible for him 
not to comply with that order.
Believing that the International Law Commission was 
at fault for the unacceptability of its recommendations, 
the General Assembly set up a Special Committee on 
Principles of International Law, to draft a "Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations", to be submitted 
for adoption on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
Organisation. The Declaration was duly adopted on 24 
October 1970.
The seven principles of international law embodied
in the Declaration are still referred to with favour as
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representing "a generally accepted interpretation of the 
provisions of the Charter".^ They were cited, for 
example, in the New Delhi Appeal and Declaration,issued 
at the 1981 Conference of Non-aligned foreign ministers 
condemning the Iraq-Iran war for being in contravention 
of those principles, yet failing to name the aggressor.
No doubt due to the vagueness of their terms,
neither the New Delhi statement, nor the United Nations
Declaration which it invoked, has made an appreciable
impact. The 1970 Declaration added nothing new to
existing principles and procedures while disregarding
practical considerations. For example, with respect to
arms control the Declaration lays down that -
All States shall pursue in good faith negotiations 
for the early conclusion of a universal treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control and strive to adopt appropriate measures to reduce international 
tensions and strengthen confidence among States.
With respect to the fulfilment of State obligations, the
Declaration merely reiterates that -
Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith its 
obligations under the generally recognized 
principles and rules of international Law.
No attempt is made to identify the so called 
"generally recognized principles and rules". Ten years 
later, but no nearer to identifying the relevant 
principles of international law, the Disarmament 
Commission in its Report to the 35th Session of the 
General Assembly, obliquely links the generally accepted
principles of international law with certain objectives
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often reiterated in the United Nations, in the following 
terms -
All States Members of the United Nations have, in 
the Final Document, reaffirmed their full commitment 
to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations 
and their obligation strictly to observe its 
principles as well as other relevant and generally 
accepted principles of international law relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, 
respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of States, the peaceful settlement of 
disputes in accordance with the Charter and the 
strengthening of international peace and security 
are directly related to each other. Progress in any 
of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of 
them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative 
effects on others.
In the light of that construction, it is perhaps 
opportune to examine the nexus between the various 
principles of international law as they impinge on the 
above-listed interrelated issues.
The facility for reaching agreements under the 
prevailing international legal system affects NAC not 
only as regards agreements for the qualitative and 
quantitative limitation of nuclear weapons, but also as 
it relates to the prevention and settlement of all major 
international disputes. Agreements concerning the 
development, stockpiling, transfer and deployment of 
weapons, especially nuclear weapons, at all stages of 
their negotiation, conclusion and implementation, share 
all of the shortcomings which also result in the failure 
to settle other vital international disputes.
At the same time, in so far as there are stronger 
inducements for the elimination of genocidal force than
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lesser types of force, it has been possible to conclude 
NAC agreements, amounting to the resolution of 
international disputes as to the disposition or 
equivalence of nuclear forces, perhaps more readily than 
the settlement of less immediately threatening disputes. 
Yet the two processes interact, so that failure of the 
international legal system to resolve disputes involving 
geopolitical conflicts, seriously inhibits the process of 
NAC .
In its legal context, the utilisation of nuclear 
armaments is generically an aspect of war, pertaining to 
the threat or use of force, while the control of nuclear 
armaments is part of the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Although there are plausible 
theories that the threat and use of force, at all levels, 
often has bio-psychological origins of an irrational 
nature, the direction into which that belligerence is 
channelled in the international arena usually relates to 
genuine conflicts of interests. The conflicts take the 
form of international disputes involving the territorial, 
economic and social aspirations adopted by States, or 
reflecting the interests of influential groups within 
States.^
Hence, the efficacy of settlement of the inter­
national disputes is an important factor in the process 
of eliminating the threat or use of force, including the 
most extreme force entailing weapons of mass destruction. 
International disputes caused by the clash of 
territorial, economic and social interests could be
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termed primary disputes. Increasingly, there are 
conflicts about the manner in which conflicts should be 
resolved, including the principles and procedures of 
peaceful settlement, as well as the legitimate methods of 
self-defence and the assertion of international rights. 
Disputes concerning these matters, which could be 
termed consequential disputes, include all outstanding 
NAC issues. Failure to differentiate between primary and 
consequential disputes can give rise to negotiating 
postures inconsistent with a State's fundamental 
objectives.
Three basic methods are utilised for the settlement 
of both primary and consequential disputes. There is a 
judicial method, a direct method and an institutional 
method, all of which contain legal elements.
Judicial settlement of both primary and conse­
quential disputes threatening international peace and 
security rests with the International Court of Justice, 
as presently provided by the Charter of the United 
Nations. With respect to issues other than NAC, 
arbitration could be classified as a judicial function.
In regard to NAC matters it is not foreseeable that 
settlement of a substantial NAC dispute would be 
entrusted to any arbitrator. Possibly an arbitrator may 
be empowered at some time to determine a point that is 
minor, by NAC standards, perhaps in conjunction with a 
wider mediating role.
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The direct method includes negotiation, mediation and 
conciliation. In accordance with the variants of this 
method, the parties arrive at an accommodation among 
themselves, with or without the assistance of third parties 
selected by them. It is an essentially ad hoc procedure, 
whereby the rules governing the mode of settlement can be 
varied on each occasion in conformity with the agreed wishes 
of the parties.
The institutional method of resolving disputes relies 
on the facilities and authority of an institution, other 
than a Court, enjoying international confidence. Foremost 
among these are the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, representing world opinion. The Security Council 
has the primary responsibility in this regard, as provided 
in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Both the General 
Assembly and the Security Council are empowered to set up 
subsidiary bodies to assist them in these tasks, on a 
permanent or ad hoc basis.
Attempts to create permanent bodies to help with 
institutional dispute settlement have not succeeded so 
far. In 1947 the General Assembly established an Interim 
Committee with a view to organising ongoing machinery 
for enquiry tasks. The Committee adjourned sine die in 
1952. In 1949 the General Assembly set up a Panel of
oInquiry and Conciliation, whereby Member States were 
invited to nominate suitable persons for appointment to 
enquiry and conciliation work, at the request of organs 
of the United Nations or individual States. No use was 
made of the Panels, which were abandoned after 1961.
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However, several important United Nations quasi- 
legal enquiries have been conducted on an ad hoc basis. 
Some examples of General Assembly enquiries were the
gUnited Nations Special Committee on Hungary,of 1957, 
and the Commission of Investigation into the death of 
Patrice Lumumba10, of 1961.
It is common knowledge that attempts to settle 
disputes involving international peace and security by 
the three methods, judicial, direct, and institutional, 
have often failed, leading to many instances of hostility 
and armed conflict between States. Therefore, especially 
since the end of the Second World War and the advent of 
nuclear weapons, persistent efforts have been made by 
international lawyers to improve the theoretical basis, 
as well as mechanisms, for the prevention and settlement 
of international disputes impinging on the security 
interests of States. By Western States, these efforts 
consisted largely of theories for the stimulated growth 
of customary international law, while the other States 
frequently reaffirmed and attempted to expand the 
relevant provisions of the Charter by means of 
declarations of the General Assembly.
As has been already noted, three unsuccessful 
attempts were made by the International Law Commission, 
within the first decade after World War II, to strengthen 
the principles of international law for the maintenance 
of peace, in accordance with the experience of the 1930s 
and 1940s. During the next quarter century, the General 
Assembly made numerous recommendations on the subject,
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the following eight being the most comprehensive. They 
were mostly initiated by the Non-aligned and Socialist 
States. Despite the more lengthy description of the 
issues, the content of these documents does not, in 
essence, go beyond the provisions of the Charter.
Western States predominantly opposed or abstained 
from voting in five out of the eight resolutions, while 
three resolutions were carried by consensus. These were 
the Resolution approving the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co­
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, of 24 October 1970,11 referred to
above; the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression,
12of 14 December 1974; and a Declaration on the 
Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente, of 
19 December 1977. ^
The Resolution on the Definition of Aggression does 
enlarge on the description of aggression as laid down in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter, by citing self-evident 
instances of aggression, such as bombardment, blockade, 
etc. However, also listed are less straight-forward 
forms of aggression, including "the use of armed forces, 
such as a State permitting another State to use its 
territory for the perpetration of an act of aggression 
against a third State", which would apply to aggression 
via foreign bases. Another prohibition listed is the 
incursion of armed bands from one State into another, 
which would apply to infiltration by guerilla forces, 
referred to in Article 3(f) and (g) of the Resolution.
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Article 5 also introduces a new element by proclaiming 
that "no consideration of whatever nature, whether 
political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as 
a justification for aggression." Nevertheless, the 
Resolution does not attempt to derogate from the right of 
individual and collective self-defence provided by 
Article 51 of the Charter.
The Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation 
of International Detente, disclaims any intention to 
"detract from" the provisions of the Charter and the 
existing principles of international law, and does not 
claim in any way to "alter" those provisions. Yet, 
without adding to the obiigations of member States, the 
Resolution does encourage Members to permit freer 
international travel and to promote cultural exchanges.
The non-consensus declarations are even less 
significant in elaborating the general principles of 
international law, as they may apply to NAC or to other 
areas of interaction that could affect NAC. The 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty, of 21 December 1965,^  
reiterates that no State may intervene either directly or 
indirectly into the affairs of another State and that no 
type of coercion is permissible including economic, 
political, subversive, etc.
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The Declaration on the Strengthening of International 
Security, of 16 December 1 9 7 0 , lists several provisions 
of the Charter, including the primacy of obligations assumed 
under the Charter, and "the principle that States shall 
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and 
justice are not endangered". The Declaration also seeks to 
enhance the authority of decisions reached by the Security 
Council and urges the establishment of subsidiary organs of 
the Council in conformity with Article 29 of the Charter.
The Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International
Relations and Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
1 f)Weapons, of 29 November 1972, enunciates "the permanent
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons". The Resolution
on the Conclusion of a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force
17in International Relations, of 8 November 1976, calls on
1 ftStates Members to give consideration to a Draft Treaty
on the subject, submitted by the Soviet Union; while the
Resolution on the Inadmissibility of the Policy of
Hegemonism in International Relations, of 14 December 
191979, describes the concept of hegemonism and condemns 
"the creation of spheres of influence and the division of 
the world into antagonistic political and military blocks".
The most recent international effort in this field, the 
draft Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes, shows no more promise of effectiveness than 
its predecessor resolutions in the General Assembly. It re­
states the relevant principles already contained in the 
Charter and draws attention to various Chapters and Articles
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Articles of that document, as if they were likely to be
overlooked in the absence of reiteration. Perhaps the
only sentence that comes to grips with a concrete issue
is the proposed item stating -
It is recalled that whenever States have accepted a 
binding means of settlement of disputes, they are 
obliged to comply strictly with the decision 
taken.21
Principles embodied in the above United nations
resolutions are still too vague to cover many
contingencies. For instance, no appreciable headway has
been made to define and outlaw quasi-aggression, posing
as defence assistance to allies, hot pursuit or forward
defence, as the case may be. Thus, while overt
aggression has been clearly outlawed, there are no
guidelines for the designation and condemnation of that
type of military activity whereby one Government gives
assistance to another Government in order to resist so
called "aggression", in cases when civil disaffection
within the besieged State is a factor in the unrest. Yet
it is this type of activity, or the threat thereof,
involving both Superpowers, that has precipitated the
most bitter primary international disputes in recent 
2 2years, and which presents the scenario for nuclear 
conflict at any time.
So long as existing disputes and potential conflicts 
of such magnitude remain unsolved, and apparently 
insoluble, the temptation to settle them by force is 
overwhelming, leading to the acceptance of extreme risks 
in the escalation of the nuclear arms race, with a 
corresponding reluctance to enter into NAC agreements.
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International Agreement by Resolution
In the attempt to formulate adequate rules of 
conduct for the avoidance or settlement of primary 
international disputes, the international community faces 
a dilemma. The possibilities of advance by way of treaty 
law are limited. Unlike arms control agreements, 
treaties for the designation of specific rights and 
duties related to the avoidance of primary disputes would 
be necessarily too limited in scope for the ongoing 
maintenance of international security. On the other hand, 
existing principles are insufficient. Yet, while the 
broad objectives for peace and justice contained in the 
Charter have stood the test of time and fundamentally 
changed circumstances, any attempt to elaborate them 
further would amount to a quasi-legislative function.
Nevertheless, it is evident that the resolutions 
of the General Assembly have to be incorporated into the 
international legal system, especially as they relate 
to principles for the maintenance of peace and security, 
because agreement in the form of those resolutions is 
the only process capable of sufficiently rapid 
development to make a timely impact over a wide range of 
major issues. For instance, the Legal Counsel of the 
United Nations, Professor Erik Suy, has noted the norm 
creating authority of General Assembly resolutions, 
claiming that -
It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the 
general will of the international community has 
acquired a certain legislative status when 
manifested through formal actions of international 
institutions. In this sense the General Assembly 
resolution is becoming a useful modern tool for
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standard-setting and rule-creation in an expanded 
international society that requires more rapid 
formulations of standards governing the conduct of 
its members.^^
However, Professor Suy did not indicate the 
jurisprudential nature of the process. Failure to 
resolve this impasse in international norm creation and 
conflict resolut ion,involving matters vital to State 
interests, has a strong indirect influence on the success 
of NAC. It also has a direct bearing on NAC, to the 
extent that States do not avail themselves of the 
opportunities to conclude the appropriate NAC treaties.
Unable to devise a solution, international lawyers 
from the Socialist States tend to ignore that a 
theoretical dilemma exists beyond acknowledging that the 
principles of international law need to be further 
elaborated by agreement, based on the concept of co­
existence. Lawyers from the newly independent States of 
the Third World are understandably uneasy that West 
European oriented international law is dominant, drawing 
attention to its weaknesses, while refraining from 
advancing comprehensive alternatives. They take the 
pragmatic stance of attaching great importance to 
Assembly resolutions without feeling the need to explain 
their position in terms of a general theory.
By contrast, many international lawyers of the West, 
although showing no marked enthusiasm for the content of 
General Assembly resolutions, have suggested that, in one 
way or another, Assembly resolutions should be accorded a 
theoretically consistent status. Basically two modes of 
achieving this aim have been envisaged by them.
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According to one school of thought, the Assembly's 
recommendatory powers are quasi-legislative, or should be 
transformed into explicitly legislative powers; while 
others believe that Assembly recommendations can form 
part of the evolutionary process of the law.
The legislative school of thought has several 
variants. Professor Richard Falk asks in this context,
"How can there be legislative change without a 
legislature?"^ He answers the question by proposing 
that Assembly resolutions should be regarded as creating 
"weak" legislative norms. However, he does not elaborate 
in detail how these weak norms are to influence 
international conduct, except to observe that -
... the resolution joins, admittedly to an 
imperceptible degree, with other tendencies that together 
create some legal basis for the argument that an 
obligation exists...
It then becomes necessary to determine how "weak" a 
norm may be without altogether losing its normative 
character. Professor Falk suggests the minimum support 
required to be a two-thirds majority in the General 
Assembly, including the Superpowers. A different assessment 
is made by Rosalyn Higgins, who postulates the possibility 
of a General Assembly resolution emerging more or less 
intact as a norm of general international law, without the 
support of any of the permanent Members of the Security 
Council, although she recognises that, "... exclusion of all 
the Big Powers may in present circumstances render the new
n  /Tcustom ineffective". The suggestion may possibly have
validity in a regional context.
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Similarly indeterminate qualities have been 
attributed to Assembly resolutions by Gaetano Arangio- 
Ruiz. Using somewhat different terminology, he claims 
that -
The Assembly has a law determining, interpreting and
developing function in a 'non-technical' sense.
Taking a somewhat stronger stand, B.V.A. Rb’ling
claims that, "National sovereignty must give way to
international co-operate action..." without
specifying the modus operandi for its attainment. Taking
the extreme position on the legislative spectrum are
those who see a need for overt legislation by the General
Assembly under a system of world government, advocating
29world peace through world law, world federalism etc.
Academic writers who support what could be termed 
the evolutionary school, envisage the metamorphosis of 
General Assembly resolutions into customary international 
law by a gradual transformation. It has been already 
concluded above that international law relating to NAC 
is not amenable to evolution by means of customary 
international law. Hence, it remains to consider whether 
the principles and rules of international law, especially 
as they may affect the settlement of international 
disputes pertaining to the basic security interests of 
States, could be advanced by some variant of the 
evolution of resolutions into custom.
The first prerequisite of the evolution of Assembly 
resolutions into customary international law would be the 
frequent interpretation of the law by the International
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Court of Justice, or like judicial body, in order to 
indicate in what manner development is taking place.
Yet, as noted in the previous Chapter, very few cases are 
referred to the Court even by States with a West European 
tradition. It has been frequently observed that the most 
prevalent reason for avoiding the Court is the 
unreliability of the law which it applies. Hans Blix put 
it in these words -
What are the reasons for this reluctance to submit 
to the Court's jurisdiction? One reason, applying 
generally, is that the rules of customary 
international law are often so uncertain, that 
states may be inclined in their disputes to rely 
rather upon their bargaining position than upon what 
they believe is - but cannot be quite sure is - 
their right.30
If the International Court of Justice were at fault,
rather than the law it dispenses, then States could be
expected to use arbitration facilities. However, with
the exception of commercial transactions, relying on
31quasi-contractual agreements involving States, 
international arbitration has not gained favour.
During the early 1950s a concerted effort was made
to encourage arbitration. In pursuit of that aim the
International Law Commission drafted a Convention on
international arbitration and agreed on a set of model
rules. These were considered by the General Assembly
which decided to circulate the model rules to Member
3 2States for their comments. Governments showed their 
disinterest in arbitration by their failure to comment on 
the draft rules, leading to their abandonment.
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Therefore, the formulation used by M.K. Nawaz in
describing the situation is more apt in this context
because it emphasizes the reluctance of States to submit
to any judicial ruling that would rely on imprecise
concepts of international law. He said -
Time and again states have expressed a view that in 
the absence of agreement on the precise scope and 
content of international law, they cannot submit 
their disputes to compulsory judicial settlement. ^
Yet, if the principles of the evolutionary school were 
adopted, there would have to be constant uncertainty as 
to which Assembly resolutions were evolving into law and, 
if so, to what extent they had evolved. Without constant 
Court rulings it would be impossible to determine the 
rights and duties of a given State at a particular time. 
Therefore, whenever a judicial body were called upon to 
adjudicate on any issue involved, the judges or 
arbitrators concerned would have to take upon themselves 
a wide personal discretion similar to that necessitated 
by the imprecision of the general principles and rules of 
international customary law.
Further, as has been noted with respect to NAC 
issues, the Charter, with the exception of a few subject 
areas, only gives the General Assembly power to make 
recommendations. Therefore, States must be assumed to 
rely on the express provisions of the Charter. Hence, 
far from the possibility of assuming their intention to 
be bound, the opposite presumption must prevail short of 
clear evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, several
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academic writers have expressed a contrary view. For
example, Professor Arangio-Ruiz states that -
... the resolutions of international bodies are 
certainly among the elements of states' practice 
that may contribute to the creation of rules of 
customary law or of contractual rules.
The widely held view is also presented by Dr Higgins, in
these words -
Resolutions of the Assembly are not per se binding: 
though those rules of general international law 
which they may embody are binding on member states, 
with or without the help of the resolution. But the 
body of resolutions as a whole, taken as indications 
of a general customary law, undoubtedly provide a 
rich source of evidence. ^
Apart from the theoretical difficulties of the 
evolutionary school, it should be observed that its 
adherents would find it difficult to produce recent 
examples of the development of international law by these 
means, especially involving issues that concern the vital 
security interests of States. This is not to deny that 
some aspects of the above cited formulations are both 
valid and significant, but merely to observe that they 
are so vague as to be impractical in their present form.
As the International Law Association concluded at 
its Workshop on the Theory and Methodology of 
International Law, "The fact that international law is in 
a state of incoherence and confusion needs no further 
elaboration."^ The conclusion which emerges from that 
fact, notwithstanding persistent efforts to make 
improvements is, that the traditional framework of the 
theory of international law can no longer accommodate the 
necessary changes.
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Restructuring the International Legal System
In previous Chapters, and the earlier part of this 
Chapter, an examination was undertaken of the 
shortcomings of the international legal system in 
relation to agreements for NAC. Subsequently it was 
noted that the international legal system is similarly 
deficient in the prevention and resolution of primary 
conflicts of interest which constitute the major 
plausible inducements fuelling the nuclear arms race. 
Whether or not those apparent inducements are valid 
grounds for nuclear armament is immaterial, so long as 
they are perceived to be so by decision makers. It has 
also been noted that the operation of NAC agreements 
cannot be separated from the general principles of 
international law imparting their particular status, and 
prescribing all other relationships between States. 
Further, it was asserted that, in several ways, those 
general principles have proved to be inadequate for 
present needs and for the tasks ahead.
It follows that NAC is inhibited by the present 
structure and content of the international legal system 
and, implicitly, that if that system were to be improved 
NAC agreements would become more effective. Therefore it 
is pertinent to advert to the type of improvements that 
might take place, and to propose an outline for a 
restructured international legal system. The conclusions 
reached by the United Nations Study on the Relationship 
Between Disarmament and International Security present
the issues thus
Even in a climate of co-operation and detente, some 
basic political and other differences among States 
will remain. It is important to contain these by 
developing and utilizing more effectively procedures 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
and by the establishment and faithful respect for 
principles of international conduct in relations 
among States. In the long run, only consistent 
adherence by all States to such principles would 
provide a solid basis for lasting detente, far- 
reaching disarmament and sustained international 
security. Over the years, the United Nations 
General Assembly has been elaborating such 
principles in relevant expressions of the political 
will of States to act accordingly in international relations. However, their full potential as means 
for developing an international legal order is not 
realized unless they are developed, as appropriate, 
into recognized norms of international law. Such 
norms should, wherever possible, include procedures 
for the settlement of disputes that may arise out of 
the implementation of the terms of such agreements 
and treaties.^
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There are also non-legal impediments to the NAC 
process, briefly adverted to in the Introduction and 
previous Chapters, which could become so inhibiting as to 
make the adequacy of the international legal system 
irrelevant to the inevitable loss of control over the 
nuclear arms race. Proceeding on the assumption that 
other obstacles to NAC are not insurmountable, the 
following changes are required in the international legal 
system to create a climate in which NAC can become more 
effective
Firstly: in order to win the confidence of the great 
majority of States to an acceptance of third party 
adjudication of international disputes, the law applied 
by the International Court of Justice would have to be so 
unambiguous that the outcome of cases presented to it 
would be largely predictable. In order to achieve this, 
the obligations recognised by the Court of Justice would
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have to be restricted to those that had been 
unequivocally undertaken by the parties to the dispute 
under consideration.
Likewise, the methods of interpretation of those 
undertakings would have to enjoy the widest possible 
acceptance, and such discretion as remained with the 
judges would have to be exercised with reference to 
norms approved by the various forums of the United 
Nations. The inevitable consequence of such changes 
would be that the Court would have to abandon any 
pretention of being able to adjudicate all international 
conflicts hitherto regarded as legal disputes.
Therefore, it would be necessary to have the means for 
transferring all inappropriate cases, or aspects of 
cases, from the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction to 
organs more suited for dealing with them.
Secondly: major international disputes not amenable to
speedy negotiated settlement by the parties themselves, 
with or without mutually accepted third party assistance, 
and excluded from the Court's jurisdiction, would have to 
be automatically referred to the Security Council as the 
only world body with the theoretical right to take action, 
and the practical capacity to do so. However, the 
Security Council could not assume the administrative 
burden of this task without backup facilities. Further, 
it would be of paramount importance for the whole 
membership of the United Nations to participate in the 
adjudicative process, but only in a recommendatory
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capacity, in keeping with the spirit of the Charter and 
the contemporary alignment of power and influence which 
it represents.
The procedure would not have to entail the abandon­
ment of the legal process or the sacrifice of the 
expertise contributed by international lawyers. It would 
merely require the institution of a system whereby 
lawyers could exercise their competence as accredited 
delegates of States, instead of sitting in their in­
dividual capacities. Nor would the change have to entail 
the diminution of impartiality. The standard of 
adjudication would be predicated on whether States wish 
to conduct a system of consistent international justice 
or whether they do not. If not, it would be futile to 
attempt to foist justice on them surreptitiously by any 
means whatever. All that can be done is to devise an 
administrative system for the dispensation of justice 
that is seen to be the nearest possible approximation, 
under present circumstances, to the impartial application 
of international norms. Viewed in that light, the 
relevant comparison is not between the operation of the 
Court and an ideal Court, but between the marginal impact 
on major international disputes that has been exerted by 
the Court, juxtaposed against the relatively successful 
day to day functioning of the General Assembly and the 
Security Council.
Thirdly: so as to foster the development of inter­
national law as a universally accepted standard of 
conduct, all States must have the opportunity to
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participate in the establishment of its norms, as well as 
in determining the manner of their observance. Likewise, 
possibilities should be created for States to have a 
direct input with respect to the legal principles and 
rules governing their relationship inter se in keeping 
with the changing requirements of international life, 
including the designation of the legal consequences that 
are to flow from their deliberations and agreements at 
the various levels of formality.
As some of these functions do not lend themselves 
to decision by deliberations of the General Assembly, a 
more flexible system should be instituted. At the same 
time, in keeping with the balance of powers inherent in 
the United Nations system, the Security Council, with the 
concurrence of its permanent Members, must remain the 
final arbiter. Where appropriate, of course, the method 
of approval by resolution, based on recommendations of 
the International Law Commission and/or the Sixth 
Committee, as the case may be, would be utilised.
Fourthly: in all but the most pedantic sense, the
provisions of the Charter are the embodiment of customary 
international law at this time. If there exists a State 
that does not believe itself bound by the principles and 
rules of the Charter, it can be confidently asserted that 
none of that State's accredited representatives would be 
prepared to acknowledge that perception. Also, the 
charter is a Treaty in force, duly ratified by nearly all 
sovereign States in the world. Its rules are 
sufficiently detailed to create contractual relations.
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Its principles are broad enough to encompass all the 
significant endeavours of the international community.
Albeit technically a part of the Charter, Article 
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
is not consonant with the principles of the Charter and 
the division of powers created by it. It has already 
been argued in the previous Chapter that the provisions 
of Article 38 lead to consequences out of step with 
contemporary State practice; that they enshrine a 
Eurocentric orientation; and that they imply the 
willingness of States to entrust their most vital 
interests to a few individuals with legal qualifications 
acquired in other, sometimes potentially hostile,
States.
The aforementioned inappropriate attributes of 
Article 38 are reminiscent of the failed League of 
Nations regime of international law. The provisions 
transposed in their entirety from the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice are the 
heritage of an alien era,that not only hinders the 
settlement of current disputes but also standsin the way 
of the development of viable alternative modes of 
settlement.
For the above reasons, in order to achieve the 
requisite improvement in the international legal system, 
it would be imperative to devise a general theory of 
international law in harmony with the outlook prevalent 
in the main groups of States, that would be acceptable to
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all. Such a general theory would have to differentiate 
between legal consequences flowing from matters to which 
States have given their explicit consent, and legal 
consequences flowing from those matters to which they 
have given only tacit or implied consent.
Code of General Principles of International Law
The Code would be adopted by consensus in the 
General Assembly on the basis of a draft prepared by the 
International Law Commission, and revised by the Sixth 
Committee, or a Legal Revision Committee appointed by the 
Assembly in accordance with the principles of equitable 
geographical distribution. Subsequently the draft could 
be incorporated into the Charter in the form of an 
amendment. Alternatively, an Assembly Resolution or 
Declaration could form the basis or a separate 
Convention. Another solution would be for States to act 
in accordance with a consensus Declaration of the subject 
without other formal endorsement. The following elements 
might be considered when preparing the Code :
1. Affirmation of the supremacy of the United 
Nations Charter as the ultimate source of international 
law for the foreseeable future.
2. Declaration that two kinds of international law 
exist -
a. treaty law, being international agreement by
explicit consent of the parties, to be created, 
observed and interpreted in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and
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b. precept law, being precepts of international
co-operative conduct, to be defined and applied 
in accordance with the Code.
3. Definition of precept law as being those 
principles and rules of international co-operative 
conduct to which Member States of the United Nations have 
implicity given their consent.
4. Confirmation that the International Court of 
Justice be retained as provided in the Court's Statute, 
including the scope of the Court's jurisdiction as laid 
down in Article 36, provided that the sources of law to 
be invoked in the Court's ordinary jurisdiction shall be 
as follows -
a„ treaties in force that were concluded or 
confirmed after the Charter was adopted 
b. to the extent necessary for the interpretation 
of treaties - 
i. precept law
ii. in the absence of relevant precept law,
such international norms, hitherto called 
customary rules of international law, as 
have already been cited in cases decided by 
the International Court of Justice or by 
the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.
Identification of -
the sources of precept law, as being principles 
and rules of international co-operative conduct
contained in
i. widely accepted treaties in force
ii. resolutions of United Nations bodies
iii. in the absence of i and ii, such
international norms, hitherto called 
customary rules of international law, as 
have already been cited in cases decided 
by the International Court of Justice or 
by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.
b. the content of precept law, as being those
principles and rules of law that can be deduced 
from i, ii and iii, having been implicitly 
recognised as constituting international co­
operative conduct required of Members of the 
United Nations.
Exposition of the operation of precept law, can 
establishing that it can only be applied by -
a. the Security Council
b. the International Court of Justice in its 
treaty intrepreting capacity.
The designation of jus cogens as being the body 
of principles contained in the Charter.
Provision that -
a. legal issues referred to the Secretary-General 
by the Security Council, the General Assembly 
or the International Court of Justice, not
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being adjudicable by the Court in its 
amended jurisdiction in accordance with 
paragraph 4., are to be transferred for 
assessment to Legal Panels;
b. States entitled to nominate delegates to the 
Legal Panels are to be selected by the General 
Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical 
distribution, provided that, if the issue 
relates predominantly to the observance of 
treaty provisions, the Legal Panel to assess it 
shall be composed of representatives of States 
parties to the relevant treaty, or those of 
them that wish to avail themselves of the 
opportunity to participate;
c. in the event that the participation of States 
representatives exceeds a given number, being 
representatives of the parties to a treaty 
under consideration, then those representatives 
are to be empowered, by decision among 
themselves, to appoint an appropriate lesser 
number to sit on the Panel.
9. Pronouncement that the mandate of the Legal
Panels is to be the submission of recommendations to the 
Security Council, in accordance with the assessment of 
Panel members as to whether a State has acted contrary to 
treaty law or precept law or both, as the case may be. 
Further, that in accordance with paragraph 6., the Panel 
be required not to determine the content of precept law 
by reliance on any individual resolution of the United
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Nations, but only on an overall appraisal of the relevant 
treaties, resolutions, and their observance by States, 
indicating the creation of an accepted standard of 
international co-operative conduct.
10. Indications of the procedure to be followed by
the Legal Panels, requiring them to -
a. Receive submissions from the parties and,when 
appropriate, from the Sixth Committee;
b. At any stage of the proceedings to recommend 
interim action by the Security Council;
c. Recommend referral of any issue of treaty 
interpretation to the International Court of Justice, 
provided that in the opinion of the Panel the Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the case;
d. Specify the relevant treaty law, and establish 
the nature and extent of the consensus that allegedly 
constitutes the precept law to be invoked, (for example 
that there shall be no testing of nuclear weapons in the 
atmosphere) citing evidence of the consensus;
e. Investigate the facts complained of, allegedly 
constituting the breach of precept law;
f. Assess whether the breach has occurred and its 
significance in all of the circumstances, including -
i. whether specific damage has resulted or 
could result from the breach 
ii. the existence of any aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances;
g. Report its findings or interim 
recommendations, made jointly or severally and presented
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in a public document to the Security Council, preferably 
not in a discoursive style but concisely, under the 
various headings.
11. Reaffirmation that the Legal Panels are to be
entirely subordinate to the Security Council and that 
their creation is not to be interpreted as establishing a 
practice requiring the Security Council to desist from 
debating and deciding upon issues concurrently under 
consideration by a Legal Panel.
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"1. Draws the attention of States to 
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and conciliation;
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CHAPTER VIII
PREVENTING AN INCREASE IN NUCLEAR ARMED STATES
The Horizontal Non-Proliferation Regime
Horizontal proliferation is the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons capability by additional States. Nuclear 
weapons capability could be a few crude bombs 
manufactured or obtained by clandestine means, or the 
declared stockpiling of several hundred weapons, with 
correspondingly sophisticated delivery systems, or any 
other level of nuclear weapons preparedness between those 
extremes. The stationing of nuclear weapons, owned and 
controlled by one State, into the territory of another 
State, is regarded as a part of vertical proliferation 
as between States that have control over nuclear weapons.
The horizontal non-proliferation regime has been 
created by the international community to prevent or 
inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to additional 
countries. It is based on the operation of three 
treaties: the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty.'*' The last named Treaty sets out 
the measures to be adopted for the prevention of 
horizontal proliferation as follows -
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or control over such weapons or explosive 
devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way
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to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear 
weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 
or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any 
transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,- and not 
to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.
The corresponding Article 1 of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco only refers to the obligations of non-nuclear- 
weapon States in the maintenance of the horizontal non­
proliferation regime, in the following terms -
Article 1
1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to 
use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear 
material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their 
respective territories:
(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or 
acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear 
weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or 
indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other 
way, and
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, 
deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear 
weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties 
themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other 
way
2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to 
refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorising, 
directly or indirectly, or in any way participating 
in the testing, use, manufacture, production, 
possession or control of any nuclear weapon.
Both Treaties require extensive verification
procedures to be undertaken in co-operation with the
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IAEA. Such verification primarily consists of entering
into safeguards agreements with the IAEA, whereby the
Agency is supplied by the relevant non-nuclear-weapon
State with the necessary information concerning nuclear
activities to be safeguarded, including the disposal of
all special fissionable material. The agreements to be
concluded with the Agency also require the contracting
State to permit periodic inspection of all of its nuclear
materials and facilities (full scope safeguards) by
2designated inspectors employed by the Agency.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which preceded the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, does not rely entirely on the 
operation of the safeguards system with the Agency. That 
Treaty contains provisions for additional controls, 
requiring States Parties to submit biannual reports 
confirming that no activity prohibited by the Treaty has 
occurred within their borders, and permitting special 
inspections in given circumstances. Another notable 
difference is that the Treaty of Tlatelolco, unlike the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, permits nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes under its Article 18. If the Article 
is to be observed to the letter, it is not likely to have 
any practical application because it requires a peaceful 
nuclear explosion to be in accordance with prior Articles 
1 and 5. The relevant portion of Article 5 defines a 
nuclear weapon as -
. .any device which is capable of releasing nuclear 
energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a 
group of characteristics that are appropriate for use 
for warlike purposes.
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Since there is no known or contemplated method 
whereby peaceful nuclear explosions can be differentiated 
from explosions suited to warlike purposes, the 
provisions of Article 18 appear to be redundant. This 
does not exclude the possibility of tortuous 
interpretations to suit the purposes of some Latin 
American States not Parties to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which may be determined to explode nuclear 
devices without acknowledging nuclear-weapon status. 
However, world public opinion could not be deceived by 
such a ruse, least of all in Latin America itself where 
the issue has been the subject of some concern.
The second Review Conference of the Parties to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
during August-September 1980, afforded a good opportunity 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards 
system in relation to the entire horizontal non­
proliferation regime. While the Review Conference 
naturally concentrated on issues directly bearing on the 
conduct of the Parties to the Treaty, the operation of 
the safeguards system in relation to the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, and also in connection with safeguards 
agreements entered into with States not members of either 
Treaty, came under scrutiny Although the Conference 
concluded without reaching agreement on any substantive 
issue,^ due to the dissatisfaction of Parties with the 
lack of progress by nuclear-weapon States in halting 
vertical proliferation, many important assessments were 
made by individual States and groups of States.
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The caucus of developing nations, known as the Group
of 77, submitted their assessment in the form of two
Working Papers.-* Relying on the report of the IAEA, as
well as their own evaluations, these States maintained
that in the past five years there had been no diversion
of nuclear material subject to the IAEA safeguards
system. Yet, in the same context, they pointed out that
there have been reports alleging "significant quantities
of special nuclear material unaccounted for in a non-
£nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty". However, 
it was felt that in broad terms, the verification
7procedures undertaken in co-operation with the IAEA, 
and implemented in accordance with the Agency's Statute, 
were quite adequate. IAEA provisions were found to be 
satisfactory, not only to the extent that they verified 
the non-division of sensitive materials, but also with 
respect to the manner in which they were applied, so as 
not to hamper "economic, scientific or technological 
development of the parties to the Treaty".
The Group of 77 also drew attention to serious flaws 
in the horizontal non-proliferation regime. While it was 
conceded that there had been no direct transfer of 
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States in breach of 
Article I, it was implied that the spirit of the Treaty 
had not been altogether complied with. The Group noted 
the loophole in the Treaty whereby non-nuclear-weapon 
States Parties are not expressly forbidden to export 
nuclear material, equipment and technology to other non­
nuclear-weapon States, in a manner that could lead to
240
their utilisation for the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
capability by the recipient. The members of the Group 
did not recommend an amendment of the Treaty to rectify 
this omission. Instead, they called on the Parties to 
the Treaty to interpret its provisions so as to infer an 
extension of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States to 
non-nuclear-weapon States, wherever applicable.
The Group was particularly concerned about the 
transfer of nuclear materials and skills to States not 
Parties to the Treaty whose nuclear-weapon status has
obeen in doubt, in particular South Africa and Israel.
They referred to these two States by name but omitted to 
mention some other similarly ambivalent importing States, 
as well as all of the exporting States so implicated.
Mexico and Yugoslavia were critical of the alleged
Qdeficient implementation of Article V of the Treaty.
They claimed that there had been insufficient effort, on 
the part of the IAEA, to inform non-nuclear-weapon States 
Parties about the potential benefits to be derived from 
the peaceful application of nuclear explosions allegedly 
obtainable from the nuclear-weapon States. Efforts to 
keep open the lines of communication for passing on 
information of this kind might be intended to forestall 
any moves among the Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
from insisting on the right to detonate nuclear 
explosions of an ostensibly peaceful kind.
The United States drew attention to a very 
significant problem, arising from the vast increase in
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the volume and type of safeguarding activities that the 
IAEA will have to undertake in order to keep pace with 
the growing nuclear industry and with changed methods of 
operation among sections of that industry.10 The 
United States cautioned that, unless additional human and 
financial resources were made available for the 
refurbishment of the Agency's safeguards procedures, they 
could become inadequate in the near future. It was also 
suggested that States planning new commercial nuclear 
installations should design and construct them in such a 
manner as to facilitate safeguards measures.
The Implications of Horizontal Proliferation
The consequences of horizontal proliferation would 
undoubtedly vary depending on the sequence in which 
States acquired the capability, the overt or clandestine 
nature of the capability, and the degree of 
sophistication attained by the various States. None of 
these variables are foreseeable with any certainty, 
although the level of nuclear technology for industrial 
energy production is acknowledged to be the best guide of 
a State's ability to produce nuclear weapons, if it so 
wished.
Taking into account both technological development 
and a possible political motivation, the following States 
have come into contemplation as likely Nth States in the 
foreseeable future: Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Egypt, (Federal Republic of) Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, (South) Korea, 
Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sweden, Syria,
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Taiwan and Zaire.11
While several of these States are Parties to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, their 
renunciation or breach of those Treaties cannot be ruled 
out in the event of the breakdown of the non­
proliferation regime. Such an eventuality must be 
contemplated in any prediction about the likely 
consequences of horizontal proliferation.
Bearing in mind the difficulty of foreseeing what any 
one State may do in an altered international environment 
or as the consequence of an internal change of 
Government, it is evident that across-the-board 
prediction about the consequences of a cataclysmic 
upheaval, such as horizontal proliferation might produce, 
can only qualify as guess-work. Nevertheless, many
12predictions of this kind are being confidently made.
Soviet commentators have said little about the
expected consequences of horizontal proliferation, but
the actions of the Soviet Union indicate that it is
committed to a stringent policy of preventing the
emergence of more nuclear-weapon States. The Soviet
Union has been extremely reticent about the transfer of
11nuclear technology, even at the expense of serious 
political disadvantage in its relations with the States 
friendly towards it.1  ^ Further, it has foregone the very 
considerable political advantages to be attained from 
offering nuclear technology and materials to countries
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rebuffed in their efforts to obtain these from the United 
States and other Western States. Whenever supplying 
special fissionable materials, the Soviet Union insists 
on the return of all spent fuel, thus preventing any 
possibility of its misuse.15
Although not as commercially stringent as the Soviet 
Union, the United States has so far followed a determined 
policy opposed to horizontal proliferation. This policy 
coincided with Government and academic assessments 
concerning the dangerously destabilising consequences 
that the emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States 
would produce. The introduction of the Nuclear Weapon 
Non-Proliferation Act in 1977 by President Carter, and 
its subsequent adoption in 1978, marked the zenith of 
that policy and that outlook.
When attempting to apply the legislation by 
renegotiating supply agreements with countries like India 
and Japan, the United States encountered much stronger 
opposition than it had anticipated. In addition, Western 
allies like France and Germany did not close ranks on the 
issue. Instead, they permitted commercial interests in 
their States to take advantage of the strict supply 
conditions imposed by the United States, by offering more
I (Tfavourable terms. Naturally this was received with 
disfavour by the United States nuclear industry, which 
has resulted, since 1978, in a powerful backlash opposed 
to strict anti-“ proliferation measures .
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Since that time there has been a number of
assessments in the United States predicting that an
increase in nuclear-weapon States is (a) inevitable, (b)
manageable, and (c) decidedly advantageous. There is a
notable contrast between the attitudes that prompted the
introduction of the 1977 Act., and subsequent official
attitudes to horizontal non-proliferation. For instance,
a Nuclear Proliferation Fact-book, prepared in 1977 by
the Congressional Research Service of the Library of 
17Congress, took the objective of non-proliferation for
granted and concentrated on methods for achieving this
purpose. By 1979, however, a collation of assessments
by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of 
18Defence, assumed large-scale proliferation within a 
decade or so to be unavoidable.
Without over-estimating the significance of the 1979 
collation, it is interesting to note that all of the 
assessments in that study tend to be optimistic and no 
grossly destabilising consequences of horizontal 
proliferation are predicted. On the contrary, it is 
postulated that the known possibility of possession of 
nuclear weapons by sub-national groups would tend to 
stabilise otherwise unstable regimes; that horizontal 
proliferation could undermine Third World solidarity in 
its economic confrontation with the North; that 
acquisition of the weapons is not likely to result in 
their use; that, alternatively, the use of nuclear 
weapons by the newly emerged nuclear-weapon States could 
have a salutory effect by bringing about a code of good
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O  Obehaviour regarding nuclear weapons; and, above all,
that horizontal proliferation would disadvantage the 
Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States. The last- 
mentioned assessment is the most significant from a 
policy point of view, and is presented in the following 
unequivocal terms -
To recapitulate nuclear proliferation would have 
adverse effects on the Soviet Union, increasing the 
threat to its national security, diminishing its 
ability to project power and influence through 
military means, and reducing its stature as a global 
power. To counteract these effects and remain as 
actively competitive in world affairs as possible, 
the Soviet Union would modify some of its traditional 
strategies and tactics which would tend to become 
increasingly counterproductive in an era of nuclear 
proliferation, replacing them with others, more 
suitable to cope with the tasks at hand. The style 
and method of Soviet foreign policy would become less 
abrasive. The content of Soviet foreign policies 
would be less confrontationally oriented, emphasizing 
co-operation and accommodation instead. Moderation, 
reasonableness^ a high sense of responsibility, and, perhaps, even responsiveness to the sensitivities of 
others would characterize Soviet behavour. In sum, 
under the impact of nuclear proliferation the Soviet 
Union would become a more sensible member of the
In all of the assessments, the possible adverse 
consequences in the West of uncertainty, social 
disillusionment, rapid political realignments, and perhaps 
public fear verging on panic if nuclear weapons were used 
by anyone, have been omitted from calculation. Neither is 
it apparent, for example, why Soviet leaders should react 
so positively in a situation of unprecedented complexity 
and stress, unless they are expected to be endowed with 
supehuman qualities. As there is no suggestion of 
confidence in the Soviet leadership in other connections 
anywhere in the collation, there appears to be no
community and play a more constructive role in
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reasonable explanation for this expectation of 
extraordinary prudence. Similar criticisms could be 
levelled at other highly optimistic conclusions reached 
by the study, which derives its significance from the 
fact that the views presented coincided with United 
States policy changes indicating diminished commitment to 
non-proliferation.
One example of the change was the acceptance, within 
the framework of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
(INFCE), of the arguments supporting the construction of 
fast breeder reactors on a commercial scale, despite the 
well known proliferation risks involved. Other examples 
of relaxation could be found in the easing of uranium 
supply conditions, as in the case of continuing supplies 
to India, notwithstanding that country's non-compliance 
with United States export conditions. There has also 
been a slackening of United States diplomatic and 
economic pressures to compel all States to submit their 
nuclear facilities to full scope IAEA safeguards.2^
Interestingly, the diminished concern shown by the 
United States in non-proliferation, spurred many Third 
World countries to adopt the non-proliferation cause. 
Since SSD I, there has been a growing appreciation of the 
likely security and economic consequence to the Third 
World of the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by 
some of them. While longer term destabilisation in 
Superpower relations is anticipated, it has not been 
overlooked that the first casualties of horizontal 
proliferation could be the political rivals within the
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Non-aligned group of nations.
At the Second Review Conference of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, had the participating members of
the Group of 77 decided to end the non-proliferation
7 Sregime, they had an excellent opportunity to do so.
With political divisions and economic competitiveness 
holding sway among the nuclear-weapon States, the re- 
emergence of cold war attitudes between the Superpowers, 
and adequate justification provided by the clear breach 
of their obligations under Article VI by the nuclear- 
weapons States, especially the Superpowers, the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty could have been repudiated there and 
then.
There was no repudiation. On the contrary, the
nations of the Group of 77 affirmed their adherence to
the principles of the Treaty in the strongest terms used
to date. They did so by quoting from the conclusions
reached by SSD I in the Final Document, which warned of
"the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the
existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms
race", and cautioned that "mankind today is confronted
with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising
from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most
9destructive weapons ever produced..."
The upshot was that, although the Review Conference 
ended without agreement on any substantive issue, 
commitment to the Treaty and the principles it embodies 
remained intact - no longer primarily in response to
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active persuasion by the West but rather as an expression 
of the autonomous evaluation of the Third World, 
including would-be Nth countries.
Since the end of the Conference, there has been a 
partial swing back of the pendulum in the United States 
towards a reassertion of the non-proliferation 
commitment. The reappraisal has been at the behest of 
long-standing opponents of horizontal proliferation, like 
Senator John Glenn, who was a sponsor of the 1978 Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act, and who continues to warn about 
the propensity of peaceful nuclear technology to
27diversion for the production of nuclear weapons. Other 
traditional advocates of anti-proliferation measures, 
like Joseph Nye, Deputy Under-Secretary of State 
responsible for non-proliferation policy during the 
Carter Administration, now take an intermediate position, 
cautioning against both "purism" and "cynicism" in supply 
policy.2®
The trend was confirmed in the Presidential Statement 
on Non-Proliferation, made on 16 July 1981, in which it 
was reiterated that -
Further proliferation would pose a severe threat to 
international peace, regional and global stability, 
and the security interests of the United States and 
other countries.
Regarding the contentious issue of supply policy, the 
President undertook to "seek" agreement on full scope 
safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States,"as a condition 
for any significant new nuclear supply commitment". On 
the issue of reprocessing, the Statement declared that
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the Administration will "not inhibit or set back... 
breeder reactor development abroad in nations with 
advanced nuclear power programs where it does not 
constitute a proliferation risk".2  ^ No guidelines were 
set out for the objective determination of the existence 
of a "proliferation risk".
Continuing Development of the_Horizontal Non-
Proliferation Regime
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material:
Following several years of negotiations, the 
Convention was opened for signature on 3 March 1980. As 
stated in the text, which was adopted at the Vienna 
Conference of Government representatives, the chief aim 
is to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for 
weapons purposes, although the prevention of other kinds 
of misuse is also contemplated, whether in the course of 
domestic use, storage or transport. The Convention 
refers to any illegal manner of appropriating nuclear 
material, including illegal receipt, possession, use or 
alteration of materials.
The first international effort to give protection 
against theft or other unauthorised diversion of nuclear 
materials, and against sabotage of nuclear facilities, 
was made in 1972 under the auspicies of the IAEA. It was 
in the form of a report by a panel of experts convened by 
the Director-General, under the title "Recommendations 
for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials". These
250
Recommendations were revised and published in 1975. 
Subsequently the Director-General of IAEA convened a 
Standing Advisory Group on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, which proposed some modifications that were 
incorporated into the document in 1977.^
The Convention is a further extension of the original 
IAEA Recommendations. By its provisions, physical 
protection is to be applied during the transportation of 
the materials across international borders, and also 
across the territories of individual States. Pursuant to 
the Convention, Parties undertake responsibility for 
materials carried on ships or aeroplanes under their 
jurisdiction, and they are required to impose agreed 
terms on any import or export authorisation of such 
materials. The types of physical protection that are to 
be applied to nuclear materials have been determined in 
accordance with the technical standards of the IAEA.
States Parties have also agreed to co-operate in the
retrieval of missing or illegally appropriated material
and to prosecute or extradite the perpetrators of
criminal offences prohibited by the Convention.
Provisions relating to the prosecution and extradition of
offenders have been based on the Hague and Montreal
Conventions on Suppression of Terrorism in Air Traffic
and on the Convention and Punishment of Crime Against
Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic 
7 4Agents.
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International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation:
The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation was
undertaken during 1978-80, by 40 supplier and consumer
States of nuclear materials and technology. It was an
attempt to reconcile the perceived economic benefits of
nuclear energy with the belatedly acknowledged propensity
of such use to spread the capability of manufacturing
nuclear weapons. The suitability of all nuclear
technology, and all weapons grade material however
obtained, to utilisation for the manufacturer of nuclear
weapons, has long been denied or underrated. It has been
correctly pointed out, particularly by spokesmen for the
developing nations, that there are more efficient ways of
acquiring nuclear weapons capability than by
clandestinely diverting materials and technological
expertise ostensibly required for peaceful use. While
that argument is sound from an economic standpoint, there
are persuasive political reasons why the more devious
8 5path to proliferation may be preferred.
Concerns of this genre prompted a number of supplier 
States, consisting of Western and Socialist industrial 
States, to form themselves into the so-called "London 
Suppliers Club". They agreed to a set of guidelines 
regarding the conditions under which transfer of 
sensitive materials and technologies for peaceful 
purposes were to be conducted. These guidelines were 
reproduced in IAEA document INFCIRC 254, imposing 
substantially stricter conditions of transfer than those 
agreed upon by all IAEA Members, as set out in INFCIRC
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209 and Addenda. Some consumer Members of the IAEA 
bitterly attacked the sectional approach by the "London 
Suppliers Club", whose members were accused of 
restricting supply for economic gain, rather than a 
measure to prevent proliferation.
Developing countries have argued, convincingly 
enough, that if the supplier States were truly concerned 
about the horizontal proliferation problem, they would 
ensure that States Parties to the Non-Proliferation
3 6Treaty received preferential treatment over non-Parties 
whereas the converse position tends to prevail 
whenever economic conditions favour the non-Party. Some 
supplier States have even failed, so far, to require the 
acceptance of full scope IAEA safeguards as an invariable 
condition of supply, on the inconsistent and spurious 
ground that the requirement would constitute unwarranted 
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign 
States.
Another area of contention has arisen with respect to 
the measures to be adopted to enable the IAEA to maintain 
the high standard of its inspections. Of particular 
concern were the newly developed fast-breeder reactors 
being constructed in Germany and Japan as prototypes, 
with a view to their introduction on a commercial scale, 
and the growing volume of nuclear material being produced 
by an increasing number of facilities. Plans have been 
under consideration by the Agency for the construction of 
regional nuclear fuel-cycle centres and for the 
international management of surplus plutonium.
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It was the accumulation of problems such as these 
which prompted the organising of INFCE. The essentially 
technical and analytical study afforded opportunities 
for international diplomatic consultation and the 
informal negotiation of outstanding issues. The 
evaluation was conducted in the following Working Groups -
Working Group 1 - Fuel and Heavy Water Availability
(Co-Chairmen. Canada, Egypt,
India);Working Group 2 - Enrichment Availability (Co-
Chairmen; France, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Iran);
Working Group 3 - Assurances of Long-Term Supply of
Technology, Fuel and Heavy Water 
and Services in the Interest of 
National Needs Consistent with Non- 
Proliferation (Co-Chairmen; 
Australia, Philippines,
Switzerland);
Working Group 4 - Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling,
Recycle (Co-Chairmen: Japan, United 
Kingdom),
Working Group 5 - Fast Breeders (Co-Chairmen:
Belgium, Italy, USSR),
Working Group 6 - Spent Fuel Management (Co-Chairmen:
Argentina, Spain);
Working Group 7 - Waste Management and Disposal (Co-
Chairmen: Finland, Netherlands, 
Sweden);
Working Group 8 - Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor
Concepts (Co-Chairmen Republic of 
Korea, Romania, USA).
The above designation of Working Groups accurately 
indicates that the emphasis was on economic 
considerations, especially the assurance of supply, the 
efficiency and safety of reactors, and the implementation 
of more productive technologies with respect to 
reprocessing spent fuel management etc. However, all of 
these matters are inexorably bound up with the problems 
of diversion and proliferation. Hopes were expressed 
during the earlier part of the Evaluation that a 
breakthrough in technologies might result in the
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construction of nuclear fuel cycles that are diversion- 
proof. While it was found that such innovations would be 
feasible, it was concluded that they are not, at present, 
economically competitive.
During the course of the evaluation, the activities 
most prone to risk were identified as fuel fabrication, 
uranium reprocessing, and plutonium handling. However, 
it was acknowledged at various times that some risks of 
proliferation exist in relation to fresh nuclear fuel 
containing enriched plutonium, uranium enrichment, all 
reactors, spent fuel storage - especially plutonium 
storage, mixed oxide fuel fabrication, waste disposal, 
and the dismantling of old nuclear plants.
five international organisations which contributed to the
by the participants that, following INFCE, dialogue 
concerning the subject would continue within the 
framework of the IAEA One kind of follow-up measure was 
expected to be the conduct of tests to evaluate a number 
of proposals presented at INFCE for proliferation- 
resistant technology.
Ongoing Conflicts and their Resolution
Neither INFCE nor any other forum has yet provided 
satisfactory solutions for reconciling the often guoted, 
so called "inalienable right" of all non-nuclear-weapon 
States to carry out their own programmes for the peaceful
o ouse of nuclear energy, with the objective of preventing
The findings of the participating countries, and
3 7evaluation, were largely inconclusive.
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horizontal proliferation. Nevertheless, many 
improvements have been made with an important cumulative 
effect. The least publicised, but probably most 
effective steps have been the continuing improvements in 
the safeguards system applied by the IAEA. Increasingly 
stringent conditions imposed by the supplier countries, 
although open to charges of undemocratic and 
discriminatory conduct, have no doubt had an inhibiting 
effect on proliferation tendencies.
The several anti-proliferation proposals in Working 
Papers and other contributions to the inconclusive second 
Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
together with the many tentative suggestions arising from 
the INFCE studies, have provided the basis for far- 
reaching measures. Clandestine diversion of nuclear 
materials for whatever purpose, including their 
utilisation by terrorist groups, perhaps with the 
connivance of some non-nuclear-weapon States, will be 
inhibited as the result of the Convention on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material. Technological 
initiatives undertaken by States singly or in co­
operation for the perfection of economically viable yet 
proliferation-resistant technologies also hold promise. 
Alternatively, the utilisation of nuclear fusion 
techniques in energy production, such as those being 
investigated through the International Tokamak Reactor
O QProject, could have an important future impact.
Likewise the proposed institutional barriers to 
proliferation, notably the scheme for international
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plutonium storage and international spent fuel 
management, as well as regional reprocessing and similar 
co-operative measures,40 present possibilities for 
reconciling economic objectives with non-proliferation 
objectives. Current projects have a predominantly 
European commercial orientation.41 Plans for 
international projects proposed to be undertaken chiefly 
to inhibit proliferation, are not sufficiently developed 
for legal issues to have emerged clearly. They could be 
established along the lines of the Statute of the IAEA, 
only participating States would have much greater 
economic interests in their operation.
The above matters will remain under constant review 
by the IAEA There will be further opportunities for the 
elaboration of the appropriate agreements at several 
forthcoming conferences- The most significant of these 
will be a world Conference, in 1983, for the Promotion of 
International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy.42
It should be borne in mind, however, that neither the 
technical possibilities for further international action 
to inhibit horizontal proliferation nor administratively 
contrived opportunities, could be automatically converted 
into concrete measures That will depend on the extent 
of concurrence of all relevant States to take the 
definitive steps. Likewise, existing agreements 
regarding safeguards are only as firm as the 
determination to enforce them If other political 
objectives override that determination, particularly by
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one or other of the Superpowers, then the non­
proliferation regime must suffer to that extent. The 
gradual erosion of the non-proliferation regime could be 
slowed down by the strict imposition of the requirement 
for full scope safeguards of all nuclear activities by 
non-nuclear weapon States wishing to acquire nuclear 
technology, equipment or materials.
It may be preferable for the international community 
to moderate disapproval of the existence of a few 
quasi-nuclear-weapon States whose security is under 
special threat, like India, Israel and South Africa, 
until the political situation eases, than to make their 
presence an excuse for the further relaxation of 
standards. Yet both Third World and developed Western 
States are prone to the latter interpretation of the 
situation.
There is a tendency for countries of the Third World 
to accept proliferation under the slogan of non­
discrimination. China has been the foremost proponent of 
this approach, in outright opposition to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. Three years before that Treaty was 
concluded, the Chinese position was stated in these words 
by Marshal Chen Yi -
China hopes that Afro-Asian countries will be able to 
make atom bombs themselves and it would be better for 
a greater number of countries to come into possession 
of atom bombs.^
Since rapprochement with the United States, China has 
modified its public statements on horizontal 
proliferation but has made no statement in favour of non-
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proliferation goals. It appears, however, that China has
not supplied nuclear technology to other States. For
example K.N. Romachandran claims that -
Firstly on the question of transferring nuclear- 
weapon technology to other countries - a tangible act 
in support of proliferation - Beijing's unwillingness 
is similar to that of other nuclear powers. When 
Libya sent a secret mission to China and expressed a 
desire to buy a nuclear bomb late Premier Shou 
politely but firmly rejected the request. 4
Yet it has been claimed by M. Goryanov that a statement
made by Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang in Pakistan, during
his visit there in 1981, "implies assistance in the
4 5manufacture of the 'Islamic atom bomb'".
It has been noted that there are also some Western 
theorists who postulate the alleged benefits to be 
derived from the possession of nuclear arsenals by States 
friendly to the Western Alliance. What they overlook is 
that if such a process gained momentum, the transfer of 
counterveiling nuclear weapons to their antagonistic 
competitors could be achieved in a very short period of 
time. A clear example of the speed with which a 
developing nation can acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability is that of Iraq, an oil-rich State which has 
no need of nuclear energy for industry and has had no 
peaceful nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, a 
sophisticated research reactor would have been ready for 
operation in that country by 1982f had it not been 
destroyed by Israel. T h e r e can be no doubt that Iraq 
had acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. The only matter open to question is whether 
there was an intention to divert fissionable materials in
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contravention of commitments entered into under the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. ^
As we have seen, the horizontal non-proliferation 
regime requires States to adopt and adhere to treaties, 
contractual arrangements, and gentlemen's agreements, and 
to do so by following the spirit as well as the letter of 
the agreements. In a subsequent Chapter the further 
need to monitor observance of the agreements, and to 
apply formal sanctions or economic disincentives, will 
also be examined. The success of the regime depends on 
these, together with some other factors.
As with vertical proliferation, the impetus towards 
horizontal proliferation is constantly spurred by 
technological advances. The nexus between the spread of 
technology and the danger of proliferation was presented 
in the following terms by United States Senator John 
Glenn -
A nation with fairly low sophistication in nuclear 
matters can make a bomb from 10 kilograms of 
plutonium. If they really know what they're doing, 
they can make a bomb from 5 kilograms. That means 
you could have between 25 and 50 bombs made from the 
leftover fuel of each gigawatt each year. If you 
multiply all that the potential from 247 peaceful 
nuclear reactors is between 4,000 and 8,000 bombs per 
year,48
Technological advances also make safeguarding more 
difficult due to the quantity of materials to be 
inspected and the presently seeming impossibility of 
verifying the quantity of fissionable materials in the 
more advanced nuclear reactors.
In common with all NAC, horizontal proliferation is
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also dependent on the general international situation, 
especially the relationship between the Superpowers and 
their progress or lack of it to curb vertical 
proliferation. Much more than other NAC issues, 
horizontal proliferation is influenced by economic 
considerations. These involve competition for nuclear 
markets by the developed nations and the condition of 
North-South relations, especially disputes about the 
implementation of a New International Economic Order and 
the claims of erstwhile colonial peoples to the rapid 
transfer of technology.
Maintenance and extension of the institutional 
framework of IAEA is crucial. For example the future 
ability of IAEA to assume control over the 
storage and reprocessing of nuclear materials could be 
decisive for the long term success of horizontal non­
proliferation. In the short term, the person of the 
Director-General of the IAEA, as well as the composition 
of the Board of Governors, exercise a considerable 
influence over the maintenance of the regime. Apart from 
its planning duties, the Board is a quasi-judicial panel 
when investigating a breach or threatened breach of its
Statute, and when recommending sanctions or warnings 
4 9accordingly. Therefore, the election in September
S 01981 to the position of Director-General of Hans Blix, 
a committed opponent of proliferation, is a signal that, 
for the immediate future at least, the international 
consensus is to persist with a stringent approach to the 
horizontal spread of nuclear weapons.
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CHAPTER IX
THE BILATERAL PROCESS IN NUCLEAR 
ARMS CONTROL
Stabilising the Balance of Terror
As the nuclear weapons prowess of each Superpower 
greatly exceeds the nuclear weapons capability of all 
other States combined, the bilateral process is the most 
significant aspect of NAC. The bilateral NAC process 
consists of public agreements in the form of the ratified 
and unratified treaties listed in Table II, public 
statements and, presumably, some confidential 
understandings. It is evident from Table II that 
basically two kinds of public agreements have been 
concluded in efforts by the Superpowers to stabilise the 
nuclear arms race.
The first kind of agreement is in the form of 
ratified treaties that aim to prevent the accidental 
outbreak of nuclear war, essentially by improving 
communications. These agreements encompass the so-called 
"Hot Line" treaties which establish telegraphic, radio­
telegraph, teleprinter and satellite communications 
between the Parties, especially for use in times of 
crisis. This type of agreement includes the only 
bilateral NAC agreements that are not between the 
Superpowers, namely three agreements, concluded by the 
Soviet Union with the United Kingdom and France 
respectively. The other communications agreements are
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the Nuclear Accidents Agreement and the Agreement on the 
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, both 
between the Superpowers. These Treaties require that 
immediate notification be given in ambiguous situations 
that could be mistaken for hostile action, and the taking 
of preventive steps in order to forestall 
misunderstandings that could lead to unpremeditated 
nuclear exchanges.
The second kind of bilateral NAC agreement sets 
limits on the number and type of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems that may be tested or deployed by either 
Superpower. Most of the relevant agreements have been 
the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT), of which only the agreements in the SALT I group 
of Treaties have been ratified. These comprise the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Bai1istic Missile 
Systems (SALT ABM Treaty); the Interim Agreement on 
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitations of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I Interim Agreement); and 
a Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the 
Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission on 
Arms Limitation.
Several other bilateral agreements of the second kind 
have also been signed but have not been ratified. The 
most important among these has been the Treaty on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, including a 
Protocol, a Memorandum of Understanding, and a Joint 
Statement, together known as the SALT II Treaty. There 
is no evidence to suggest that there has been a breach of
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any of the currently relevant, but still unratified, 
bilateral NAC treaties. Regarding the SALT II Treaty, 
there have been repeated public statements by the United 
States, the Party unwilling to ratify the Treaty, that 
its terms will be observed on a reciprocal basis.
The multilateral NAC treaties listed in Table I also 
play a part in the bilateral NAC process, as they have a 
special relevance for the Superpowers. In particular, 
the Outer Space Treaty1 is at present only applicable 
to the Superpowers, as only they have the means to carry 
out the activities contemplated by the Treaty. Although, 
with the possible broadening of the terms of the Treaty 
to include prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear 
weapons anywhere in space, other nuclear powers may also 
be affected, the Treaty would still retain a 
predominantly bilateral application.
The envisaged bilateral NAC programme entails a 
three-pronged strategy. Firstly, there is need for the 
maintenance and continued supervision of existing 
ratified treaties and those agreements which, although 
unratified, have so far been observed on a mutual basis. 
Secondly, it is sought to prevent a new spiral in the 
bilateral nuclear arms race that could disturb the 
existing essential equivalence of nuclear armed forces. 
Thirdly , there is the aspiration to achieve an eventual 
dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons and 
weapons systems on a mutual basis, maintaining equal 
security at progressively lower levels of nuclear
armament.
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The principles agreed upon to govern the bilateral 
NAC process have been elaborated in their most 
comprehensive form by the SALT II Treaty, in the terms of 
a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines.
The Statement, despite its title, does not refer to 
principles but merely to broad objectives. These include 
the avoidance of the outbreak of nuclear war; the 
attainment of strategic stability; the outlawing of 
strategic offensive arms most destabilising to the 
strategic balance; the quantitative and qualitative 
reduction of strategic arms, including their development, 
testing, deployment and modernisation; and the future 
continuation of the SALT process.
These so-called principles avoid the issue of time 
frames, or the specification of any indices of 
asymmetrical equivalence for the guidance of negotiators. 
There are also other shortcomings. For example, while 
affirming the principle of equality and equal security, 
the Statement fails to specify whether equality refers 
only to strategic equality or to full military equality. 
Nor does it indicate whether equality is sought with 
reference to the two Superpowers, the NATO and Warsaw 
Pact Powers, or the whole Western and Eastern alignment 
of States. Yet even a rough approximation of equivalence 
would require such distinctions to be made.
A constructive feature of the Statement is the 
precedence given to strategic stability, ahead of 
contemplated reductions in strategic arms, acknowledging 
a concept of growing significance in arms control. It is
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often assumed that the chief aim of arms control is the 
reduction in the number and destructiveness of weapons. 
However, in the bilateral NAC context, the regulation of 
strategic arms for the sake of stability does not 
necessarily entail their reduction, and may even require 
a temporary increase.
For instance, one of the destablising aspects of the 
bilateral nuclear arms race at the present time is the 
growing vulnerability of the command, control and 
communications (C ) systems of the Superpowers. It 
could prevent subsequent escalation to conclude bilateral
3NAC agreements for strengthening the C systems of both 
the United States and the Soviet Union in order to 
guarantee the survivability of verification, early 
warning and retaliatory mechanisms. Similarly, an 
increase of missile sites protected by BMD could make 
mutual deterrent systems more secure, thereby enhancing 
their deterrent effect.
The view has also been advanced that certain arms 
cuts would result in propelling the arms race forward. 
Prima facie it would appear that a freeze on nuclear 
weapons systems, or their reversal to a prior stage of 
equilibrium, would promote stability. Yet it has been 
suggested that the proposition would only apply in the 
absence of continuing R & D, because the nature of the 
balance is irreversably altered with the availability of 
new techniques, even if they remain only a latent option. 
The argument has been advanced, for instance, that -
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The recent history of SALT has only augmented the 
powerful hold that substantial reductions have had on 
the popular imagination. Yet proposals for deep cuts 
seldom deal with the forces that most endanger 
stability - improvements in accuracy; some forms of 
mobility; antisubmarine warfare capabilities; ABMs; 
and the possibility of more exotic systems such as 
lasers. Indeed, deep cuts may only stimulate 
development in these areas.
The above formulation gives a misleading impression 
because it is not the quantitative freeze, or reduction 
of nuclear weapons, that could endanger stability but the 
failure to conclude concurrent agreements so as to 
control qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons 
systems. For NAC to be effective in the long term, each 
new refinement in the weapons and every new weapons 
system that becomes technically feasible, would have to 
be the subject of additional agreements forestalling 
their deployment.
Thus, the obsolescence of strategic stability gives 
rise to the need for advances in NAC merely for the 
maintenance of strategic equilibrium. As each Superpower 
is prone to conceal its genuine vulnerabilities with 
disputes about relatively inconsequential imbalances, 
such as numbers and throw weight of missiles, it is 
incumbent on the other Superpower or on third States to 
advance proposals for solutions to problems arising from 
disproportionate developments.
For the day to day application of current agreements, 
as well as for the continued monitoring of the overall 
balance, it is imperative to have an ongoing dialogue 
between the Superpowers in addition to the negotiation of 
major new SALT treaties. This requirement was
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recognised with the establishment of the Standing 
Consultative Commission (SCC)^ in conjunction with the 
conclusion of the SALT I group of Treaties. The 
Commission, established by a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the United States and the Soviet Union,5 was 
originally given the task to promote and implement the 
Nuclear Accidents Agreement of 30 September 1971, the 
SALT ABM Treaty of 26 May 1972, and the SALT I Interim 
Agreement, also of 26 May 1972.
By the terms of the Treaty setting up the Commission, 
each side is entitled to representation by a 
commissioner, deputy commissioner, and such staff as 
may be deemed necessary from time to time. The original 
regulations agreed upon for the conduct of the 
Commission, laid down that the commissioners were to 
preside over meetings alternatively. They also provided 
that, on all occasions, each side could submit for 
consideration any issue within the competence of the 
Commission to determine, preferably after prior 
not i f icat ion.
The Treaty requires the Commission to meet at least 
twice yearly, in addition to which the regulations 
facilitate the exchange of written or oral 
communications by commissioners during the intervals 
between sessions. While the original rules did not 
specify the numbers of advisers and experts whom either 
side was permitted to invite for participation at 
meetings, references to the work of the Commission 
indicate that efforts have been made to attain
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reciprocity in the number of participants.
Express directives were given identifying methods of 
work, including the setting up of ad hoc Working Groups 
and the written recording of proceedings, English and 
Russian texts being equally authoritative. Regarding all 
aspects of Commission work, each side bears its own
/Texpenses.
In the main, the work of the SCC can only be adduced 
from the results attained, as the meetings have been held 
in private since its inception. Regulation 8 
immediately provided that the proceedings were not to be 
made public unless expressly agreed to by both 
commissioners. Report by consent has rarely occurred, and 
then only in very general terms.
Substantial expansion in the work of the Commission 
was contemplated in March 1977, when the two Superpowers 
agreed to convene joint Working Groups on the following 
subjects: chemical weapons, radiological weapons,
conventional arms transfers, civil defence, anti­
satellite capabilities, missile test flights, the Indian 
Ocean, and a comprehensive test-ban. The United Kingdom 
was invited to join the last-mentioned Group in July of 
that year. It is notable that the Working Groups 
established by the Commission relate to most of the major 
subject areas also under consideration by the Committee 
on Disarmament.8 in the case of radiological weapons, the 
consultations have led to the formulation of the elements 
of a treaty, although there has been less success in
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other subject areas. For example, it is known that the 
Working Group on anti-sate 11ite capabilities has only met 
three times.^
The SALT II Treaty envisages a greatly expanded role
1 0for the SCC in the conduct of Superpower relations. 
Although the Treaty has not been ratified, minimal 
compliance with its terms is being observed on the basis 
of reciprocity.1 * However, there is no evidence that 
such observance has included the envisaged expansion of 
the Commission's role. In the longer term, with the 
continuation of the SALT process, the intensification of 
the Commission's work seems inevitable for the 
maintenance of strategic stability between the 
Supe rpowe rs.
Competition, Reciprocity and Linkage
Whether in the Standing Consultative Commission or in
the course of SALT negotiations, Superpower dialogue on
the limitation of nuclear weapons is founded on the
reluctant acceptance of a military stalemate that could
only be resolved by mutual destruction. In its simplest
form it has been stated as "co-existence or non-
existence". Co-existence, as envisaged a decade ago,
was to rest on strategic equilibrium together with other
12military restraints, some economic co-operation and
13cultural exchanges. It was thought possible to pursue 
this course in the face of undiminished competition for 
eventual supremacy, which each side believed would result 
from the ultimate non-viability of the social system 
espoused by the other. Unfortunately, the experience of
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the past decade has demonstrated grave contradictions 
implicit in the concept of co-existence.
In the first instance, the balance of terror is not 
based on the nuclear arsenals possessed by both sides but 
on the perception that the other side will respond to the 
threat, and will do so reasonably. Apprehensions persist 
in the West that, due to their indiscriminate 
destructiveness, the weapons are perceived to be 
unusable.
Concern has also been expressed that a reckless
leadership could gain control in either State, prepared
to countenance vast destruction as "acceptable damage".1^
Fears about the ascendancy of extremists in the opposite
camp could, within each Superpower, weld coalitions
between individuals who are motivated entirely by
considerations of self-defence and those who desire to
15exploit military advantages for aggressive purposes. 
Further, nuclear weapons are clearly useless without the 
projection of an image of extreme viciousness that makes 
their possible use credible. This is in direct contrast 
to the calm reasonableness that is required for NAC 
dialogue.
The objective of maintaining equivalence in one 
sphere whilst seeking superiority in other spheres is 
also a direct contradiction, entailing simultaneously 
threatening and co-operative behaviour. Contradictions 
in detente, as hitherto understood, are exemplified by 
definitions of the concept from the leaders of the
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Superpowers during the zenith of the period of
accommodation. Gerald Ford, then President, said in 1975
regarding the meaning of detente -
It means maintaining the strength to command respect 
from our adversaries and to provide leadership to our 
friends, not letting down our guard or dismantling 
our defenses, or neglecting our allies. It means 
peaceful rivalry between political and economic 
systems, not the curbing of our competitive 
efforts...Detente means moderate and restrained 
behaviour between the two superpowers, not a license 
to fish in troubled waters. It means mutual respect 
and reciprocity, not unilateral concessions or one­
sided agreements. With this attitude I shall work 
with determination for a relaxation of tensions. b
Likewise, Leonid Brezhnev said in 1972 that -
...while striving for the confirmation of the 
principle of peaceful coexistence, we recognize that 
successes in this important matter in no way signify 
the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle 
On the contrary, it is necessary to be prepared that 
this struggle will intensify, will become a still 
sharper form of the antagonism between the two social 
systems. And we do not have any doubts about the 
outcome of this struggle, for the truth of history 
the objective laws of social development are on our 
side.17
In the course of their endeavours it is constantly 
demonstrated to practitioners that success in one aspect 
of their conduct diminishes returns in the other aspect. 
In a situation of overall confrontation, every concession 
is interpreted as a sign of weakness. Yet NAC consists 
of reciprocal concessions.
Both Superpowers have great difficulty in coming to 
terms with the abovementioned contradictions. The United 
States finds it especially burdensome to adjust to the 
loss of its outright nuclear weapons superiority. It is 
faced with the spectre that the Soviet Union will 
continue its rate of ascendancy unrestrained by public 
scrutiny or the means of societal censure. Restraint in
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the nuclear arms competition is particularly irksome in 
view of the overall technological superiority enjoyed by 
the United States and its allies, and because the arms 
race is financially rewarding to some sections of the
1 oprivate sector.
Another, more agressive strand in the United States 
anti-SALT syndrome is motivated not so much by concern 
about ultimate defeat but rather by expectations of 
imminent victory over the Soviet Union. That approach 
rests on the conviction that a continuing strategic 
nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union would soon 
exhaust the lesser resources of that country, leading to 
its spontaneous disintegration. The Soviet Union, in 
turn, faced with domestic problems as well as 
simultaneous hostility in North America, Western Europe, 
Japan and China, is not well placed to make concessions 
at the present time without giving an impression of 
outright capitulation. w Whether, and if so to what 
extent, concessions would be made by the Soviet Union if 
the tables were turned, is a matter of conjecture.
So long as the confrontation mentality exists, the 
contradictions in the bilateral NAC process are likely to 
persist. The wish, if not the active promotion, of the 
disintegration of the political system in the adversary 
State is the diametrical opposite of the restraint and 
the predictability required for the reliable observance 
of NAC agreements .Failure to facethis problem frankly and 
realistically has led to disillusionment with detente, 
the name allotted to the imprecise notion of
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"peaceful competition" between the Superpowers.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the NAC agreements 
enumerated in Tables I and II were concluded, and 
various measures of economic, social and cultural co­
operation, were undertaken between States having a 
socialist economic system and those with a free 
enterprise system. These measures succeeded in lessening 
antagonisms, but not sufficiently to give either 
Superpower the assurance that its security and the 
security interests of its allies would be safe from 
the other in the absence of constant military readiness. 
The Soviet Union gave expression to the dilemma with the 
vain slogan that detente should be made "irreversible", 
while United States leaders have increasingly decried the 
whole concept of detente.
Nevertheless, before the objective of detente is 
discarded, it is as well to recapitulate that the only 
alternative is mutual annihilation. This situation 
cannot be materially changed by measures such as the 
prohibition by the United States on the sale of some 
electronic equipment to the Soviet Union, imposed with 
increased vigour in 1982. Any suggestion that such steps 
could be signficant in the balance of terror is entirely 
inconsistent with the often repeated United States 
assessment that the military strength of the Soviet Union 
is approximately equal, if not superior, to that of the 
United States.21 It is similarly inconsistent with the 
assessments of the Soviet Union and its allies, that the 
forces of the Soviet Union are inferior to those of
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7 7the United States, but only marginally so.
Thus, it becomes prudent to re-examine the concepts 
of detente and co-existence, to ascertain whether the 
methods of their implementation could be altered so as to 
reduce the contradictions inherent in notions of 
"peaceful competition". It is relevant to the present 
study to enquire how the fierce antagonism between the 
Superpowers could be reconciled with the continuation of 
the NAC process.
At the basic conceptual level, it would no doubt be
helpful if the future of mankind ceased to be perceived
in terms of a competition to demonstrate the
"correctness" of the two unrealised and increasingly
unrealisable nineteenth century objectives concerning
2 3proletarian inspired communism and free enterprise.
It is suggested that a more realistic approach, in 
preparation for the twenty-first century, would be to 
envisage an era of rapid constructive evolution of all 
national systems of government for the benefit of 
citizens in conformity with the principles laid down in 
the Charter, taking into account historical, social and 
current resource factors, as well as the demands of the 
cataclysmic technological and demographic changes to be 
anticipated.
In the day to day management of Superpower 
disengagement an obvious approach would be to expand, and 
to make more precise, the concepts in the Joint Statement 
of Principles and Basic Guidelines contained in the
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SALT II Treaty. The principles and rules of the 
bilateral NAC process have to serve the implementation of 
a wide range of tasks, the most prominent of which are 
now briefly to be considered.
Primarily, agreement is required on the demarcation 
of categories of nuclear arms, for example, as to what 
are to be designated strategic nuclear arms, and whether 
grey area weapons should be included in calculations of 
strategic weapons parity. Simultaneously there is the 
problem of measuring equivalence among a range of varied 
weapons, taking into account features like speed, accuracy, 
destructive power, capability to evade detection, and 
durability.
A further vital consideration is verifiability, such 
as adherence to externally observable design features.
There is the need to consider how suspected breaches are 
to be dealt with. Attention must be paid to the functioning 
of early warning systems, so as to keep them inviolate 
against new weapons designed to evade detection; and to 
ensure that false alarms will not provoke mistaken 
retaliatory responses. It is also necessary to plan ahead 
so as to forestall the development of destabilising systems, 
complicating deterrence by the introduction of further 
weapons into space, or the perfection of a first strike 
capability by whatever means.
At the same time, there is the problem of the scope 
of the SALT process - whether it should take into account 
non-strategic nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, and
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non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, namely whether, 
and if so under what circumstances, cognizance should be 
taken of issues extraneous to the strategic nuclear 
balance. The relevant principle of both theoretical 
justice and military practicality on which the bilateral 
NAC process was based, has been that of reciprocity. The 
concept has been translated into words like "essential 
equivalence", "balanced reductions" and "mutual benefit". 
The problem then arises of the boundaries within which 
reciprocity should operate. The notion of "linkage" 
propounded by former United States Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, is a form of reciprocity. It 
differs from the reciprocity of the SALT process, as 
hitherto understood, in that it advocates that the 
reciprocal acts, bargaining positions, rewards and 
punishments meted out by the Superpowers towards each 
other, should extend to the whole gamut of East-West 
relations.
The greater fairness of the proposed wider scope for 
the operation of reciprocity is beyond doubt. The 
problem is whether it is feasible, given the method of 
auto-legislation and auto-adjudication that are 
essential and foreseeably unalterable ingredients of the 
bilateral NAC process. For instance, could it be 
realistically argued that the United States is entitled 
to an X number of additional ICBM, provided that it 
supplies Y tonnes of grain per annum to the Soviet Union? 
Or that the Soviet Union may station twice the number of 
SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe, provided that a trade
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union organisation in Poland is given access to certain 
media outlets?
Records of the seven-year negotiation of the SALT II
Treaty provide ample evidence of the difficulty of
measuring equivalence and ensuring reciprocity, even
within very confined parameters. In particular, the
debates in the United States prior to the signing of that
Treaty, and in connection with the advisability of its
ratification, demonstrate the immense complexity of the
measurement of military strategic equivalence. That
conclusion is confirmed by the varied assessments adduced
by the two Superpowers in their pre-SSD II update,
published by the United States under the title Soviet
Military Power, and countered by the the Soviet
Union in a response entitled Whence the Threat to 
27Peace.
Similarly, with respect to compliance, one can only 
conjecture about the chaos that would result if, say, the 
United States decided to suspend the Hot Line Treaties as 
punishment for the jamming of "Voice of America" 
broadcasts in Europe, or if the Soviet Union shot down a 
United States verification satellite in retaliation for 
that country's co-operation with South Africa in defiance 
of United Nations directives.
Hence, linkage between the bilateral NAC process and 
other forms of interaction between the Superpowers can 
only be envisaged in relation to a suspension of the 
bilateral norm creating process. However, as has been 
shown in connection with the consideration of recent
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technological advances, and as will be discussed 
subsequently relating to projected nuclear arms 
programmes, the suspension of the norm creating process 
will shortly render existing NAC agreements obsolete. 
Therefore, by exercising the option to suspend bilateral 
norm creation for NAC, a Party must inevitably bring 
about a situation in which the entire bilateral process 
of NAC is put into jeopardy.
Perhaps wishing to increase public confidence, or
perhaps due to fundamental misconceptions, the spokesmen
of both Superpowers occasionally make statements
indicating that they could defend themselves in a
military contest should bilateral agreements on NAC be
abandoned. Whatever the motivation, such statements are
misleading. As previously indicated, the strategic
balance is not a policy option but an inescapable 
2 8necessity. Therefore, an element of choice only 
impinges on whether that balance is to be stable or 
unstable, in the knowledge that any instability poses 
roughly equally catastrophic dangers to all. In order to 
have predictability and reliability, and to adhere to a 
set of consistent norms capable of auto-application, it 
is essential to maintain a self-contained system. Within 
that framework, the general principles of conflict 
resolution have relevance.
Conflict Resolution and Quasi-Judicial Negotiation
Negotiation has emerged as the most favoured method 
of conflict resolution in the NAC process. It is 
applicable to both multilateral and bilateral situations,
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and is suited to the elaboration of new NAC agreements, 
as well as to the settlement of disputes that arise in 
relation to the manner of their observance.
With respect to the conclusion and observance of NAC 
agreements between the Superpowers, bilateral 
negotiation has been the only method employed, without 
the benefit of third party assistance in any arbitral or 
mediating capacity. Even good offices have never 
amounted to more than a general encouragement. Hence, 
the nature of the negotiating process, notably its 
potential for harmonising Superpower relations, is of 
crucial importance.
The confrontational nature of bilateral NAC
negotiations is not in question. For instance, the chief
SALT negotiator appointed by the Reagan Administration,
Paul H. Nitze sees the overall situation in these terms -
In seeking each specific objective within their 
global policy, the Soviet rulers use the lowest 
level of pressure or of violence necessary and 
sufficient to achieve that objective. The purpose of 
their capabilities at the higher levels of potential 
violence, all the way up to intercontinental nuclear 
war, is to deter, and if necessary control, 
escalation by us to such higher levels.
It is a copybook principle in strategy that, in 
actual war, advantage tends to go to the side in a 
better position to raise the stakes by expanding the 
scope, duration, or destructive intensity of the 
conflict. By the same token, at junctures of high 
contention short of war, the side better able to cope 
with the potential consequences of raising the stakes 
has the advantage. The other side is the one under 
greater pressure to scramble for a peaceful way out. 
To have the advantage at the utmost level of violence 
helps at every lesser level. In the Korean war, the 
Berlin blockades, and the Cuban missile crisis the 
United States had the ultimate edge because of our 
superiority at the strategic nuclear level. That 
edge has slipped away. ^
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Leading Soviet theoretician on bilateral NAC 
negotiations, Henry Trofimenko, has a different view of 
the matter -
To sum up, then, throughout the entire post-World War 
II period, it is the United States that has tried to 
impose on the "potential adversary" rules of the game 
(i.e., rules of conflict behaviour) which would 
maximize the one-sided technical advantage enjoyed by 
the United States at any given moment and minimize 
the capabilities of the adversary. That is what the 
entire American doctrinal progress boils down to. 1
There has been so little trust between the two States
that it sometimes appears from their dialogue that they
are hardly discussing the same problems. For example,
the Deputy Director of the Institute of United States and
Canada Studies in Moscow, R.G. Bogdanov, speaks of -
...the illusion that it is possible to wage nuclear 
war and to survive sufficiently intact to make it 
other than completely senseless.
Paul Nitze, on the other hand, states that -
The Soviets do not follow a strategy of deterrence 
and retaliation. In their doctrinal writing, they 
spell out their belief in a strategy of first strike, 
and their weapons have been designed with that use in 
mind. Therefore, in their case, a condition of 
parity plus their policy of strategic initiative 
gives them superiority. J
The partners in the bilateral dialogue have had 
negative attitudes towards each other regarding 
negotiating style as well as credibility. A typical view 
was that of Arther H. Dean, Ambassador in the post­
armistice negotiations in Korea; Chairman, of the United 
States delegation at the Disarmament and Nuclear Test-Ban 
negotiations in Geneva, 1961-63; and former member of his 
country's delegation to the UN General Assembly. In 
1964 he claimed that -
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In considering Soviet diplomacy as a whole, two major 
characteristics stand out: a dogmatic expectation of 
hostility from the outside world and an iron 
determination to carry out a program previously 
determined in Moscow and not subject to change by the 
diplomat in the field. ^
In the same year, Thomas W. Wolfe, of the Sino-Soviet 
Institute, George Washington University, elaborated 
further on the theme of both the unwillingness and the 
inability of the Soviet side to conduct fruitful 
negotiations.
Publicly expressed Soviet views of the West more 
often than not are meant to serve propaganda ends of 
one sort or another, such as demonstrating aggressive 
intent in every Western move. The private Soviet 
assessment, on the other hand, may vary from one case 
to another. Thus, image of the West reflected in 
Soviet public statements does not necessarily 
correspond in all respects with what Soviet leaders 
may think privately about the strategies and 
intentions of their opponents...
He went on to add -
It would be premature in the extreme to suggest that the Soviet image of the West now mirrors reality with 
reasonable fidelity. Soviet perception of the West 
is still filtered through ideological and parochial 
suspicions that produce a woefully distorted picture, 
particularly of Western motives and intentions.
Yet the treaties concluded and observed during the 
past two decades indicate that these assessments were, at 
the least, exaggerated and of limited application. The 
possibility of acquiring a changed outlook resulting from 
dialogue and experience, is illustrated by the remarks 
in 1979 of Senator Charles Percy, later to become 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under 
the Reagan Administration. Commenting on the testimony 
of General Rowny during the SALT II ratification 
hearings, the Senator said -
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It is interesting that the two most credible and 
strongest opponents of this treaty have both come to 
the same conclusion. In an off-hand comment this 
morning, I am sure well thought through, Paul Nitze 
came to the conclusion that he did not believe that 
the Soviet Union wanted to wage a nuclear war. This 
is an utterly responsible statement. It is so easy 
to demagogue this issue, to wave the flag and imply 
that the motive of the Soviets is to make a nuclear 
first-strike on the United States of America. That 
position has no credibility.
The last trip I took to the Soviet Union was with 
Hubert Humphrey. We walked through the Leningrad 
Cemetery where a half-million Soviet men are buried. 
The Soviets lost 20 million people in a war that was 
waged entirely with conventional weapons. We 
realized at the time that the deep-seated desire to 
avoid an all-out confrontation goes from the most 
Soviet citizen right straight through the
Conflict resolution theories based on experiences from 
other fields such as management-labour disputes or inter­
personal relations, could give too much weight to 
psychological considerations. Significantly different 
conditions prevail at bilateral MAC negotiations. As the 
Canadian Professor, Edward McWhinney, has pointed out -
The rival Soviet and American negotiating teams in the area of disarmament and arms control seem to have 
had superb professional qualifications and an unusual 
degree of tec expertise in strategic armaments
1imitation...
Thus, when debating the relative destructive capabilities 
of contending nuclear weapons, the parties can at least 
have confidence in their own assessments and a thorough 
comprehension of the legal and technical nuances involved 
in the day to day discussions.
Superpower negotiation for NAC in the framework of 
the Standing Consultative Commission has all the
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elements of the classical bipolar model for conflict 
resolution. Although it is doubtful whether theories and 
models of conflict resolution have reached a standard 
that could beneficially influence a negotiating process 
of such complexity, the converse might very well apply so 
as to inhibit and discourage negotiation due to a 
misconception and underestimation of its possibilities by 
political decision-makers.
The negative impact of conflict resolution models
chiefly arises from the projection of various game
theories, which postulate two adversaries with
diametrically opposed interests seeking to defeat one
another by all means available within given bounds. In
the light of this projection, negotiation is seen as a
kind of game or battle, being a set arena of conflict
where each player must beat the other or be beaten. It
gives rise to the notion of "negotiation from a position 
3 Qof strength", which implies negotiation by threat. 
Negotiation by threat is a contradiction in terms and is 
merely an excuse for the avoidance or the postponement of 
negotiation. It is the converse of the concept of mutual 
benefit envisaging, as it does, a series of victories by 
one side and capitulation by the other.
A similarly negative approach is engendered by the 
postulate that a negotiation is a type of market place 
for bargaining over two relatively fixed sets of 
beneficial attributes. It implies that any shift from 
the status quo is likely to be to the advantage of one 
party and to the disadvantage of the other.
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Another approach to negotiation is to see it as a 
process of compromise, in the sense that each side gets 
less than it would wish, on the understanding that the 
other is similarly deprived. The outcome is always 
represented as an overall loss. In accordance with this 
outlook, instead of making increasing threats, the 
parties need to make inflated claims, to ensure that the 
compromise struck will appear to be more of a sacrifice 
to them than it is in reality.^0
The Marxist concept of conflict and its resolution by 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis could also be applied to 
negotiating postures, but this would imply that both 
parties have to change their position fundamentally in 
the process.^ In the present climate of Superpower 
relations such an outcome would be, even theoretically, 
unacceptable to both sides.
Negotiation can be treated in the manner of a holding 
operation, as an empty gesture for marking time. Or it 
can be used as a form of camouflage, providing a benign 
facade to conceal preparations for hightened aggressive 
conduct. Negotiations can also be envisaged as a form of 
intelligence activity, facilitating the extraction of 
information concerning the strengths, weaknesses and 
objectives of the other side. Alternatively, a 
negotiation can be used as a propaganda weapon, by 
treating it as a forum for the dissemination of 
misleading information or, perhaps correct information, 
disconcerting to the other party.
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All of the above negotiating postures are predicated 
on the premise that each side occupies distinctly 
circumscribed economic, social, ideological, and 
hegemonistic positions.42 Admittedly, some 
representations of conflict resolution postulate an 
evolutionary movement to take place as a result of 
sitting at one table and talking, but there is no 
suggestion of where the input will come from to propel 
the evolutionary development. For example, NAC 
negotiation between the Superpowers is mostly represented 
as an essentially closed system, not with respect to the 
precise nuclear weapons available, but in regard to the 
existence of two distinct ideological-military entities.
The most belligerent conceptualisation envisages the 
two "positions" to be entirely disparate, while more 
conciliatory outlooks picture the positions as 
overlapping at various points. Negotiation cannot alter 
whether the positions ovelap or whether they do not, 
because that is given fact. The overlap could only 
increase, in this representation, if one or both sides 
changed their positions. To the extent that they would 
be prepared to do that, they would have to compromise 
their chosen ideology or abandon the most advantageous 
power-seeking military, or quasi-military posture.42
It is possible that with the further advance of 
conflict resolution theory the process of negotiation, 
notably by the Superpowers, will become substantially 
more effective.44 in particular, it is suggested that
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there are prospects for the development of negotiation 
theory in two main directions. One approach could be 
called the theory of the unstated third position/ and the 
other, guasi-judicial negotation.
The Theory of the Unstated Third Position:
In accordance with this proposed theory, the 
positions adopted by the two adversaries in bilateral 
NAC negotiations - and by the various parties in most 
negotiations - do not accurately reflect either the real 
interests of the parties or the full import of their 
respective ideologies. This observation does not refer 
to deliberate deception but to genuine misconceptions by 
the parties due to stereotyped thinking, the constraints 
of language, the clumsiness of State bureaucracies, and 
other similar factors that limit and distort the 
perception of reality.
Therefore, there generally exists a reservoir of 
conciliatory factors not at first fully recognised by 
either side. These factors are not the kind that would 
necessarily become manifest with more thorough self­
appraisal by each side. Slothful appraisal tends not to
4 5arise as a significant problem in NAC issues. These 
misconceptions are more fundamental and have the 
character of blind spots, which result in an inability to 
ask the right questions.
The theory differs from other models of conflict 
resolution, in that the "third position" is not envisaged
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as any variant of compromise, deceit, conquest or 
synthesis, but of mutual discovery. Without denying that 
compromise and synthesis can be beneficially utilised in 
the resolution of conflict, the emphasis is on the 
opportunity afforded by the negotiating process for two 
or more parties, having different conceptual frameworks, 
to interact with a view to discovering areas of mutual 
benefit. Those areas represent the unstated third 
position.
The most significant example of an unstated third 
position that was subsequently identified, is the 
ideology and strategy of co-existence. Co-existence here 
is used in the sense of a permanent political condition 
for the foreseeable future, not merely an interim 
condition that was predicted by Lenin to persist until 
the so-called "inevitable" victory of international 
communism had been achieved.
Neither free enterprise nor socialist ideology has 
much to say about it, yet it is implicit in both 
ideologies that physical and cultural survival are 
indispensable conditions for their success. However, the 
notion of co-existence is only the tip of the iceberg.
The detailed aspirations contained in the concept of the 
wish to survive, and the modalities to be elaborated for 
the attainment of those aspirations, form the subject 
matter of the future unstated third position.
The unstated third position is, by definition, the
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position of realism. It reveals the necessary, often 
unwelcome - that is why it is overlooked - preconditions 
necessary for the realisation of the stated material and 
moral objectives of the parties. The identification of 
the unstated third position in NAC has consisted of 
perceptions concerning mutual benefits arising from the 
preservation of the environment, the desirability of 
legalised and co-operative espionage in the form of 
verification,the need for faster and more reliable 
communication between adversary leaders in times of 
crisis etc. Such measures have become the subject matter 
of the agreements listed in Tables I and II, although the 
concepts on which they are based were foreign to the 
ideological and military postures of the parties in the 
not too distant past.
Quasi-Judicial Negotiation:
This form of negotiation relates mostly to the auto­
interpretation and auto-adjudication of treaties, 
although it is also applicable to the elaboration of 
agreements on the basis of precepts such as equivalence 
and equal benefit. It is a process whereby the parties 
apply mutually accepted principles and rules to a subject 
in order to resolve the differences between them.
It has often been claimed that the judicial process, 
to be effective, requires a common ideological-cultural 
base.^ The overall ineffectiveness of the 
International Court of Justice has been attributed partly 
to the alleged absence of such a base. The contention
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overlooks the fact that even national entities are, to 
various degrees, culturally and ideologically 
heterogeneous. What does appear to be indispensable is a 
bridging ideology, consisting of a set of intellectual 
concepts and sincerely held beliefs concerning the legal 
precepts to be utilised.^ An internationally bridging 
ideology has to include fundamental concepts like the 
inviolability of treaty undertakings, reciprocity, 
essential equivalence, and the various norms of 
international conduct including those referred to above 
as international precept. While the existence of 
some common ground is necessary for any international 
judicial function, the need for a consistent and 
plausible bridging ideology is more pronounced in the 
tenuous environment of a bilateral negotiation.
The absence of a judge or any judicial figure is the 
chief distinguishing feature between quasi-judicial 
negotiation and an overtly legal procedure. It can be 
compensated for by meticulous precision in the rules to 
be applied. The terms of the SALT II Treaty indicate 
that the need to formulate exact rules and definitions 
has been recognised by both Superpowers.
However, it must happen in all complex evaluations 
that occasionally individual judgments have to be made, 
when existing rules do not extend to a particular 
situation. The decision could be of marginal importance 
and still cause inordinate delays. In such situations, a 
relatively impartial, respected individual could be asked 
to adjudicate regarding, say, the military equivalence
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of two somewhat similar weapons. These and like 
stratagems could also be useful to save face, when the 
point at issue is not so much the content of a concession, 
although preparedness to make the concession could be 
construed as a defeat. In those circumstances, third 
party adjudication could greatly accelerate bilateral NAC 
negotiation.
Unlike other judicial proceedings, quasi-judicia 1 
negotiations are best conducted in secrecy, otherwise 
public opinion could usurp the position of the absent 
judge. In other words, the parties would be tempted to 
address their submissions to an extraneous audience that 
has no opportunity to gain access to all the relevant 
facts, thereby only further complicating the difficult 
task.
One possibility exists for the utilisation of public 
opinion in quasi-judicial negotiation, namely in case of 
a stalemate. A party could advise the other that, unless 
agreement is reached by a given date, the negotiating 
position of that side would be divulged. For example, 
the Soviet Union could declare that, unless the United 
Kingdom and the United States agree to a Comprehensive 
Test-Ban Treaty by, say, September 1983, its own position 
would be made public at the 38th Session of the General 
Assembly. Or, the United States could declare that, 
unless the Soviet Union were prepared to accept certain 
substantial cuts in armaments by a given date, details of
the refusal would be revealed.
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In those circumstances, the threat of adjudication 
and sanction by public opinion might accelerate the 
negotiation. On the other hand, it could lead to 
increased resentment and intransigence. A more 
beneficial variant might be if the parties were to agree 
to such a procedure as a prior stipulation at the 
commencement of negotiations. However, there are other, 
more effective sanctions to induce the Superpowers in the 
bilateral NAC process to adhere to NAC agreements, which 
will be discussed in the next Chapter.
When assessing the likely future effectiveness of NAC 
agreements in the maintenance of international peace and 
security, it would be misleading to exclude from 
consideration the possibilities for innovation that could 
accompany the increasingly acute danger of nuclear war. 
The elaboration of conflict resolution theory in this 
context is sought to provide an indication of the 
available outlets for development that might emerge with 
the passage of time, in the light of the successes and 
failures of NAC agreements so far negotiated and 
presently operative.
It would seem that with stronger commitment by States 
for negotiated arms control, especially on the part of 
the two Superpowers, negotiating techniques could be 
improved. It is also possible that a theoretical basis 
of NAC negotiation could be established, with a view to 
creating a consistent discipline that would impart much 
greater speed and predictability to the process.
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Preventing the Next Spiral in the Bilateral 
Nuclear Arms Race
After consideration of various nuclear weapons
strategies in previous Chapters, it was concluded that
the weapons could be used in a non-self-destructive way
only in two situations, either in an extreme case
requiring self-defence, or in an almost totally disarming 
4 9first strike. The next spiral in the nuclear arms 
race involves chiefly the development of weapons to serve 
those two purposes.
In the one instance, additions to arsenals consist of 
local war fighting weapons, like the neutron bomb and 
other tactical nuclear devices, together with hard-to- 
detect delivery systems, like the cruise missile and low 
flying manned bombers. Yet it is noteworthy that, while 
these weapons could be used defensively in local 
conflicts, they could also be employed aggressively 
although, as has been observed previously, such use could 
lead to unlimited escalation.
The other kind of development taking place is the 
perfection of weapons systems leading to the possibility 
of a disarming first strike capability, together with 
weapons designed to thwart such an outcome. The main arena 
for that contest is in outer space. In this regard it 
has been noted previously that the most dangerous 
international situation could arise at a time when either 
Superpower appeared to be approaching a first strike 
capability, because the other Superpower might be induced
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to take extreme measures in order to prevent the 
attainment of that objective.
It may be appropriate to recapitulate that in view of 
the abovementioned considerations, no State stands to 
gain militarily, or in any other way for that matter, 
from developments that would constitute the next spiral 
of the nuclear arms race.
There are two impediments that appear to be 
particularly difficult to overcome in the limitation of 
tactical nuclear weapons. Firstly, verification of any 
treaty to limit their manufacture and deployment may be 
difficult to achieve by the usual verification methods. 
The other impediment to the limitation or elimination of 
tactical nuclear weapons is that the United States is 
thought to be disadvantaged, in some contemplated 
military confrontations, if restricted to conventional 
weapons and combat troops. Therefore, there is a 
powerful body of opinion within the United States and,
to a lesser extent, among the NATO allies, that nuclear
S1weapons should be on hand for use in those situations.
With respect to arms control agreements to restrict 
the arms race in outer space, a major difficulty is to 
establish, with an acceptable degree of certainty, the 
level of R & D attained by the other side at any given 
time. The prevalent attitude is that any slackening in 
the pace of R & D might give the other side a lead that 
could not be made up. In addition, with respect to many 
relevant technologies, it would be impossible to
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differentiate between those that have a military 
application, and those that are developed exclusively, or 
predominantly, for civilian purposes.
The strategic nuclear balance is closely bound up 
with the arms race in outer space. ICBM delivering 
nuclear warheads must travel through outer space during 
part of their trajectory. Also most of the backup 
systems enabling the use of nuclear missiles are 
conducted via satellite. For instance, the pinpointing 
of targets is largely by satellites; homing guidance 
can be augmented by satellite; and commands for 
activating nuclear weapons systems rely, to a
5 2considerable extent, on satellite transmission.
Many defensive systems against nuclear weapons are 
also based in outer space. Early warning networks 
utilise satellite mounted reconnaissance systems, and 
verification by NTM is conducted by the Superpowers 
chiefly with the aid of remote sensing and other 
satellite connected methods of surveillance. A 
contemplated development is a space-based ballistic 
missile defence (BMD) system. In case of an impending 
first strike, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons could be used 
to disrupt the command, control and communications (C ) 
networks of the opponent.
The abovementioned defence systems could also be used 
aggressively. A combination of exact pinpointing of 
targets - even moving targets, accurate guidance of 
missiles, instantaneous transmission of commands,
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elimination of the opponent's satellites with anti­
satellite weapons, and the use of BMD against any vestige 
of rataliatory capacity could, conceivably, result in a 
counterforce strike able to disarm the other Superpower.
Apart from effective BMD, the systems referred to are
already operational, although they have not been
perfected to the point that would enable either
Superpower to mount a disarming first strike against the
other. The most significant aspect of the next spiral in
the nuclear arms race could provide such a capability
although, on the available evidence, this could not be
5 4achieved by stealth. The new technologies giving 
rise to these developments will be considered briefly 
below.
It should not be overlooked that the technological
revolution in the perfection of nuclear weapons systems
has another dimension. While attention is directed to
the novel technological feats of the Superpowers, it is
all too easy to discount the immense technological
strides of the other nuclear-weapon States, as well as
the nuclear threshold States . Seven States are now said
to have observation satellites in space, including those
5 5of two "developing" countries, namely China and India.
For instance, the placement of weapons of mass
destruction in space may not be far from the technical
capabilities of these States. It is therefore
disconcerting to note that China has not acceded to the
Outer Space Treaty, which forbids the placement of
S 6weapons of mass destruction into outer space.
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Failure by third parties, with military capabilities 
that have been the subject of bilateral NAC agreements 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, to adhere 
to the terms of those agreements, could exert a negative 
influence on the whole NAC process between the 
Superpowers. In the same way, by refusing to abide by 
multilateral NAC agreements with hitherto special 
application for the Superpowers, third States could 
prejudice the bilateral efforts for accommodation.
Several of the Treaties referred to in Table I have 
an application for arms control in outer space. The 
Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963, forbids the detonation 
of nuclear devices in outer space. The Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967, in Article IV, provides that the moon and 
other celestial bodies are to be used "exclusively for 
peaceful purposes". The Treaty also requires the Parties 
to -
...undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth 
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
weapons on celestialbodies, or station such weapons 
in outer space in any other manner.
S 7The SALT Treaties also have relevance to arms 
control in outer space. The SALT ABM Treaty of 1972, and 
Protocol of 1976, forbid all ballistic missile defence 
with the exception of one site each in the Soviet Union 
and in the United States, which may be so defended.
The SALT II Treaty of 1979, in Article IX provides that -
Each party undertakes not to develop, test or 
deploy...systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear 
weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass 
destruction, including fractional orbital missiles...
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In addition, Article XV of the SALT II Treaty provides 
that -
For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance 
... each party undertakes not to interfere with the 
national technical means of verification of the other 
party...
The import of the provision is that it forbids 
interference with satellites used for verification.
It has been noted already that all of the unambiguous 
provision of the above treaties have been observed. What 
the treaties fail to prohibit is the development of 
structures, instruments and techniques that could be used
•3to destroy satellite borne C systems, or to intercept 
nuclear warheads in the early stages of their
c otrajectories. So far there is no evidence to 
demonstrate that "weapons" as presently defined, have 
been utilised in outer space in the course of developing 
the aforementioned technologies. With the exception of 
weapons support systems and earth-targeted missiles, all 
space-related weapons are tested on the ground or in 
aerospace.
The technologies currently being perfected include 
"real time" calcualtions, with the aid of vast satellite 
formations some of which are already in their correct 
orbits. They will facilitate exact pinpointing of all 
potential targets on earth and in aerospace - and perhaps 
in outer space - together with precise home guidance 
systems for weapons to destroy them. Another facet of the 
developments is the perfection of directed energy weapons 
(DEW), including both particle beam weapons (PBW)
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and high energy lasers (HEL).^° Unhampered by an 
atmosphere, the speed and accuracy of those beams would 
make them ideal ASAT weapons, as well as exoatmospheric 
BMD weapons. Continuing perfection of the 
manoeuvrability of satellites could also be turned to 
military use, both for approaching enemy satellites and 
for evading them.
The next stage in the testing of these systems would 
be to undertake experiments for actually destroying 
targets with the weapons in outer space. While any State 
that commenced such activities would be acting in 
defiance of the general principles of the Charter urging 
peaceful conduct, it is not entirely clear whether the 
Outer Space Treaty forbids the conduct. In accordance 
with Article III of the Treaty, activities in outer space 
are to be carried out -
...in the interests of maintaining international 
peace and security and promoting international co­operation and understanding.
However, in specific terms, Article IV of the Treaty only 
prohibits the testing of weapons and the carrying out of 
military manoeuvres on "celestial bodies". No definition 
is given of a "celestial body", but presumably the Treaty 
refers to naturally occurring celestial bodies indicated 
by various references in the Treaty, including a 
provision in Article I that "there shall be free access 
to all areas of celestial bodies."
The Antarctic Treaty, in wording similar to that used 
in the Outer Space Treaty, provides in Article 1(1) that -
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Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. 
There shall be prohibited, inter alia any measures of 
a military nature, such as the establishment of 
military bases and fortifications, the carrying out 
of military manoeuvers, as well as the testing of any 
type of weapons.
In that instance, the spirit as well as the letter of 
the Treaty has been observed. Not so with the Outer Space 
Treaty, which has been strictly interpreted by the 
Superpowers so as to permit the projection of weapons 
into space, as well as the stationing of military support 
systems on satellites. Keeping in mind the important 
bearing that those military activities have on the 
strategic balance, it would be entirely impractical to 
dismantle those systems at the present time. Likewise, 
continuation of the legal debate as to the correctness of 
the interpretation that permitted those military 
activities,^1 could only serve as a distracting 
diversion from efforts to implement further arms control 
measures in outer space.
The crucial question is still outstanding, namely 
whether all space-targeted weapons, discharged from 
earth, aerospace or outer space, are to be outlawed. 
Countenancing tests of that kind would be consistent with 
the interpretation that the Superpowers have given the 
Treaty provisions, rightly or wrongly. Yet it appears 
from the literature that, so far, both Superpowers have 
been very restrained about weapons tests in space. Hence 
the next step for NAC in this field is to foreclose the 
option of deploying space-targeted weapons, either with a 
Protocol to the Outer Space Treaty or with the conclusion 
of a further treaty.
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An additional treaty has been proposed by the Soviet 
Union, and a draft Treaty has been presented to the 
United Nations to that end. In two separate resolutions, 
one with the support of Western States and the other with 
the support of Socialist States, the General Assembly 
decided in December 1981 to explore the means of 
preventing an arms race in outer space. Western States 
gave priority to the negotiation of "an effective and 
verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite
r Osystems", while the Socialist States called for a
treaty on "the prohibition of the stationing of weapons
f) ^of any kind in outer space", taking into account the
4draft presented by the Soviet Union.
Support given to both General Assembly resolutions by 
the Non-aligned States suggests that the obstructive, 
albeit theoretically plausible argument that the existing 
Treaty is adequate, has been abandoned.
No resolutions or treaties regarding the arms race in 
outer space, or any other aspect of the bilateral NAC 
process, could be so worded as to guarantee 
implementation. At best, the agreements are tools of 
trade that make NAC possible, provided the two 
Superpowers genuinely wish them to succeed. Their 
interests in so doing have already been adverted to, and 
will be further elaborated in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER X
SUPERVISION OF COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE AGREEMENTS
Verification of Multilateral NAC Agreements
Supervision of compliance with NAC agreements and, in 
case of reluctance to comply or outright breach, the 
enforcement of those agreements, are essential components 
of the NAC process. There is no ambiguity in international 
law concerning the obligation to observe treaties on the 
basis of the universally uncontested maxim of pacta sunt 
servanda. Despite the assumption that all international 
agreements will be carried out in good faith, it is 
acceptable practice to supervise performance. The 
observance of compliance for the purpose of detecting any 
breaches of NAC agreements is referred to as verification. 
Methods of persuasion or coercion used to ensure that States 
abide by their obligations - whether pursuant to an Order or 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice, an arbitrated 
or negotiated settlement, or otherwise - are referred to as 
enforcement.
Apart from the Nuclear Tests case, discussed in 
Chapter VI, there is no case law relating to NAC. In 
accordance with the general principles of treaty 
interpretation, it can be adduced that the obligation to 
abide by an NAC agreement requires compliance with the 
letter and spirit of its terms, although it does not forbid
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circumvention of the agreement by extraneous means 
even if that entails the attainment of unilateral 
advantage over another party. NAC provisions appear to 
be prone to ambiguity regarding distinctions between a 
breach and a permissible circumvention.
Verification has assumed a new importance with the 
advent of arms control agreements. In the case of other 
international agreements, such as commercial 
arrangements, protection of diplomatic personnel and 
aliens, or border dispute settlements, the observance or 
non-observance of the agreement is generally obvious. By 
contrast, in NAC agreements there is often a substantial 
possibility that extensive preparations for breach, 
should they occur, would not be detected and, possibly, 
that actual and repeated breach of the terms of the 
treaty would be overlooked. For this reason, the final 
document of SSD I refers to the need for adequate 
verification of arms control agreements.
"Adequate verification" could be defined as the 
intensity of surveillance necessary to ensure that 
discovery of an irregularity would be sufficiently likely 
as to make breach of the particular undertaking by 
subterfuge an unacceptable risk to the State concerned.
As accidental discovery is usually a possibility, the 
risk of discovery does not rest entirely on deliberately 
instituted "measures".
When assessing "unacceptable risk" of discovery of 
breach, especially by United States Government Agencies, 
emphasis is often placed on the 1 ikelihood of discovery
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rather than the consequences of discovery. Yet it is 
reasonable to suppose that the latter consideration 
weighs more heavily with Governments than the former one. 
The consequences of discovery of breach would no doubt 
depend to a large extent on the steadfastness of the NAC 
regime. So long as open breaches can be avoided, as they 
have been so far, then a breach of an NAC agreement by a 
party could lead to ostracism by other States or, if 
perpetrated by a Superpower, to the collapse of the 
entire NAC process.
The possibility of adequate verification can be 
prejudiced by ambiguities in drafting, often deliberately 
countenanced, in order to paper over irreconcilable 
differences among negotiating partners. A typical 
instance is the imprecise wording of Article IV of the 
NPT.1 Another example is a provision in the Statute of 
the IAEA requiring the deposit with the Agency, for the 
purpose of temporary storage, of "any excess of any 
special fissionable materials" being the by-products of 
safeguarded materials. The Treaty does not state by whom 
or by what criteria it is to be determined whether any 
nuclear material not in current use is "excess", 
requiring IAEA storage. Neither does it indicate in what 
manner or at whose cost such transfers of superfluous 
nuclear materials should occur. Hence, several non­
nuclear-weapon States are building up large stockpiles of 
weapons grade nuclear materials. So far, no nuclear 
material whatever has been deposited with the IAEA for 
safekeeping, and the Agency has no facilities to
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accommodate a State that may wish to transfer its excess 
special fissionable material for storage.^
In addition to ambiguities, several of the treaties
have loopholes. Some of these are acquiring greater
significance with the passage of time, such as the
absence of any provision in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
to prevent a non-nuclear-weapon State Party from
supplying special fissionable material or relevant
equipment to another non-nuclear-weapon State for
military purposes.^ A further example is to be found
in the Outer Space Treaty which is in urgent need of
overhaul for the rectification of substantive omissions,
for instance, failure to outlaw the stationing of
weapons, that are not weapons of mass destruction, on
5satellites or on space stations.
Methods of Verifying Multilateral NAC Treaties:
In some respects, international verification is 
comparable to search, interrogation, inspection of 
records, and similar procedures in domestic jurisdictions 
designed to ensure that the laws are being observed. 
Verification measures provided for in multilateral NAC 
Treaties are in addition to such other methods as States 
may themselves devise, without transgressing the rights 
of other States. For example, nuclear explosions in the 
atmosphere can be detected visually; by measuring fallout 
levels of radioactive substances; and by the nature and 
sequence of shock waves caused, referred to as the 
"signature" of the blast.^ Observations of this kind
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can be made by NTM without receiving co-operation from 
other States, by using photographic, electronic, chemical
7and other sensors. The Partial Test-Ban Treaty, 
banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, makes no 
provision for internationally co-operative verification, 
thus leaving the Parties with only NTM as the method of 
verification.
The other multilateral NAC treaties do make some 
provisions for co-operative verification. To do so, they 
utilise several techniques, the most substantial being 
the institutional method employed by the IAEA, which will 
be considered in greater detail under the next sub­
heading. The IAEA also provides the verification 
mechanism for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by requiring 
all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to enter into full
oscope safeguards agreements with the Agency.
Adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco is also verified by 
the IAEA,  ^ in addition to on-site inspections 
undertaken by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).■*■0
Another verification system being utilised is that of 
mandatory notification. For instance the Antarctic 
Treaty requires notification to be given to all Parties 
of any expedition undertaken to the Antarctic Continent.'*''*' 
Likewise, by the terms of the Outer Space Treaty, a Party 
is obliged to notify all other Parties of any potentially 
harmful activities in outer space that it plans to 
undertake .-*■ ^ By contrast, the Sea-Bed Treaty only requires 
notification of Parties after a dispute has occurred, in
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order to facilitate co-operative verification 
l ^procedures. J
Observation provisions for the verification of NAC 
treaties authorise general observation of procedures, 
specific observation under given circumstances, as well 
as designating appointed observers and investigators.
The Antarctic Treaty permits the appointment of observers 
by the Parties to scrutinise the whole Continent and all 
traffic flowing to and from it. On the other hand, the 
Outer Space Treaty only permits observation of activities 
and installations belonging to another Party after 
reasonable notice has been given. A different provision 
has been adopted in the Sea-Bed Treaty, which permits 
continuous observation of relevant activities, without 
requiring the designation of special observers.
Co-operative verification is provided for in both the 
Sea-Bed Treaty and the ENMOD Convention, but only at the 
request of the Parties when they, presumably, suspect 
irregularities. It is always implied, while in the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Sea-Bed Treaty it is overtly 
stated, that observation procedures must not interfere 
with the activities of the Parties being observed. •*■ ^
Contemplated Methods of Verifying Future NAC Treaties:
Efforts to improve the verification of multilateral 
NAC treaties take several forms. While States 
continuously endeavour to update existing techniques 
involved in methods such as remote sensing, and air and 
water sampling to detect nuclear waste products, novel
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proposals are constantly put forward for the verification
of treaties still under negotiation. For instance it has
been proposed that a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty could
be verified by periodic inspection perhaps aided with the
installation of recording instruments in "black boxes"
and/or inspection by challenge in the event of suspected
irregularity.^ Likewise, an International Seismic
1 fiMonitoring Network is under contemplation.
Another type of endeavour in multilateral NAC
verification is to give more States access to
verification techniques, if need be by utilising a joint
operation. The most ambitious programme of this kind is
the proposed International Satellite Monitoring Agency 
1 7(ISMA). It is anticipated that through participation 
in the Agency, States would acquire access to remote 
sensing instruments and techniques by pooling their 
resources to launch the necessary satellites, and to 
analyse and interpret the resulting data. Until now, the 
procedure has been available only to the Superpowers.
When ISMA was proposed by France at SSD I, both 
Superpowers were strongly opposed to it, fearing that it 
would merely add to the grounds for international 
dispute, misunderstanding and competition. However, with 
the rapid development of launching techniques, 
particularly by the Europeans and the Chinese, remote 
sensing will soon be within the competence of several 
States. Therefore, the options today are only between 
haphazard additions to the space "club", or the 
introduction of an organised international system.
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Nevertheless, the successful operation of this form of 
joint verification is not a foregone conclusion.
Difficult questions are still unresolved regarding the 
equitable allocation of management responsibilities, the 
basis of cost-sharing, the criteria for participation and 
access to data, together with problems related to the 
interpretation and divulgence of the information to be 
ga ined.
The legal status of the proposed ISMA is also 
undecided and will, no doubt, depend on whether it is to 
be a United Nations body or whether only regional or 
other selective participation is achieved. In the 
meantime, the international community is obliged to place 
great reliance on the verification of multilateral NAC 
treaties by the Superpowers, a situation that is not 
altogether satisfactory. There is no recognition in 
international law that the Superpowers have a 
responsibility to divulge breaches of multilateral NAC 
treaties observed by them as a consequence of their 
developed surveillance systems. Nor are they required to 
report on conduct contrary to General Assembly 
resolutions, even if they alone are able to verify it.
The adverse repercussions of this situation were strongly 
felt at the time of the suspected nuclear explosion off 
the coast of South Africa in 1979, known as the 
"September event", when records of observations of the 
event could not be elicited as of right.18
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The IAEA Safeguards System
The verification of multilateral and bilateral 
international treaties regarding nuclear activities, 
referred to as the safeguards system of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is by far the most extensive 
verification system for horizontal nuclear arms 
proliferation control. The objective of the IAEA 
verification system, as described in the Statute of the 
Agency, is -
To establish and administer safeguards designed to 
ensure that special fissionable and other materials, 
services, equipment, facilities, and information made 
available by the Agency or at its request or under 
its supervision or control are not used in such a way 
as to further any military purpose... y
It was originally envisaged that the Agency's
safeguards would be applied chiefly pursuant to project
agreements, whereby material and technical assistance in
nuclear projects is supplied by or through the Agency to
a recipient State.
The IAEA is also authorised to apply safeguards at 
the request of its Members "to any bilateral or 
multilateral arrangement". These are referred to as 
safeguards transfer agreements, which enable States to 
confer on the Agency the task of supervising safeguards 
responsibilities undertaken in various nuclear co­
operation agreements between them.
There is a further provision in the IAEA Statute 
which permits the application of safeguards "at the 
request of a State, to any of that State's activities in 
the field of atomic energy". The provision regarding
323
these unilateral submissions has enabled the Agency to 
verify the commitments of States under the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
It was only in 1962 that the first safeguards 
inspection occurred. During the next four years, the 
safeguards system was substantially revised and extended 
as the result of strong co-operation on the issues 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. It has 
been suggested that increased support by the Soviet Union 
for safeguards during that era was consequent upon the 
acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by China.
Details of the safeguards system were elaborated in
21two Agency documents. The specific aim of safeguards 
is described as -
...the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear 
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes 
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk 
of early detection.
The Agency's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation, has considered the meaning of
p o"significant quantities of nuclear material". A 
"threshold amount" of nuclear material was defined as the 
approximate quantity of special fissionable material 
needed for a nuclear explosive device, namely, in general 
terms, 8 kg of plutonium, 8 kg of uranium 233 or 25 kg of 
uranium 235. The phrase "for purposes unknown", has been 
interpreted to mean that the Agency is not required to 
enquire into the purposes for which diverted material may 
be intended, provided it is shown to be a diversion from
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the peaceful nuclear activities ostensibly 
undertaken.2  ^ The Agency seeks an above 90% 
probability of detecting a diversion.2^
All Agency safeguards are based on a State System of 
Accountancy (SSAC), as well as national physical control 
of radioactive material. In accordance with this system 
States accept the obligation to maintain comprehensive 
records, based on the method of material balance areas 
to facilitate verification at key measurement points.
They are required, inter alia, to submit monthly reports 
to the Agency concerning all nuclear inputs, outputs, 
production and losses of nuclear material. The State is 
also obliged to provide the results of all physical 
inventories of nuclear materials and to draw the Agency's 
attention to any discrepancies.
Inspectors appointed by the Agency have the task of 
ascertaining that such records supplied are consistent 
with the records appearing at the relevant plant and with 
the quantities of special fissionable material actually 
present. It is assumed that potential diverters could be 
States, facility operators, individuals or groups of 
individuals. Therefore, all information supplied by the 
State has to be independently verified in the course of 
ad hoc, routine and special inspections.
According to IAEA estimates concerning the efficacy 
of its safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities, as 
submitted to the second Review Conference of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, the great majority of reactors,
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being light water reactors, are effectively safeguarded. 
The Agency has greater difficulties with on-load fuelled 
power reactors, including the Magnox and Candu type 
reactors, which are refuelled continually without reactor 
shutdown. Also, in these reactors storage may be in 
"close-packed three-dimensional arrays", which does not 
facilitate fuel element counting.
It is claimed that conversion prior to fuel
fabrication can also be satisfactorily safeguarded, as
the facilities are usally shut down several times a year.
On those occasions all the material can be tagged for
2 7later identification.
The Agency admits to only "limited experience" in 
safeguarding reprocessing plants and no experience with 
large reprocessing plants. Only "some preliminary work" 
has been done regarding proposed methods for safeguarding 
the plants. Each of these plants can produce 10 to 14 
tonnes of plutonium annually, so that expected 
measurement errors and uncertainties would be too great 
for the successful use of the customary material 
accountancy method. One suggestion has been the 
installment of monitoring barriers around critical parts 
of the plant. As safeguards for large reprocessing 
plants would have to be based largely on containment
techniques, these would have to be built in during the
2 8construction of the plant.
Likewise, the Agency has had no experience with 
uranium enrichment plants - or even pilot plants in this
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case. The first enrichment plants to be safeguarded by 
the Agency are of the centrifuge type. Commercial 
diffusion plants to be safeguarded are still under 
construction, while the nozzle process and other new 
processes are merely at the experimental stage. Gaseous 
diffusion plants are as yet only operated in the nuclear- 
weapon States.
The chief verification problem of the Agency at the 
present time, is to prevent the possibility of converting 
a high production rate at low enrichment to a low 
production rate at high enrichment levels, between 
periods of observation. However, in the near future, 
larger scale diversion of special fissionable material, 
namely weapons grade material, could become possible.
Fast breeder reactors are the most proliferation- 
prone. In those reactors the irradiated fuel, and even 
part of the fresh fuel assemblies, are "virtually 
inaccessible". Nor can the quantity of material in the 
core be verified at any stage. Similarly, spent fuel 
cannot be identified for at least several months.
The Agency has only had experience in safeguarding 
pilot plants of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor 
type. At present prototypes are being perfected, while 
commercial plants are to commence production in the next 
few years. It is anticipated that containment and 
surveillance with the aid of inbuilt design features, 
could make safeguarding possible. The Agency claims that 
the necessity could arise for new concepts of
safeguarding to be utilised as the larger plants and the
•) Qnew fuel cycles of fast breeders come into operation.
Already the Agency has the use of seals; electronic 
sensors to detect the movement of various grades of 
nuclear material; "tamper-proof" cameras; and sound 
recorders. The possibility of inbuilt measurement and 
containment features sought to be incorporated, gives 
some prospect of verifiability of the operation of the 
more sophisticated plants. The responsibility of non- 
nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant treaties and 
agreements, to ensure that all nuclear facilities subject 
to their jurisdiction are so constructed as to facilitate 
appropriate verification, is an issue of international 
law that, so far, has not been fully confronted.^
Compliance Enforcement of Multilateral NAC Treaties
Enforcing Compliance Pursuant to the IAEA Safeguards 
System:
The function of IAEA safeguards, pursuant to the two 
non-proliferation treaties and the various bilateral 
safeguards agreements concluded in compliance with those 
treaties, is to report on the diversion of special 
fissionable material suitable for the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons, from facilities ostensibly required to 
produce radioactive material for peaceful purposes. The 
mere knowledge that a breach of treaty obligations has 
occurred, or is about to occur, would be pointless unless 
it is assumed that divulgence of the facts would lead to 
deterrence. The relevant NAC treaties contain only
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minimal direct sanctions provisions. These consist 
largely of withholding materials and assistance for 
further nuclear activities^ and making the facts of 
the breach known to those directly concerned, as well as 
to the world community through the United Nations. It 
would then be possible for States individually, 
collectively, or universally to apply economic, social, 
or military sanctions.
However, pressures in support of upholding the non­
proliferation regime do not have to await a finding that 
an NAC treaty has been breached. International sanctions 
and inducements can be applied irrespective of treaty 
obligations. For instance, the offer of economic 
assistance or military aid can be made, in the first 
instance, with a view to persuading a State to accept 
obligations with respect to the prevention of horizontal 
proliferation. Moves to admit Spain into the European 
Economic Community, and subsequent acceptance by that 
State of full scope safeguards, may be a case in point. 
Conversely, South Africa and Israel have resisted 
economic pressures and are prepared to forego imports of 
enriched uranium for commercial use in preference to 
accepting full scope safeguards. Undoubtedly even those 
States could be persuaded to conform if Western States 
were prepared to apply more stringent economic and 
military inducements or, alternatively, perhaps if the 
security problems of the non-complying States ceased to 
be so pressing.
It would be mistaken to conclude from the above
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considerations that the relevant treaties are either 
ineffectual or irrelevant. Their role in the non­
proliferation regime could be characterised as the main 
strands in a wider fabric. In accordance with that 
analogy, the precise objectives and standards set by 
those treaties, and the support they enjoy, represent
the strength and resilience of the binding strands that
3 3hold the fabric together.
How well is this horizontal anti-proliferation fabric 
likely to endure?^ The present spread of 
proliferation-prone technology in the world has resulted 
from the pursuit of short term goals in preference to 
long term non-proliferation objectives. It began at a 
time of acute Soviet-American rivalry for influence among 
emerging Third World nations. In 1954, a United States 
Atomic Energy Act was passed, enabling that country to 
supply nuclear research reactors to more than twenty 
States, including several that were economically 
underdeveloped and politically unstable. However, as 
well as extending Western influence to the recipient
3 5States, the transactions were commercially profitable.
With the perfection of nuclear technology in 
additional developed Western States, the commercial 
incentive gained the upper hand. The nuclear industries 
of Canada, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
in particular, entered into competition with the United 
States for the sale of nuclear plant, materials and 
technology.^  This occured simultaneously with growing 
demands by the Third World for economic and political
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justice in the international arena. ^
The demand for commercial reactors for power 
generation, as well as for research reactors, is 
invariably justified on economic grounds, while the 
concomitant creation of a nuclear technology 
infrastructure, providing at least a potential for 
weapons capability, tends to be dismissed as an 
insignificant by-product of the process.
In recent years the argument for supplying sensitive
3 fttechnologies, for example, by Germany to Brazil0 and 
by France to Pakistan, has been that the consequent 
reliance by those States on the supplier for materials, 
spare parts and consultancy, would integrate them into 
the economic and legal non-proliferation system. The 
strategy appears to have succeeded, for the time being, 
with Brazil which has accepted full scope safeguards. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, which, as a result of a 
change of heart by France has been ultimately denied 
assistance, has decided to refuse full scope safeguards.
These two instances hardly justify a conclusion that 
the transfer of nuclear technology restrains 
proliferation while its refusal tends to promote 
proliferation. Such reasoning fails to take account of 
the different geopolitical situations of Brazil and 
Pakistan. More generally, the argument ignores the 
relevance of the time factor in the spread of 
proliferation-prone technologies, namely that the mere 
postponement of nuclear weapons prowess may be
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beneficial. It also overlooks the propensity for early 
self-sufficiency in nuclear processes by assisted States, 
destined to reduce the influence of original suppliers.
Although the spread of nuclear technology was 
inevitable as the result of world-wide technical 
development, the rate of spread has been artificially 
increased stemming from Superpower confrontation, 
economic rivalries among the technologically advanced 
States, and the desire to acquire a future nuclear 
weapons option by developing States. The current issue 
is whether the nuclear weapons option is to be exercised 
by the twenty or more developed and developing States 
ripe for it, and at what rate additional States are to 
acquire the option*
Pakistan has often maintained at the United Nations 
that horizontal proliferation is not a technological 
question but a political question. While at present this 
isstill not true for most States, it is becoming an 
increasingly valid claim. Restraint due to verification 
and the threat of sanctions, whether imposed pursuant to 
treaty obligations or as the result of international 
opinion independently of treaty obligations, in 
conformity with the general principles of non­
proliferation, still only applies to a limited number of 
countries. It applies especially to those that have 
large commercial plants capable of rapidly producing 
militarily significant amounts of weapons-grade material, 
or the early prospect of enrichment, reprocessing and 
fast breeder facilities. Those are also the countries
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that could not only produce increasingly large quantities 
of the sensitive materials but also, as has been noted 
previously, are installing reactors that are difficult, 
if not impossible, to safeguard. As well as undisguised 
production of weapons-grade material in reactors 
constructed for that purpose, research reactors and pilot 
plants can also be utilised to produce significant 
quantities of weapons-grade material.
At present only four non-nuclear-weapon States 
possessing nuclear facilities are not under full scope 
IAEA safeguards. These are India, Israel, Pakistan and 
South Africa. Several of the countries under full scope 
safeguards have accepted safeguards not as the 
consequence of treaty obligations, as they are not 
parties to either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco, but under bilateral co-operation 
agreements. Unlike the requirements of the Treaties 
referred to, full scope safeguards undertaken pursuant to 
commercial treaties do not necessarily anticipate the 
safeguarding of any future nuclear plants.
However, the distinction between safeguards pursuant 
to a treaty and those in compliance with a co-operation 
agreement is of limited significance. Firstly, the 
repudiation of the relevant treaties only requires three 
months' notice. Secondly, recent bilateral nuclear co­
operation agreements generally contain fallback 
safeguards, should IAEA safeguards no longer apply, and 
they can also require prior consent by the supplier to 
the recipient regarding reprocessing, enrichment and
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transfers to third countries. In addition, several 
agreements restrict indirect proliferation routes, 
including copying and the use of subsequent generations 
of nuclear fuel. Thirdly, safeguards agreements entered 
into with the Agency consequent upon co-operation 
agreements probably have an independent operation and 
would continue even if the co-operation agreement were 
repudiated. A situation where it was sought to terminate 
Agency safeguards resulting from the suspension of a 
bilateral co-operation agreement has not occurred so 
far.
The emergence of renewed Superpower antagonisms 
coincidental with the growing nuclear autarchy of 
developing nations, could place the task of policing the 
horiztonal non-proliferation regime increasingly with the 
Third World. Rather than withdrawing from the IAEA 
supply and safeguards system, these countries may prefer 
to exercise their voting strength in that institution in 
order to secure the election of a majority to the Board 
of Directors. In the meantime, the possibility can be 
used as a bargaining lever. Having acquired a voting 
majority, whether they would turn a blind eye to the 
emergence of some of their number as nuclear-weapon 
States is not predictable on the basis of present 
indicators. The wish to gain nuclear-weapon status by 
some of the developing States could well be offset by the 
growing apprehensions of their less ambitious 
colleagues.
At present, the only nuclear-weapon States in the
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world are the five permanent Members of the Security 
Council. It is an indication of the astuteness with 
which the permanent Members were chosen, at a time when 
the architects of the United Nations were still unaware 
of the military potential of nuclear reactions. Yet, 
should the five veto-carrying nuclear-weapon States 
fail to provide an acceptable modicum of security to non­
nuclear-weapon States, as well as continuing to slacken 
non-proliferation standards, they could be faced with 
nuclear challenges not only from developing States but 
also from technologically advanced States. For instance, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan have vast 
stockpiles of nuclear material suitable for insertion 
into missile warheads, the possibility of sophisticated 
delivery systems, and the technical prowess to turn these 
capacities to immediate military advantage.
In the absence of concerted world opinion opposed to 
horizontal proliferation, it would also be possible for 
less powerful States to become thinly disguised latent or 
quasi nuclear-weapon States, such as Israel and South 
Africa are reputed to be. It is a stance that may afford 
a measure of deterrence while minimising ostracism and 
the embarrassment of allies.
Over the longer term, the non-proliferation regime 
could be substantially fractured with the emergence of 
additional overtly or reputedly nuclear-weapon States.
It has been repeatedly put forward that such a situation 
might galvanize world opinion into enforcement of the 
non-use of nuclear weapons, thus preventing their further
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spread. ^  This view is open to conjecture. The
successful restraint exercised, so far, by the nuclear
five is not proof that nuclear weapons can be stockpiled
as a deterrent indefinitely without precipitating their
use. The relatively brief time involved and the
exceptional stability and competence of the bureaucracies
of those States, compared with those of many other
States, were no doubt contributing factors in averting
nuclear war. Even so, the use of nuclear weapons is
known to have been seriously contemplated by at least one
of the nuclear-weapon States in the post second World War
period, while the other Superpower is also thought to
44have proposed such use on at least one occasion.
Hence, complacency about horizontal proliferation, in the 
belief that non-use of the weapons in a proliferated 
world could be more easily enforced than the prevention 
of proliferation, does not appear to be justified.
General Principles of Compliance Enforcement:
It has been observed in previous Chapters that the 
standard of compliance with the provisions of all the 
treaties listed in Table I has been very good. No 
situation has arisen when it would have been appropriate 
to consider the application of sanctions for non- 
compliance with an NAC treaty. Therefore, when assessing 
the likely effectiveness of sanctions that may have to be 
administered in the future, it becomes necessary to 
extrapolate from experience gained in the application of 
measures to enforce non-NAC agreements.
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The only experience in relation to the enforcement of 
NAC provisions has been in the form of consultations 
between the Parties to a treaty. There has also been 
conduct inconsistent with United Nations NAC resolutions, 
perpetrated by States that had not undertaken treaty 
obligations in the relevant matters, for instance, in 
relation to conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, 
or refusal to accept IAEA safeguards.
Apart from consultations concerning compliance that 
take place in the IAEA or in OPANAL, formal consultations 
have been conducted in the framework of Review 
Conferences. If any breaches were to occur and in case 
of suspected breaches, the exposure of such conduct at 
Review Conferences or by direct communication to the 
parties, as provided by the disputes procedures of the 
various NAC treaties, would itself carry the sanction of 
ill-repute. By comparison, it is noteworthy that in 
other areas of international law more formal and regular 
procedures have been devised for the monitoring of 
compliance with international standards.
For instance, under Article 22 of the Constitution of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), States are 
obligated to supply annual reports regarding measures 
adopted by them to give effect to the Conventions they 
have ratified. Those reports have to supply particulars 
requested by the Governing Body of the ILO. Further, in 
accordance with Article 19 of the ILO Constitution,
States Members are required to give an account of such 
circumstances as may have prevented them from ratifying
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ILO Conventions to which they are not parties. A 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations,examines the reports submitted by 
Governments, a summarised version of which is presented 
at each annual session of the ILO.
Another example of enforcement by persuasion, on the 
basis of disclosure of non-compliance, is to be found in 
procedures pursuant to Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, Article 
XII, Section 8 provides that "the Fund shall at all times 
have the right to communicate the views informally to any 
member on any matter arising under this Agreement". The 
Article further provides that the Fund is empowered to 
publish a report concerning matters within its control, 
if the balance of payments situation of Members has been 
adversely affected by the activities of another Member, 
provided there is strong international commitment 
regarding the matter. In the knowledge that it could be 
exposed for non-observance of an obligation by the 
reporting methods just referred to, any State that may be 
tempted to perpetrate a breach would tend to be dissuaded 
from so doing.
Yet another form of sanction for breach of an 
international obligation, under a treaty or otherwise, is 
to take retaliatory action commensurate with the breach. 
For example, Article XIX:3(a) of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), permits the suspension of 
"substantially equivalent concessions or other 
obligations" in certain circumstances as retaliation for
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breach. Likewise, the Contracting Parties to GATT may, 
under the said Article, retaliate against the withdrawal 
of some tariff concessions.
A further kind of retaliation is countenanced by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) which, 
pursuant to the ICAO (Chicago) Convention of 1973, 
permits the exclusion of aircraft from the airspace of 
any State that has been adversely affected by a breach of 
the anti-hijacking provisions of the Convention.
Different considerations apply in the field of NAC.
It is difficult to envisage retaliatory sanctions for the 
breach of NAC agreements that would not be self-defeating 
in their operation, by permitting the deployment or use 
of nuclear arms. An exception is the relatiation 
authorised by the Statute of the IAEA, which provides 
that a State that receives Agency assistance may be 
denied further assistance for its nuclear industry as the 
result of breach of an undertaking with the Agency. In 
accordance with Articel XII (A)7 of the IAEA Statute, 
the Board of Governors has the discretion under such 
circumstances to either suspend or terminate assistance 
to the offending State.
Some formal sanctions for non-compliance with the 
provisions of NAC treaties are available. For example, 
the Outer Space Treaty, by Article VII, makes any State 
Party, "from whose territory or facility an object is 
launched" into outer space, liable for damage caused by 
the space object. Similarly, in case of breach of
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safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, the Board of 
Governors is empowered to apply several formal sanctions 
in addition to the retaliatory measures of suspension or 
termination of assistance. These include the right to 
recall the return of materials and equipment supplied, 
and the suspension of all membership privileges, while 
requiring the continued observance of membership 
obiigations.
The Annual Reports of the Board of Governors indicate 
that none of the abovementioned sanctions have been 
applied, so far, by the IAEA in pursuance of Article 
XII(A)7. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the operation 
of the horizontal non-proliferation regime that the 
retaliatory measures available under the Statute of the 
IAEA, as well as the other sanctions provisions, would 
pose no administrative difficulties in their application, 
with the exception that the return of materials and 
equipment already supplied may be difficult to enforce.
The most onerous formal sanctions that could be 
administered for breach of NAC obligations, would be 
applied in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter. Those sanctions are not 
available for the enforcement of most international 
obligations, as they may be invoked only on occasions 
when there is a "threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression", in circumstances when the 
maintenance or restoration of "international peace and 
security" are at stake.
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As non-compliance with NAC obligations could well
give rise to a situation jeopardising international peace
and security, the sanctions that may be imposed by the
Security Council are very pertinent to this area of
international law. The sanctions under Article 41
include the severance of international communication by
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, and radio contact,
partial or complete interruption of economic relations,
and severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42
authorises the Security Council to take whatever military
measures are necessary "to maintain or restore
4 Sinternational peace and security".
While attempted sanctions for non-compliance with NAC 
undertakings could be frustrated by any permanent Member 
of the Security Council, the use of the veto to block 
sanctions against a State that had violated clear-cut 
treaty obligations would be a very serious step to take, 
which could damage the whole international legal system 
impinging on the observance of the United Nations 
Charter. This conclusion could be drawn from the 
deterioration of the international situation that 
occurred at the time when the Soviet Union used the veto 
power to prevent the application of sanctions against 
Iran, despite that country's clear violation of treaty 
obligations with respect to the safety of diplomatic 
personnel. The use of the veto on that occasion was 
sought to be justified on the ground that, although the 
taking of diplomatic hostages was reprehensible and a 
breach of treaty obligation, it did not represent a
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danger to international peace and security authorising 
the application of sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
Charter. However, the military significance of NAC 
treaties would foreseeably preclude a similar argument as 
a plausible excuse for refusal to apply sanctions in the 
event of breach.
The United Nations can apply the further disincentive
of expulsion from United Nations membership under Article
6 of the Charter and, in particular, under Article 5
authorising such action with respect to a Member
"against which preventive or enforcement action has been
taken by the Security Council". Expulsion entails
suspension from the "exercise of the rights and
privileges of membership" but does not absolve from the
obligations of membership. Such action can only be taken
by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the
Security Council, which has so far failed to agree on the
imposition of that sanction. A similar result can be
attained by the General Assembly acting alone under Rule
4 627 of its Rules of Procedure, regulating the 
Assembly's exercise of power to accept or reject the 
credentials of delegations that purport to represent the 
Government of a Member State. Non-approval of 
credentials by the Credentials Committee of the General 
Assembly has been used by that body for several years as 
a sanction against South Africa, on account of its 
refusal to repeal its apartheid laws.
Neither accession to NAC treaties, nor any other form 
of international agreement is a necessary prerequisite
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for the application of United Nations sanctions in a case 
that is deemed, by the world body, to be a sufficiently 
serious breach of international obligation under the 
Charter. Theoretically at least, in any conflict between 
the provisions of the Charter, no matter how imprecise, 
and other treaty obligations of Member States, however 
explicit the latter may be, the provisions of the Charter 
prevail by virtue of its Article 103.^ Hence, on the 
basis of possible imposition of formal United Nations 
sanctions in the nuclear arms race, the benefits to be 
derived from the existence of specific treaties are 
obscure.
It is not possible to prove by cogent argument that 
treaty obligations for NAC, in addition to the obligation 
under the Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, have any practical effect for 
enhancing the relevant enforcement procedures of the 
United Nations. Nevertheless, although there is no 
unassailable legal dictum to that effect, the breach of a 
precise undertaking is a more obvious affront than 
failure to perform a nebulous duty, like the maintenance 
of international peace and security, and is therefore 
more likely to attract censure. To that extent, a more 
precise obligation is more binding.
Despite the vast legal powers of the United Nations 
by virtue of the provisions of the Charter, in practice, 
the imposition of sanctions and rewards to induce States 
to pursue a desired line of action is mostly of an 
informal nature, imposed by one State or a group of
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States. These inducements usually involve trade or other 
economic benefits and disincentives.^ Occasionally, 
of course, there has been an assault by armed force, as 
was the case with the attack by Israel on the Iraqi 
nuclear reactor, on the alleged ground that the reactor 
was to be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
with which to bombard Israel.^ At the other end of 
the scale, light sanctions can be imposed the mainly have 
nuisance value, such as restrictions on travel by 
diplomatic personnel of the State to be punished, and the 
imposition of other deliberate inconveniences to its 
citizens.
It is a moot point to what extent the successful 
imposition of such informal sanctions is dependent on an 
international sense of justice that deems the conduct 
being enforced to be consonant with the imposition of 
international law. For instance, the suspension of 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere by France, and the 
release of the United States hostages by Iran, were 
carried out under the threat of economic sanctions in the 
former instance, and in response to actual severe 
sanctions imposed in the latter instance. Nevertheless, 
it would be plausible to suggest that those sanctions and 
threatened sanctions could only succeed because the 
relevant treaties and United Nations resolutions had 
firmly established the principles of justice which they 
sought to apply.
Verification and Enforcement of Bilateral NAC Agreements
Supervision of compliance with bilateral NAC
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agreements is inseparable from the day to day performance 
of obligations under the relevant a g r e e m e n t s . F o r  
this reason the main verification procedures, including 
the provisions in the two SALT Treaties facilitating 
verification, as well as the verification-related 
activities of the SCC, have already been alluded to in 
Chapter IX.
The reliability of verification procedures for
establishing requisite compliance by the Soviet Union to
bilateral NAC treaties is a matter of contention in the
United States, on which expert opinion is sharply
divided. In particular, assessments concerning the
efficacy of national technical means of verifying the
SALT Treaties are often contradictory, despite the
sophisticated methods being used. Former Deputy Director
of the CIA, Herbert Scoville, gave an indication of the
prowess of NTM when he said -
Satellites can now locate, count and measure modern 
weapons from 100 miles away, while radar-sensitive 
radio receivers and infrared sensors on ships, on 
planes and on land can determine their 
characteristics and the number of warheads they 
carry. Limits on armaments can be verified so that 
pacts such as SALT II do not depend upon Russian co­
operation.
For example, in testimony to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the United States Senate, former Secretary
of State, Harold Brown, stated the position thus -
Our capacity for the monitoring is spread among 
ground stations, some of them in foreign countries, 
satellite systems, and other detection techniques, 
some of them deployed aboard ships and aboard 
aircraft that stay in international air space. If we 
lost all of our overseas, our non-U.S. sites, our 
ability to monitor SALT would be degraded somewhat. 
But our ability to monitor Soviet strategic and other 
military programs in general and our indications and 
warning capability for potential Soviet actions would
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5 7be degraded very much more than that.
When asked whether the United States would know when
there was concealment or the impeding of verification of
NTM, the Secretary replied -
We will be able to see when that happens. We will 
not always be sure, but we will always know enough to 
be able to raise it as an issue...It is easier to 
tell that they are trying to hide something than it 
is to tell what they are trying to hide.
He added that the chance of the Soviet Union being able
to develop a weapons system without the United States
being aware of the fact was "substantially less than 1
out of 1 million". ^
Senator Jess Helms has adopted a rather different
approach. He maintained during the Senate hearings that,
with respect to SALT II -
Technology has overtaken the supposed benefits of 
this treaty...We have no way of knowing whether the 
Soviet production lines have, in fact been shut down...But, if missiles can be reloaded or launched 
without a silo launcher, the threat, Mr Chairman, 
simply cannot be verified. We thought that we were 
counting guns and that the ICBM's were just the ammunition. Now we see that we have been counting 
holsters, and we have no idea how many guns they have 
pointed at us. b
More recently, the views of a number of well known 
writers on the subject were collated in a volume entitled 
Verification and SALT: the Challenge of Strategic 
Deception.^ For example, while contributors Bruce C. 
Blair and Garry D. Brewer are of the opinion that SALT 
compliance can be adequately verified by national 
technical means, Senator Gordon H. Humphrey and Amrom H. 
Katz reach the opposite conclusion, while several others 
adopt intermediate positions.
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A United States Government background briefing in 
Februruary 1978, regarding compliance with SALT I, 
disclosed that "the U.S. does not feel that the Soviet 
Union has violated either the letter or the spirit of the 
Treaty since it was signed on May 26, 1972". At the 
same time, the briefing also stated that the United 
States had made eight specific enquiries challenging 
Soviet activities as to their consistency with the 
provisions of the Treaty, suggesting that there may have 
been deliberate concealment of activities. The briefing 
concluded that by 1975 the situation had improved. It 
was not alleged that any actual breach of Treaty 
provisions had occurred.
In April 1978 Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, made a 
report on SALT compliance issues to the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The introduction to 
the report, reproduced in a Department of State Bulletin, 
draws attention to "...how carefully the United States 
has raised promptly with the Soviets any unusual or 
ambiguous activities which could be or could become 
grounds for concern". It is further observed that, 
pursuant to the queries raised by the United States in 
the SCC -
In each case, the activity in question has ceased 
or additional information has allayed the 
concern.^
None of the questions posed involved other than 
possible minor transgression of the agreements. For 
example, in 1973 United States officials came to the 
conclusion that the radar associated with FA-5 surface-
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to-air missiles were being tested by the Soviet Union in "an 
ABM mode" contrary to the provisions of the ABM Treaty. 
Although the Soviet Union denied this, the disputed activity 
was abandoned. On another occasion the Soviet Union 
admitted that there had been failure to dismantle old ICBM 
launchers and SLBM at a sufficiently fast rate to comply 
with SALT I. When challenged they accelerated the 
dismantling.
The Soviet Union has also challenged certain activities 
engaged in by the United States with respect to the 
observance of the SALT I Treaty. For instance, they 
enquired whether missile silos for old Atlas and Titan 
missiles could be reactivated, and they queried the purpose 
of installing a new United States radar in Alaska, on the 
basis of its possible usefulness in anti-ballistic missile 
defence.
The marginal nature of these queries, and their 
satisfatory resolution in each instance within the framework 
of the SCC, supports the conclusion that the bilateral NAC 
treaties are being strictly observed and meticulously 
verified.^
Methods of application and effectiveness of verification 
procedures under the SALT II Treaty are extensively analysed 
in the 1980 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI).^ Notable features of the 
verification measures cited include the prohibition of 
interference with national technical means of verification, 
and the prohibition of deliberate concealment of objects or
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activities that could impede observation, such as denial of 
access to flight-test telemetry of missiles that may be 
required for verification of compliance. For purposes of 
verification, the Study also attaches importance to the 
agreed data base provided by both sides regarding their 
existing strategic arsenals, to be updated semi- 
annually.
The manner of defining the various weapons to be 
limited by the Treaty, taking account of their 
characteristics observable by NTM, contributes 
substantially to the effectiveness of verification. The 
characteristics whereby the various weapons are 
described, were summarised in the SIPRI study as 
follows -
(a) ICBMs, by range and land-based launcher;
(b) SLBMs, by their deployment on 'modern' 
submarines and, in the case of Soviet SLBMs, 
by the date of initial flight tests;
(c) heavy bombers, by their mission capabilities, 
including the capability to carry long-range 
cruise missiles (CMs), with specific exceptions 
to this definition; and
(d) CMs by their mode of launch, weapon delivery 
mission, and by use of aerodynamic lift.
Notification provisions under SALT II also add to the 
reliability of the verification of the Treaty. The 
Parties are required, inter alia, to notify each other of 
replacement, conversion, dismantling, or destruction of 
arms limited by the Treaty; they are required to 
designate new types of light ICBM and SLBM equipped with 
MIRV; they have to warn "well in advance" of certain 
flight-testing of ICBM which is to extend beyond national 
territory, as well as new ICBM test ranges; advise the
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number of aeroplanes used for testing cruise missiles; 
and draw attention to the flight-testing of some unarmed 
aircraft that might otherwise be identified as Cruise 
Missiles, or other weapons limited by the Treaty that 
could be confused with them.
The backbone of SALT verification techniques is 
provided by the standards established in the Treaties for 
distinguishing the various weapons to be banned or, more 
usually, limited in numbers and performance. There 
is no verification problem where there are functionally 
related observable differences (FROD). Where, on the 
othe hand, the observable features do not indicate 
performance capability, the Parties are required to 
differentiate between the weapons by creating externally 
observable design features (ODF).
The United States Arms Control and disarmament Act of 
1278,63 ky Section 37 provides that "adequate 
verification of compliance should be an indispensable 
part of any international arms contol agreement". United 
States concern about verification of NAC treaties, 
especially the existing SALT Treaties and those envisaged 
in a continuation of the SALT process, stems from the 
belief that it is much more difficult for the United 
States to supplement verification by NTM with information 
gleaned from Government and other sources available in 
the Soviet Union, than it is for the Soviet Union to gain 
similar information regarding compliance with NAC 
agreements in the United States.64
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The danger feared is that a sudden revelation could 
occur of unsuspected stockpiles of weapons giving the 
other side a clear advantage, referred to as "strategic 
breakout". However, the SIPRI assessment, as well as 
much expert opinion in the United States, suggest that 
verification of NAC agreements by NTM precludes the 
possibility of strategic breakout, due to the necessity 
for repeated testing of sophisticated weapons before they 
become reliably operational. While a Panel advising the 
United States Intelligence and Military Application of 
Nuclear Energy Subcommittee reached a different 
conclusion, at least publicly, it did not rebut the 
arguments put forward in the dissenting testimony of 
Panel-member John Carr, who drew attention to the 
following point -
The panel expresses concern that SS-16 third stages could be secretly produced and stockpiled, and that 
"A determined evader could clandestinely MIRV 
missiles or increase the number of MIRVed warheads 
with a high degree of confidence that this would not be detected."
This is sophistry. A determined evader could 
maintain this "high degree of confidence: that his 
cheating was undetected only if he did not test the 
violating systems, in which case he would have a very 
low degree of confidence that the products of his 
cheating would work. And as I have pointed out 
elsewhere (see my dissent to HASC No 95-90) the 
counterforce first strike mission is absolutely 
intolerant of low-confidence weapons. Thus, cheating 
of this type would not give the Soviets a weapon of 
any use to them and would not be worth the risk of 
exposure.
In view of the many-faceted developments necessary to 
give a disarming first strike capability to either 
Superpower, a strategic breakout of that magnitude would 
not be possible. However, as has been observed in 
earlier Chapters, no other kind of military advantage
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between the Superpowers is meaningful, except in a purely 
psychological context regarding uninformed persons.
At various times, spokesmen for both the United 
States and the Soviet Union have made threats of 
retaliation, predicting military supremacy for their 
side should breaches of the SALT Treaties occur, or in 
the event of the breakdown of the bilateral NAC process. 
Such statements can only be regarded as bravado, because 
it is self-evident from an understanding of the weapons 
under consideration, that neither Superpower could attack 
the other without incurring similarly devastating damage 
in response.
Nevertheless, a very powerful sanction exists which 
induces compliance with bilateral NAC agreements, and 
which propels the Parties towards continuing their NAC 
negotiations. This sanction could be referred to as 
the ultimate consequences sanction. The sanction 
consists of the negative consequences that would flow to 
both Parties if they failed to reach substantive 
ag reement.
The most notable feature of the sanction that exists 
between the Superpowers is that each interim failure to 
reach agreement makes subsequent failure more likely 
which, if it persists, would ultimately invoke the 
sanction of nuclear war. Hence, although the sanction is 
liable to be exercised only once, with each setback and 
delay of the bilateral NAC process, the threat of the 
sanction becomes more acute.
Notes
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61 SALT II Treaty -
"STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC ARMS 
AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY
The United States of America declares that as of June 
18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of 
strategic offensive arms subject to the limiations 
provided for in the Treaty which is being signed
today:
Launchers of ICBMS 1,054
Fixed launchers of ICBMS 1,054
Launchers of ICBMS equipped with MIRVS 550
Launchers of SLBMS 656
Launchers of SLBMS equipped with MIRVS 496
Heavy bombers 573
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles 
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers 3
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMS 0
ASBMS 0
ASBMS equipped with MIRVS 0
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that 
as of (date of signature of the Treaty) it possesses 
the following numbers of strategic offensive arms
subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty 
which is being signed today:
Launchers of ICBMS 1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMS 1,398
Launchers of ICBMS equipped with MIRVS 608
Launchers of SLBMS 950
Launchers of SLBMS equipped with MIRVS 144
Heavy bombers 146
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles 
capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers 0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMS 0
ASBMS 0
ASBMS equipped with MIRVS 0
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The Treaty further provides that - 
"...at each regular session of the Standing 
Consultative Commission the parties will notify each 
other of and consider changes in those numbers in the 
following categories: launchers of ICBMS; fixed 
launchers of ICBMS; launchers of ICBMS equipped with 
MIRVS; launchers of SLBMS; launchers of SLBMS 
equipped with MIRVS; heavy bombers; heavy bombers 
equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in 
excess of 600 kilometers; heavy bombers equipped 
only for ASBMS; ASBMS; and ASBMS equipped with 
MIRVS..."
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62 These include the definitions set out in Art.II of 
the Treaty and in the Agreed Statements and Common 
Understandings Regarding the Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms.
63 22 U.S.C. 2677.
64 However, the Soviets also claim to have verification 
concerns about SALT II. See Arbatov, Georgi, Director 
of the USSR Institute of US and Canadian Studies - 
"Obviously, the agreement does not and cannot resolve 
all the problems or remove all the reasons for 
concern. We are worried about the development of 
some U.S. weapons systems not covered by the 
agreement. We, like the Americans, would like to 
ensure the complete invulnerability of our ICBM's and 
have even more than 100 per cent confidence in 
verification. But I fail to understand how wrecking 
SALT II can help solve such problems.
Take, for example, the issue of verification. The 
agreement provides a whole system of verification 
measures: special counting rules, a pledge not to 
interfere with each other's technical means, an 
obligation not to conceal telemetric data that are 
needed for verification, a special commission to deal 
with questions in dispute. Let the Americans ask 
themselves whether they will know more about our 
strategic forces without this system." "The Soviets 
on SALT", Newsweek, 28 May 1979, p.22.
65 Report of the Panel on SALT and the Comprehensive 
Test-Ban Treaty, Intelligence and Military 
Application Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, December 28, 1978 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1978) 
p.42, emphasis added.
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CONCLUSION
At present there are five States heavily armed with 
nuclear weapons, including the two Superpowers which are 
at the start of a further spiral in the nuclear arms 
race. Detonation of those weapons could exterminate 
humankind. A survey of NAC negotiations si-nce World War 
II, reveals that the overall situation today is the 
outcome of many lost opportunities by the international 
community to outlaw nuclear weapons.
However, in the course of concluding various 
agreements to partially control the spread and use of 
nuclear weapons, a vast reservoir of experience has been 
gained and efficient administrative machinery has been 
established. As a result, the nations of the world have 
acquired a much greater capacity than hitherto to 
accomplish NAC tasks, although the immense quantitative 
and qualitative increase in nuclear arsenals has made the 
undertaking more formidable.
In the early post-war period, when it would have been 
physically possible to do so, the opportunity to 
forestall the nuclear arms race was not grasped. It 
would seem that this was at least partly due to 
misconceptions about the limits of acceptable 
encroachment on national sovereignty, and an inability to 
devise NAC measures consistent with those limits.
Despite the growing nuclear menace during the 1960s 
and 1970s, or perhaps because of it, many multilateral
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and bilateral NAC agreements were concluded during that 
period. While some of those agreements are only of 
marginal relevance, a number are of fundamental 
importance in the avoidance of nuclear war, both in the 
short term and by inhibiting the nuclear arms race in the 
longer term. Apart from a few ambiguities concerning 
interpretation, all of the NAC agreements in the form of 
treaties have been satisfactorily observed by all 
parties. When assessing the possibility of successful 
application of international law to NAC, the significance 
of this factor cannot be overemphasized.
There is ample evidence that during the 1980s, the 
problems associated with NAC are going to be of a 
different order than they were previously, due to vast 
technological advances taking place. Developments are 
constantly made by improving and diversifying the 
performance of nuclear weapons, and by introducing 
perfected delivery and targeting mechanisms for their 
projection. Simultaneously, defensive systems are 
planned in attempts to counteract the improved weapons, 
such as anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite 
weapons. When statesmen are unclear about the military 
utility of these weapons, it is doubly difficult to 
determine what agreed restraints in their manufacture and 
deployment may be consistent with national objectives.
Complexities arising from the uncertain nature of 
benefits to be derived from nuclear-weapons systems, as 
well as the technical expertise required to devise 
methods for their limitation, are exacerbated by the
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importance attached to the perception of power which 
nuclear weapons are said to impart. Hence, the currently 
proposed NAC agreements are seen not merely as mutual 
restraints on weapons, but as offsetting one perception 
against another. In this morass of complexity, the clear 
aims for NAC remain the avoidance of nuclear war, the 
prevention of nuclear blackmail, and minimising the human 
and material resources devoted to the nuclear arms 
industry.
While nuclear war has been avoided so far, and 
progress has been made in the attainment of the other 
major NAC objectives, the momentum of progress in NAC is 
not sufficient to keep ahead of regression occasioned by 
the increased number of nuclear weapons and the technical 
improvements in their performance. In particular, 
reluctance to conclude a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 
can be read as a signal of impending failure of the NAC 
process.
It has been universally accepted that NAC can best be 
achieved by the conclusion of appropriate treaties 
recognised by international law. The methods for doing 
this, established over the years and perfected in 1978 
during the course of SSD I are, broadly speaking, 
adequate for the task. Only relatively simple 
organisational improvements in the treaty-creating 
process for NAC are required, chiefly in the sphere of 
greater backup and administrative facilities, both at the 
United Nations and within Member States. Endowed with 
resources more commensurate to the task, the Committee on
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Disarmament could successfully grapple with crucial 
issues, instead of habitually evading them. Many of 
these issues have a legal character, requiring greater 
input by officials versed in the ways of international 
law.
Similarly, norm creation for NAC in the deliberative 
bodies of the United Nations charged with that 
responsibility, being the Disarmament Commission, the 
First Committee, and the General Assembly, is not 
hampered by any significant methodological problem. In 
particular, it was demonstrated in the General Assembly 
during SSD I, that a heavy volume of exceedingly 
controversial material relating to NAC and other arms 
control issues could be processed at some speed, leading 
to consensus on many substantive matters.
Notwithstanding the relatively satisfactory machinery 
available, the NAC process is often thwarted by a 
pervading scepticism regarding the significance of NAC 
related norms, including those created by treaty as well 
as those resulting from United Nations deliberations.
The reason could be that, although the importance of the 
so called generally accepted principles of international 
law applicable to NAC are often alluded to in United 
Nations debates and resolutions, it is well known that 
those principles and rules are vague, contradictory and 
anachronistic. Likewise, procedures for the settlement 
of disputes concerning NAC and other matters crucial to 
the security interests of States, are unsatisfactory.
The above considerations greatly reduce the significance
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attached to the conclusion of the relevant treaties and 
the endorsement of United Nations resolutions.
Especially inappropriate for contemporary 
requirements are the imprecise tenets of international 
customary law, and the consequently wide personal 
discretion that must fall to judges of the International 
Court of Justice, or to any other adjudicators who may be 
called upon to apply that body of law. As a result, very 
few cases are referred to the Court. On the one occasion 
when an NAC case was brought to the International Court 
of Justice, the majority of judges avoided handing down 
an Opinion on the merits because they evidently deemed 
that it would be unacceptable to the international 
community for them to do so.
The deficiencies of the Court, and the law it is 
presently required to administer, have not been 
sufficiently compensated for by other organs of the 
United Nations system, notably the Security Council and 
the General Assembly. This hiatus has a directly 
inhibiting effect on the NAC process. It also gravely 
hinders the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
on a wide range of subjects involving the security 
interests of States - a situation that encourages resort 
to armed might, both for the maintenance of security and 
for gaining advantages.
No simple procedure is available for solving the 
abovementioned difficulties. Constant repetition of 
stereotyped phrases in resolutions on the need for the
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peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether in 
the form of Declarations or Conventions, appears to have 
little impact. It is opportune, therefore, to re-examine 
the general principles of international law, with a view 
to creating a fundamental change in outlook consonant 
with contemporary requirements. Several initiatives are 
under examination in this regard. The proposed draft 
Code of General Principles of International Law, 
elaborated in Chapter VII, is an additional attempt to 
aid those endeavours.
The nuclear arms race has a horizontal and a vertical 
dimension. A propensity to the horizontal spread of 
weapons, involving more and more States, is related to 
the impetus for vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons 
by the nuclear-weapon States, especially the Superpowers. 
It will require increasingly stronger anti-proliferation 
commitment, and the further improvement of the IAEA 
safeguards system, to counteract proliferation tendencies 
generated by the availability in additional countries of 
the requisite technology for the construction and 
delivery of nuclear weapons. An increase in the number 
of nuclear-weapon States would put immense strains on the 
international legal system. There are no sound reasons 
to suggest that restraint on the use of the weapons would 
be easier to enforce than the prevention of their 
acquisition.
The most serious impediment to the prevention of 
horizontal proliferation, as well as the greatest danger 
of nuclear devastation, are occasioned by the
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continuation of vertical proliferation and the consequent 
growing instability of the strategic nuclear balance.
The resolution of conflict between the Superpowers is not 
amenable to traditional remedies - either by 
confrontation or by third party adjudication. Even 
international opinion can play only a minor part.
An unprecedented relationship that exists between the 
Supe rpowe r s, founded on their vast nuclear arsenals aimed 
at each other, has been managed during the past decade by 
the application of a quasi-judicial process. That 
process consists of the elaboration of NAC treaties on 
the basis of agreed general principles of justice and 
practicality, together with the auto-interpretation of 
the treaties and auto-adjudication of the required 
standards of performance. The continuing effective 
implementation of these uniquely difficult tasks is bound 
to be rendered impossible if extraneous considerations 
are permitted to intrude.
Rapid conclusion and strict observance of treaties to 
neutralise areas of most acute and imminent conflict are 
needed for minimising the immediate dangers occasioned by 
the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. At the same time, 
far-sighted innovations must be made for the long term 
management of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to 
their eventual elimination.
Presumably, if extraneous conflicts were to become 
uncontainable for example leading to the threatened 
disintegration of one of the Superpowers due to
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apprehension of physical assault with non-nuclear 
weapons, or occasioned by economic chaos or social 
upheaval, then those extraneous considerations could not 
be divorced from the process of NAC. However, any step 
leading to interference with the bilateral NAC process 
would have to be taken on the understanding that it would 
almost certainly be the prelude to universal disaster.
Nevertheless, if a determined effort were made to 
keep the process of NAC isolated from other conflict 
areas, and if those extraneous antagonisms could be 
contained within supportable limits, the groundwork has 
been laid which could facilitate the rapid expansion of 
the principles and rules of international law so as to 
make NAC effective in the foreseeable future.
ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS AND SPECIALIST TERMS
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ABM* - Anti-Ballistic Missile
ARMS CONTROL - Any measure limiting or reducing forces, 
regulating armaments, and/or restricting 
the deployment of troops or weapons which 
is intended to induce responsive 
behaviour or which is taken pursuant to 
an understanding with another State or 
States.
ASAT - Anti-Satellite (weapon)
ASBM* - Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile
ATOM BOMB - A bomb whose energy comes from the 
fission of heavy elements, such as 
uranium or plutonium.
BMD - Ballistic Missile Defence
BREEDER - A nuclear reactor that produces more 
fissile nuclei than it consumes. The 
fissile nuclei are produced by the 
capture of neutrons in fertile material. 
The resource constraint for breeder 
reactors is thus fertile material, which 
is far more abundant in nature than 
fissile material.
C3 - Command, Control and Communications
CCD - Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament
CD - Committee on Disarmament
CM* - Cruise Missile
CTB - Comprehensive Test-Ban
DEW - Directed Energy Weapon
* Used for singular and plural
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DISARMAMENT
ENDC
ENRICHED
MATERIAL
ER
FISSION
FROD*
FUEL CYCLE
FULL SCOPE 
SAFEGUARDS
FUSION
- The reduction of a military establishment 
to some level set by international 
agreement.
- Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
- Material in which the percentage of a 
given isotope present in a material has 
been artificially increased, so that it is 
higher than the percentage of that isotope 
naturally found in the material. Enriched 
uranium contains more of the fissionable 
isotope uranium-235 than the naturally 
occuring percentage (0.7 percent).
- Enhanced Radiation (Weapon), also known as 
the Neutron Bomb
- The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two 
approximately equal parts (which are nuclei 
of lighter elements), accompanied by the 
release of a relatively large amount of 
energy and generally one or more neutrons. 
Fission can occur spontaneously, but usually 
is caused by nuclear obsorption of neutrons 
or other particles.
- Functionally Related Observable Difference
- The set of chemical and physical operations 
needed to prepare nuclear material for use 
in reactors and to dispose of or recycle the 
material after its removal from the reactor. 
Existing fuel cycles begin with uranium as 
the natural resource and create plutonium as 
a byproduct. Some future fuel cycles may 
rely on thorium and produce the fissile 
isotope uranium-233.
- IAEA supervision of all nuclear facilities 
in a State to ensure that fissionable 
material is not utilised for weapons 
manufacture
- The formation of a heavier nucleus from two 
lighter ones (such as hydrogen isotopes) , 
with the attendant release of energy 
(as in a hydrogen bomb).
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G A T T - G e n e r a l  A g r e e m e n t  on T a r r i f f s  and T ra d e
G R E Y  A R E A  
W E A P O N S
- M e d i u m - R a n g e  N u c l e a r  M i s s i l e s  s t a t i o n e d  
w i t h i n  r a n g e  of a S u p e r p o w e r  in a m a n n e r  
t ha t  c o u l d  a f f e c t  the s t r a t e g i c  b a l a n c e .
G R O U P  OF 21 - A c a u c u s  of N o n - a l i g n e d  S t a t e s  in the CD 
of v a r y i n g  m e m b e r s h i p ,  w i t h  a m a j o r i t y  of 
m e m b e r s  a l s o  b e l o n g i n g  to the G r o u p  of 
77.
G R O U P  OF 77 - A c a u c u s  of m o r e  t han  a h u n d r e d  d e v e l o p i n g  
n a t i o n s  in the UN w i t h  a v a r y i n g  
m e m b e r s h i p ,  l a r g e l y  o v e r l a p p i n g  w i t h  the 
G r o u p  of 21.
H E L - H i g h  E n e r g y  L as er
H Y D R O G E N
B O M B
- A n u c l e a r  w e a p o n  t ha t  d e r i v e s  its e n e r g y  
l a r g e l y  f r o m  f u s i o n  ( t h e r m o n u c l e a r  b o m b ) .
IA EA - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A t o m i c  E n e r g y  A g e n c y
IC A O - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C i v i l  A v i a t i o n  O r g a n i s a t i o n
ICBM * - I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e
ILO - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a b o u r  O r g a n i s a t i o n
IMF - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M o n e t a r y  F und
INFO  IRC - I n f o r m a t i o n  C i r c u l a r  of the IAEA
I SM A - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S a t e l l i t e  M o n i t o r i n g  A g e n c y
M A R V * - M a n o e u v r i n g  R e - e n t r y  V e h i c l e
M I R V * - M u l t i p l e  I n d e p e n d e n t l y  T a r g e t a b l e  R e - e n t r y  
V e h i c l e
N AC - N u c l e a r  A r m s  C o n t r o l
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NTM
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
NWMD
ODF*
OPANAL
PBW
REPROCESSING
R & D 
SALT 
SCC 
SIPRI
SLBM*
SSAC 
SSD I
SSD II
THRESHOLD
STATE
National Technical Means (of 
verification)
A collective term for atomic bombs and 
hydrogen bombs. Any weapon based on a 
nuclear explosive.
New Weapons of Mass Destruction
Observable Design Feature
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America
Particle Beam Weapon
Chemical treatment of spent reactor fuel 
to separate the plutonium and uranium.
Research and Development
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Talks)
Standing Consultative Commission
Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute
Sea Launched Ballistic Missile
State System of Accountancy
First Special Session of the General 
Assembly devoted to Disarmament
- Second Special Session of the General 
Assembly devoted to Disarmament
- (Also known as Nth Country) -
A nation judged to have high potential of 
becoming a nuclear-weapon State because 
of its technical and economic ability 
and/or its political motivations.
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